Files
seaweedFS/weed/s3api/auth_credentials.go
Chris Lu ee3813787e feat(s3api): Implement S3 Policy Variables (#8039)
* feat: Add AWS IAM Policy Variables support to S3 API

Implements policy variables for dynamic access control in bucket policies.

Supported variables:
- aws:username - Extracted from principal ARN
- aws:userid - User identifier (same as username in SeaweedFS)
- aws:principaltype - IAMUser, IAMRole, or AssumedRole
- jwt:* - Any JWT claim (e.g., jwt:preferred_username, jwt:sub)

Key changes:
- Added PolicyVariableRegex to detect ${...} patterns
- Extended CompiledStatement with DynamicResourcePatterns, DynamicPrincipalPatterns, DynamicActionPatterns
- Added Claims field to PolicyEvaluationArgs for JWT claim access
- Implemented SubstituteVariables() for variable replacement from context and JWT claims
- Implemented extractPrincipalVariables() for ARN parsing
- Updated EvaluateConditions() to support variable substitution
- Comprehensive unit and integration tests

Resolves #8037

* feat: Add LDAP and PrincipalAccount variable support

Completes future enhancements for policy variables:

- Added ldap:* variable support for LDAP claims
  - ldap:username - LDAP username from claims
  - ldap:dn - LDAP distinguished name from claims
  - ldap:* - Any LDAP claim

- Added aws:PrincipalAccount extraction from ARN
  - Extracts account ID from principal ARN
  - Available as ${aws:PrincipalAccount} in policies

Updated SubstituteVariables() to check LDAP claims
Updated extractPrincipalVariables() to extract account ID
Added comprehensive tests for new variables

* feat(s3api): implement IAM policy variables core logic and optimization

* feat(s3api): integrate policy variables with S3 authentication and handlers

* test(s3api): add integration tests for policy variables

* cleanup: remove unused policy conversion files

* Add S3 policy variables integration tests and path support

- Add comprehensive integration tests for policy variables
- Test username isolation, JWT claims, LDAP claims
- Add support for IAM paths in principal ARN parsing
- Add tests for principals with paths

* Fix IAM Role principal variable extraction

IAM Roles should not have aws:userid or aws:PrincipalAccount
according to AWS behavior. Only IAM Users and Assumed Roles
should have these variables.

Fixes TestExtractPrincipalVariables test failures.

* Security fixes and bug fixes for S3 policy variables

SECURITY FIXES:
- Prevent X-SeaweedFS-Principal header spoofing by clearing internal
  headers at start of authentication (auth_credentials.go)
- Restrict policy variable substitution to safe allowlist to prevent
  client header injection (iam/policy/policy_engine.go)
- Add core policy validation before storing bucket policies

BUG FIXES:
- Remove unused sid variable in evaluateStatement
- Fix LDAP claim lookup to check both prefixed and unprefixed keys
- Add ValidatePolicy call in PutBucketPolicyHandler

These fixes prevent privilege escalation via header injection and
ensure only validated identity claims are used in policy evaluation.

* Additional security fixes and code cleanup

SECURITY FIXES:
- Fixed X-Forwarded-For spoofing by only trusting proxy headers from
  private/localhost IPs (s3_iam_middleware.go)
- Changed context key from "sourceIP" to "aws:SourceIp" for proper
  policy variable substitution

CODE IMPROVEMENTS:
- Kept aws:PrincipalAccount for IAM Roles to support condition evaluations
- Removed redundant STS principaltype override
- Removed unused service variable
- Cleaned up commented-out debug logging statements
- Updated tests to reflect new IAM Role behavior

These changes prevent IP spoofing attacks and ensure policy variables
work correctly with the safe allowlist.

* Add security documentation for ParseJWTToken

Added comprehensive security comments explaining that ParseJWTToken
is safe despite parsing without verification because:
- It's only used for routing to the correct verification method
- All code paths perform cryptographic verification before trusting claims
- OIDC tokens: validated via validateExternalOIDCToken
- STS tokens: validated via ValidateSessionToken

Enhanced function documentation with clear security warnings about
proper usage to prevent future misuse.

* Fix IP condition evaluation to use aws:SourceIp key

Fixed evaluateIPCondition in IAM policy engine to use "aws:SourceIp"
instead of "sourceIP" to match the updated extractRequestContext.

This fixes the failing IP-restricted role test where IP-based policy
conditions were not being evaluated correctly.

Updated all test cases to use the correct "aws:SourceIp" key.

* Address code review feedback: optimize and clarify

PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT:
- Optimized expandPolicyVariables to use regexp.ReplaceAllStringFunc
  for single-pass variable substitution instead of iterating through
  all safe variables. This improves performance from O(n*m) to O(m)
  where n is the number of safe variables and m is the pattern length.

CODE CLARITY:
- Added detailed comment explaining LDAP claim fallback mechanism
  (checks both prefixed and unprefixed keys for compatibility)
- Enhanced TODO comment for trusted proxy configuration with rationale
  and recommendations for supporting cloud load balancers, CDNs, and
  complex network topologies

All tests passing.

* Address Copilot code review feedback

BUG FIXES:
- Fixed type switch for int/int32/int64 - separated into individual cases
  since interface type switches only match the first type in multi-type cases
- Fixed grammatically incorrect error message in types.go

CODE QUALITY:
- Removed duplicate Resource/NotResource validation (already in ValidateStatement)
- Added comprehensive comment explaining isEnabled() logic and security implications
- Improved trusted proxy NOTE comment to be more concise while noting limitations

All tests passing.

* Fix test failures after extractSourceIP security changes

Updated tests to work with the security fix that only trusts
X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-IP headers from private IP addresses:

- Set RemoteAddr to 127.0.0.1 in tests to simulate trusted proxy
- Changed context key from "sourceIP" to "aws:SourceIp"
- Added test case for untrusted proxy (public RemoteAddr)
- Removed invalid ValidateStatement call (validation happens in ValidatePolicy)

All tests now passing.

* Address remaining Gemini code review feedback

CODE SAFETY:
- Deep clone Action field in CompileStatement to prevent potential data races
  if the original policy document is modified after compilation

TEST CLEANUP:
- Remove debug logging (fmt.Fprintf) from engine_notresource_test.go
- Remove unused imports in engine_notresource_test.go

All tests passing.

* Fix insecure JWT parsing in IAM auth flow

SECURITY FIX:
- Renamed ParseJWTToken to ParseUnverifiedJWTToken with explicit security warnings.
- Refactored AuthenticateJWT to use the trusted SessionInfo returned by ValidateSessionToken
  instead of relying on unverified claims from the initial parse.
- Refactored ValidatePresignedURLWithIAM to reuse the robust AuthenticateJWT logic, removing
  duplicated and insecure manual token parsing.

This ensures all identity information (Role, Principal, Subject) used for authorization
decisions is derived solely from cryptographically verified tokens.

* Security: Fix insecure JWT claim extraction in policy engine

- Refactored EvaluatePolicy to accept trusted claims from verified Identity instead of parsing unverified tokens
- Updated AuthenticateJWT to populate Claims in IAMIdentity from verified sources (SessionInfo/ExternalIdentity)
- Updated s3api_server and handlers to pass claims correctly
- Improved isPrivateIP to support IPv6 loopback, link-local, and ULA
- Fixed flaky distributed_session_consistency test with retry logic

* fix(iam): populate Subject in STSSessionInfo to ensure correct identity propagation

This fixes the TestS3IAMAuthentication/valid_jwt_token_authentication failure by ensuring the session subject (sub) is correctly mapped to the internal SessionInfo struct, allowing bucket ownership validation to succeed.

* Optimized isPrivateIP

* Create s3-policy-tests.yml

* fix tests

* fix tests

* tests(s3/iam): simplify policy to resource-based \ (step 1)

* tests(s3/iam): add explicit Deny NotResource for isolation (step 2)

* fixes

* policy: skip resource matching for STS trust policies to allow AssumeRole evaluation

* refactor: remove debug logging and hoist policy variables for performance

* test: fix TestS3IAMBucketPolicyIntegration cleanup to handle per-subtest object lifecycle

* test: fix bucket name generation to comply with S3 63-char limit

* test: skip TestS3IAMPolicyEnforcement until role setup is implemented

* test: use weed mini for simpler test server deployment

Replace 'weed server' with 'weed mini' for IAM tests to avoid port binding issues
and simplify the all-in-one server deployment. This improves test reliability
and execution time.

* security: prevent allocation overflow in policy evaluation

Add maxPoliciesForEvaluation constant to cap the number of policies evaluated
in a single request. This prevents potential integer overflow when allocating
slices for policy lists that may be influenced by untrusted input.

Changes:
- Add const maxPoliciesForEvaluation = 1024 to set an upper bound
- Validate len(policies) < maxPoliciesForEvaluation before appending bucket policy
- Use append() instead of make([]string, len+1) to avoid arithmetic overflow
- Apply fix to both IsActionAllowed policy evaluation paths
2026-01-16 11:12:28 -08:00

1436 lines
49 KiB
Go

package s3api
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"os"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/credential"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/filer"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/filer_pb"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/iam_pb"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
// Import KMS providers to register them
_ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/aws"
// _ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/azure" // TODO: Fix Azure SDK compatibility issues
_ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/gcp"
_ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/local"
_ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/openbao"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
)
type Action string
type Iam interface {
Check(f http.HandlerFunc, actions ...Action) http.HandlerFunc
}
type IdentityAccessManagement struct {
m sync.RWMutex
identities []*Identity
accessKeyIdent map[string]*Identity
nameToIdentity map[string]*Identity // O(1) lookup by identity name
accounts map[string]*Account
emailAccount map[string]*Account
hashes map[string]*sync.Pool
hashCounters map[string]*int32
identityAnonymous *Identity
hashMu sync.RWMutex
domain string
isAuthEnabled bool
credentialManager *credential.CredentialManager
filerClient filer_pb.SeaweedFilerClient
grpcDialOption grpc.DialOption
// IAM Integration for advanced features
iamIntegration IAMIntegration
// Bucket policy engine for evaluating bucket policies
policyEngine *BucketPolicyEngine
// useStaticConfig indicates if the configuration was loaded from a static file
useStaticConfig bool
// staticIdentityNames tracks identity names loaded from the static config file
// These identities are immutable and cannot be updated by dynamic configuration
staticIdentityNames map[string]bool
}
type Identity struct {
Name string
Account *Account
Credentials []*Credential
Actions []Action
PolicyNames []string // Attached IAM policy names
PrincipalArn string // ARN for IAM authorization (e.g., "arn:aws:iam::account-id:user/username")
Disabled bool // User status: false = enabled (default), true = disabled
Claims map[string]interface{} // JWT claims for policy substitution
}
// Account represents a system user, a system user can
// configure multiple IAM-Users, IAM-Users can configure
// permissions respectively, and each IAM-User can
// configure multiple security credentials
type Account struct {
//Name is also used to display the "DisplayName" as the owner of the bucket or object
DisplayName string
EmailAddress string
//Id is used to identify an Account when granting cross-account access(ACLs) to buckets and objects
Id string
}
// Predefined Accounts
var (
// AccountAdmin is used as the default account for IAM-Credentials access without Account configured
AccountAdmin = Account{
DisplayName: "admin",
EmailAddress: "admin@example.com",
Id: s3_constants.AccountAdminId,
}
// AccountAnonymous is used to represent the account for anonymous access
AccountAnonymous = Account{
DisplayName: "anonymous",
EmailAddress: "anonymous@example.com",
Id: s3_constants.AccountAnonymousId,
}
)
type Credential struct {
AccessKey string
SecretKey string
Status string // Access key status: "Active" or "Inactive" (empty treated as "Active")
Expiration int64 // Unix timestamp when credential expires (0 = no expiration)
}
// isCredentialExpired checks if a credential has expired
func (c *Credential) isCredentialExpired() bool {
return c.Expiration > 0 && c.Expiration < time.Now().Unix()
}
func NewIdentityAccessManagement(option *S3ApiServerOption) *IdentityAccessManagement {
return NewIdentityAccessManagementWithStore(option, "")
}
func NewIdentityAccessManagementWithStore(option *S3ApiServerOption, explicitStore string) *IdentityAccessManagement {
iam := &IdentityAccessManagement{
domain: option.DomainName,
hashes: make(map[string]*sync.Pool),
hashCounters: make(map[string]*int32),
}
// Always initialize credential manager with fallback to defaults
credentialManager, err := credential.NewCredentialManagerWithDefaults(credential.CredentialStoreTypeName(explicitStore))
if err != nil {
glog.Fatalf("failed to initialize credential manager: %v", err)
}
// For stores that need filer client details, set them temporarily
// This will be updated to use FilerClient's GetCurrentFiler after FilerClient is created
if store := credentialManager.GetStore(); store != nil {
if filerFuncSetter, ok := store.(interface {
SetFilerAddressFunc(func() pb.ServerAddress, grpc.DialOption)
}); ok {
// Temporary setup: use first filer until FilerClient is available
// See s3api_server.go where this is updated to FilerClient.GetCurrentFiler
if len(option.Filers) > 0 {
getFiler := func() pb.ServerAddress {
if len(option.Filers) > 0 {
return option.Filers[0]
}
return ""
}
filerFuncSetter.SetFilerAddressFunc(getFiler, option.GrpcDialOption)
glog.V(1).Infof("Credential store configured with temporary filer function (will be updated after FilerClient creation)")
}
}
}
iam.credentialManager = credentialManager
// First, try to load configurations from file or filer
// First, try to load configurations from file or filer
startConfigFile := option.Config
if startConfigFile == "" {
startConfigFile = option.IamConfig
}
if startConfigFile != "" {
glog.V(3).Infof("loading static config file %s", startConfigFile)
if err := iam.loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFile(startConfigFile); err != nil {
glog.Fatalf("fail to load config file %s: %v", startConfigFile, err)
}
// Track identity names from static config to protect them from dynamic updates
// Must be done under lock to avoid race conditions
iam.m.Lock()
iam.useStaticConfig = true
iam.staticIdentityNames = make(map[string]bool)
for _, identity := range iam.identities {
iam.staticIdentityNames[identity.Name] = true
}
iam.m.Unlock()
}
// Always try to load/merge config from credential manager (filer)
// This ensures we get both static users (from file) and dynamic users (from filer)
glog.V(3).Infof("loading dynamic config from credential manager")
if err := iam.loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFiler(option); err != nil {
glog.Warningf("fail to load config: %v", err)
}
// Only consider config loaded if we actually have identities
// Don't block environment variable fallback just because filer call succeeded
// iam.m.RLock()
// configLoaded = len(iam.identities) > 0
// iam.m.RUnlock()
// Check for AWS environment variables and merge them if present
// This serves as an in-memory "static" configuration
accessKeyId := os.Getenv("AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID")
secretAccessKey := os.Getenv("AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY")
if accessKeyId != "" && secretAccessKey != "" {
// Create environment variable identity name
identityNameSuffix := accessKeyId
if len(accessKeyId) > 8 {
identityNameSuffix = accessKeyId[:8]
}
identityName := "admin-" + identityNameSuffix
// Create admin identity with environment variable credentials
envIdentity := &Identity{
Name: identityName,
Account: &AccountAdmin,
Credentials: []*Credential{
{
AccessKey: accessKeyId,
SecretKey: secretAccessKey,
},
},
Actions: []Action{
s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN,
},
}
iam.m.Lock()
// Initialize maps if they are nil (if no config loaded yet)
if iam.staticIdentityNames == nil {
iam.staticIdentityNames = make(map[string]bool)
}
// Check if identity already exists (avoid duplicates)
exists := false
for _, ident := range iam.identities {
if ident.Name == identityName {
exists = true
break
}
}
if !exists {
glog.V(1).Infof("Added admin identity from AWS environment variables: %s", envIdentity.Name)
// Add to identities list
iam.identities = append(iam.identities, envIdentity)
// Update credential mappings
if iam.accessKeyIdent == nil {
iam.accessKeyIdent = make(map[string]*Identity)
}
iam.accessKeyIdent[accessKeyId] = envIdentity
if iam.nameToIdentity == nil {
iam.nameToIdentity = make(map[string]*Identity)
}
iam.nameToIdentity[envIdentity.Name] = envIdentity
// Treat env var identity as static (immutable)
iam.staticIdentityNames[envIdentity.Name] = true
// Ensure defaults exist if this is the first identity
if iam.accounts == nil {
iam.accounts = make(map[string]*Account)
iam.accounts[AccountAdmin.Id] = &AccountAdmin
iam.accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id] = &AccountAnonymous
}
if iam.emailAccount == nil {
iam.emailAccount = make(map[string]*Account)
iam.emailAccount[AccountAdmin.EmailAddress] = &AccountAdmin
iam.emailAccount[AccountAnonymous.EmailAddress] = &AccountAnonymous
}
}
iam.m.Unlock()
}
// Determine whether to enable S3 authentication based on configuration
// For "weed mini" without any S3 config, default to allowing all access (isAuthEnabled = false)
// If any credentials are configured (via file, filer, or env vars), enable authentication
iam.m.Lock()
iam.isAuthEnabled = len(iam.identities) > 0
iam.m.Unlock()
if iam.isAuthEnabled {
// Credentials were configured - enable authentication
glog.V(1).Infof("S3 authentication enabled (%d identities configured)", len(iam.identities))
} else {
// No credentials configured
if startConfigFile != "" {
// Config file was specified but contained no identities - this is unusual, log a warning
glog.Warningf("S3 config file %s specified but no identities loaded - authentication disabled", startConfigFile)
} else {
// No config file and no identities - this is the normal allow-all case
glog.V(1).Infof("S3 authentication disabled - no credentials configured (allowing all access)")
}
}
return iam
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFiler(option *S3ApiServerOption) error {
return iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager()
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFile(fileName string) error {
content, readErr := os.ReadFile(fileName)
if readErr != nil {
glog.Warningf("fail to read %s : %v", fileName, readErr)
return fmt.Errorf("fail to read %s : %v", fileName, readErr)
}
// Initialize KMS if configuration contains KMS settings
if err := iam.initializeKMSFromConfig(content); err != nil {
glog.Warningf("KMS initialization failed: %v", err)
}
return iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromBytes(content)
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromBytes(content []byte) error {
s3ApiConfiguration := &iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration{}
if err := filer.ParseS3ConfigurationFromBytes(content, s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
glog.Warningf("unmarshal error: %v", err)
return fmt.Errorf("unmarshal error: %w", err)
}
if err := filer.CheckDuplicateAccessKey(s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := iam.loadS3ApiConfiguration(s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) loadS3ApiConfiguration(config *iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration) error {
// Check if we need to merge with existing static configuration
iam.m.RLock()
hasStaticConfig := iam.useStaticConfig && len(iam.staticIdentityNames) > 0
iam.m.RUnlock()
if hasStaticConfig {
// Merge mode: preserve static identities, add/update dynamic ones
return iam.mergeS3ApiConfiguration(config)
}
// Normal mode: completely replace configuration
return iam.replaceS3ApiConfiguration(config)
}
// replaceS3ApiConfiguration completely replaces the current configuration (used when no static config)
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) replaceS3ApiConfiguration(config *iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration) error {
var identities []*Identity
var identityAnonymous *Identity
accessKeyIdent := make(map[string]*Identity)
nameToIdentity := make(map[string]*Identity)
accounts := make(map[string]*Account)
emailAccount := make(map[string]*Account)
foundAccountAdmin := false
foundAccountAnonymous := false
for _, account := range config.Accounts {
glog.V(3).Infof("loading account name=%s, id=%s", account.DisplayName, account.Id)
accounts[account.Id] = &Account{
Id: account.Id,
DisplayName: account.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: account.EmailAddress,
}
switch account.Id {
case AccountAdmin.Id:
foundAccountAdmin = true
case AccountAnonymous.Id:
foundAccountAnonymous = true
}
if account.EmailAddress != "" {
emailAccount[account.EmailAddress] = accounts[account.Id]
}
}
if !foundAccountAdmin {
accounts[AccountAdmin.Id] = &Account{
DisplayName: AccountAdmin.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: AccountAdmin.EmailAddress,
Id: AccountAdmin.Id,
}
emailAccount[AccountAdmin.EmailAddress] = accounts[AccountAdmin.Id]
}
if !foundAccountAnonymous {
accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id] = &Account{
DisplayName: AccountAnonymous.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: AccountAnonymous.EmailAddress,
Id: AccountAnonymous.Id,
}
emailAccount[AccountAnonymous.EmailAddress] = accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id]
}
for _, ident := range config.Identities {
glog.V(3).Infof("loading identity %s (disabled=%v)", ident.Name, ident.Disabled)
t := &Identity{
Name: ident.Name,
Credentials: nil,
Actions: nil,
PrincipalArn: generatePrincipalArn(ident.Name),
Disabled: ident.Disabled, // false (default) = enabled, true = disabled
PolicyNames: ident.PolicyNames,
}
switch {
case ident.Name == AccountAnonymous.Id:
t.Account = &AccountAnonymous
identityAnonymous = t
case ident.Account == nil:
t.Account = &AccountAdmin
default:
if account, ok := accounts[ident.Account.Id]; ok {
t.Account = account
} else {
t.Account = &AccountAdmin
glog.Warningf("identity %s is associated with a non exist account ID, the association is invalid", ident.Name)
}
}
for _, action := range ident.Actions {
t.Actions = append(t.Actions, Action(action))
}
for _, cred := range ident.Credentials {
t.Credentials = append(t.Credentials, &Credential{
AccessKey: cred.AccessKey,
SecretKey: cred.SecretKey,
Status: cred.Status, // Load access key status
})
accessKeyIdent[cred.AccessKey] = t
}
identities = append(identities, t)
nameToIdentity[t.Name] = t
}
// Load service accounts and add their credentials to the parent identity
for _, sa := range config.ServiceAccounts {
if sa.Credential == nil {
continue
}
// Skip disabled service accounts - they should not be able to authenticate
if sa.Disabled {
glog.V(3).Infof("Skipping disabled service account %s", sa.Id)
continue
}
// Find the parent identity
parentIdent, ok := nameToIdentity[sa.ParentUser]
if !ok {
glog.Warningf("Service account %s has non-existent parent user %s, skipping", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser)
continue
}
// Add service account credential to parent identity with expiration
cred := &Credential{
AccessKey: sa.Credential.AccessKey,
SecretKey: sa.Credential.SecretKey,
Status: sa.Credential.Status,
Expiration: sa.Expiration, // Populate expiration from service account
}
parentIdent.Credentials = append(parentIdent.Credentials, cred)
accessKeyIdent[sa.Credential.AccessKey] = parentIdent
glog.V(3).Infof("Loaded service account %s for parent %s (expiration: %d)", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser, sa.Expiration)
}
iam.m.Lock()
// atomically switch
iam.identities = identities
iam.identityAnonymous = identityAnonymous
iam.accounts = accounts
iam.emailAccount = emailAccount
iam.accessKeyIdent = accessKeyIdent
iam.nameToIdentity = nameToIdentity
// Update authentication state based on whether identities exist
// Once enabled, keep it enabled (one-way toggle)
authJustEnabled := iam.updateAuthenticationState(len(identities))
iam.m.Unlock()
if authJustEnabled {
glog.V(1).Infof("S3 authentication enabled - credentials were added dynamically")
}
// Log configuration summary
glog.V(1).Infof("Loaded %d identities, %d accounts, %d access keys. Auth enabled: %v",
len(identities), len(accounts), len(accessKeyIdent), iam.isAuthEnabled)
if glog.V(2) {
glog.V(2).Infof("Access key to identity mapping:")
for accessKey, identity := range accessKeyIdent {
glog.V(2).Infof(" %s -> %s (actions: %d)", accessKey, identity.Name, len(identity.Actions))
}
}
return nil
}
// mergeS3ApiConfiguration merges dynamic configuration with existing static configuration
// Static identities (from file) are preserved and cannot be updated
// Dynamic identities (from filer/admin) can be added or updated
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) mergeS3ApiConfiguration(config *iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration) error {
// Start with current configuration (which includes static identities)
iam.m.RLock()
identities := make([]*Identity, len(iam.identities))
copy(identities, iam.identities)
identityAnonymous := iam.identityAnonymous
accessKeyIdent := make(map[string]*Identity)
for k, v := range iam.accessKeyIdent {
accessKeyIdent[k] = v
}
nameToIdentity := make(map[string]*Identity)
for k, v := range iam.nameToIdentity {
nameToIdentity[k] = v
}
accounts := make(map[string]*Account)
for k, v := range iam.accounts {
accounts[k] = v
}
emailAccount := make(map[string]*Account)
for k, v := range iam.emailAccount {
emailAccount[k] = v
}
staticNames := make(map[string]bool)
for k, v := range iam.staticIdentityNames {
staticNames[k] = v
}
iam.m.RUnlock()
// Process accounts from dynamic config (can add new accounts)
for _, account := range config.Accounts {
if _, exists := accounts[account.Id]; !exists {
glog.V(3).Infof("adding dynamic account: name=%s, id=%s", account.DisplayName, account.Id)
accounts[account.Id] = &Account{
Id: account.Id,
DisplayName: account.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: account.EmailAddress,
}
if account.EmailAddress != "" {
emailAccount[account.EmailAddress] = accounts[account.Id]
}
}
}
// Ensure default accounts exist
if _, exists := accounts[AccountAdmin.Id]; !exists {
accounts[AccountAdmin.Id] = &Account{
DisplayName: AccountAdmin.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: AccountAdmin.EmailAddress,
Id: AccountAdmin.Id,
}
emailAccount[AccountAdmin.EmailAddress] = accounts[AccountAdmin.Id]
}
if _, exists := accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id]; !exists {
accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id] = &Account{
DisplayName: AccountAnonymous.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: AccountAnonymous.EmailAddress,
Id: AccountAnonymous.Id,
}
emailAccount[AccountAnonymous.EmailAddress] = accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id]
}
// Process identities from dynamic config
for _, ident := range config.Identities {
// Skip static identities - they cannot be updated
if staticNames[ident.Name] {
glog.V(3).Infof("skipping static identity %s (immutable)", ident.Name)
continue
}
glog.V(3).Infof("loading/updating dynamic identity %s (disabled=%v)", ident.Name, ident.Disabled)
t := &Identity{
Name: ident.Name,
Credentials: nil,
Actions: nil,
PrincipalArn: generatePrincipalArn(ident.Name),
Disabled: ident.Disabled,
PolicyNames: ident.PolicyNames,
}
switch {
case ident.Name == AccountAnonymous.Id:
t.Account = &AccountAnonymous
identityAnonymous = t
case ident.Account == nil:
t.Account = &AccountAdmin
default:
if account, ok := accounts[ident.Account.Id]; ok {
t.Account = account
} else {
t.Account = &AccountAdmin
glog.Warningf("identity %s is associated with a non exist account ID, the association is invalid", ident.Name)
}
}
for _, action := range ident.Actions {
t.Actions = append(t.Actions, Action(action))
}
for _, cred := range ident.Credentials {
t.Credentials = append(t.Credentials, &Credential{
AccessKey: cred.AccessKey,
SecretKey: cred.SecretKey,
Status: cred.Status,
})
accessKeyIdent[cred.AccessKey] = t
}
// Update or add the identity
existingIdx := -1
for i, existing := range identities {
if existing.Name == ident.Name {
existingIdx = i
break
}
}
if existingIdx >= 0 {
// Before replacing, remove stale accessKeyIdent entries for the old identity
oldIdentity := identities[existingIdx]
for _, oldCred := range oldIdentity.Credentials {
// Only remove if it still points to this identity
if accessKeyIdent[oldCred.AccessKey] == oldIdentity {
delete(accessKeyIdent, oldCred.AccessKey)
}
}
// Replace existing dynamic identity
identities[existingIdx] = t
} else {
// Add new dynamic identity
identities = append(identities, t)
}
nameToIdentity[t.Name] = t
}
// Process service accounts from dynamic config
for _, sa := range config.ServiceAccounts {
if sa.Credential == nil {
continue
}
// Skip disabled service accounts
if sa.Disabled {
glog.V(3).Infof("Skipping disabled service account %s", sa.Id)
continue
}
// Find the parent identity
parentIdent, ok := nameToIdentity[sa.ParentUser]
if !ok {
glog.Warningf("Service account %s has non-existent parent user %s, skipping", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser)
continue
}
// Skip if parent is a static identity (we don't modify static identities)
if staticNames[sa.ParentUser] {
glog.V(3).Infof("Skipping service account %s for static parent %s", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser)
continue
}
// Check if this access key already exists in parent's credentials to avoid duplicates
alreadyExists := false
for _, existingCred := range parentIdent.Credentials {
if existingCred.AccessKey == sa.Credential.AccessKey {
alreadyExists = true
break
}
}
if alreadyExists {
glog.V(3).Infof("Service account %s credential already exists for parent %s, skipping", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser)
// Ensure accessKeyIdent mapping is correct
accessKeyIdent[sa.Credential.AccessKey] = parentIdent
continue
}
// Add service account credential to parent identity
cred := &Credential{
AccessKey: sa.Credential.AccessKey,
SecretKey: sa.Credential.SecretKey,
Status: sa.Credential.Status,
Expiration: sa.Expiration,
}
parentIdent.Credentials = append(parentIdent.Credentials, cred)
accessKeyIdent[sa.Credential.AccessKey] = parentIdent
glog.V(3).Infof("Loaded service account %s for dynamic parent %s (expiration: %d)", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser, sa.Expiration)
}
iam.m.Lock()
// atomically switch
iam.identities = identities
iam.identityAnonymous = identityAnonymous
iam.accounts = accounts
iam.emailAccount = emailAccount
iam.accessKeyIdent = accessKeyIdent
iam.nameToIdentity = nameToIdentity
// Update authentication state based on whether identities exist
// Once enabled, keep it enabled (one-way toggle)
authJustEnabled := iam.updateAuthenticationState(len(identities))
iam.m.Unlock()
if authJustEnabled {
glog.V(1).Infof("S3 authentication enabled because credentials were added dynamically")
}
// Log configuration summary
staticCount := len(staticNames)
dynamicCount := len(identities) - staticCount
glog.V(1).Infof("Merged config: %d static + %d dynamic identities = %d total, %d accounts, %d access keys. Auth enabled: %v",
staticCount, dynamicCount, len(identities), len(accounts), len(accessKeyIdent), iam.isAuthEnabled)
if glog.V(2) {
glog.V(2).Infof("Access key to identity mapping:")
for accessKey, identity := range accessKeyIdent {
identityType := "dynamic"
if staticNames[identity.Name] {
identityType = "static"
}
glog.V(2).Infof(" %s -> %s (%s, actions: %d)", accessKey, identity.Name, identityType, len(identity.Actions))
}
}
return nil
}
// isEnabled reports whether S3 auth should be enforced for this server.
//
// Auth is considered enabled if either:
// - we have any locally managed identities/credentials (iam.isAuthEnabled), or
// - an external IAM integration has been configured (iam.iamIntegration != nil).
//
// The iamIntegration check is intentionally included so that when an external
// IAM provider is configured (and the server relies solely on it), auth is
// still treated as enabled even if there are no local identities yet or
// before any sync logic flips isAuthEnabled to true. Removing this check or
// relying only on isAuthEnabled would change when auth is enforced and could
// unintentionally allow unauthenticated access in integration-only setups.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) isEnabled() bool {
return iam.isAuthEnabled || iam.iamIntegration != nil
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) updateAuthenticationState(identitiesCount int) bool {
if !iam.isAuthEnabled && identitiesCount > 0 {
iam.isAuthEnabled = true
return true
}
return false
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) IsStaticConfig() bool {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
return iam.useStaticConfig
}
// IsStaticIdentity checks if an identity was loaded from the static config file
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) IsStaticIdentity(identityName string) bool {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
return iam.staticIdentityNames[identityName]
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) lookupByAccessKey(accessKey string) (identity *Identity, cred *Credential, found bool) {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
// Helper function to truncate access key for logging to avoid credential exposure
truncate := func(key string) string {
const mask = "***"
if len(key) > 4 {
return key[:4] + mask
}
// For very short keys, never log the full key
return mask
}
truncatedKey := truncate(accessKey)
glog.V(4).Infof("Looking up access key: %s (len=%d, total keys registered: %d)",
truncatedKey, len(accessKey), len(iam.accessKeyIdent))
if ident, ok := iam.accessKeyIdent[accessKey]; ok {
// Check if user is disabled
if ident.Disabled {
glog.V(2).Infof("User %s is disabled, rejecting access key %s", ident.Name, truncatedKey)
return nil, nil, false
}
for _, credential := range ident.Credentials {
if credential.AccessKey == accessKey {
// Check if access key is inactive (empty Status treated as Active for backward compatibility)
if credential.Status == iamAccessKeyStatusInactive {
glog.V(2).Infof("Access key %s for identity %s is inactive", truncatedKey, ident.Name)
return nil, nil, false
}
glog.V(4).Infof("Found access key %s for identity %s", truncatedKey, ident.Name)
return ident, credential, true
}
}
}
glog.V(2).Infof("Could not find access key %s (len=%d). Available keys: %d, Auth enabled: %v",
truncatedKey, len(accessKey), len(iam.accessKeyIdent), iam.isAuthEnabled)
// Log all registered access keys at higher verbosity for debugging
if glog.V(3) {
glog.V(3).Infof("Registered access keys:")
for key := range iam.accessKeyIdent {
glog.V(3).Infof(" - %s (len=%d)", truncate(key), len(key))
}
}
return nil, nil, false
}
// LookupByAccessKey is an exported wrapper for lookupByAccessKey.
// It returns the identity and credential associated with the given access key.
//
// WARNING: The returned pointers reference internal data structures.
// Callers MUST NOT modify the returned Identity or Credential objects.
// If mutation is needed, make a copy first.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) LookupByAccessKey(accessKey string) (identity *Identity, cred *Credential, found bool) {
return iam.lookupByAccessKey(accessKey)
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) lookupAnonymous() (identity *Identity, found bool) {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
if iam.identityAnonymous != nil {
return iam.identityAnonymous, true
}
return nil, false
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) lookupByIdentityName(name string) *Identity {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
return iam.nameToIdentity[name]
}
// generatePrincipalArn generates an ARN for a user identity
func generatePrincipalArn(identityName string) string {
// Handle special cases
switch identityName {
case AccountAnonymous.Id:
return "arn:aws:iam::user/anonymous"
case AccountAdmin.Id:
return "arn:aws:iam::user/admin"
default:
return fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:iam::user/%s", identityName)
}
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) GetAccountNameById(canonicalId string) string {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
if account, ok := iam.accounts[canonicalId]; ok {
return account.DisplayName
}
return ""
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) GetAccountIdByEmail(email string) string {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
if account, ok := iam.emailAccount[email]; ok {
return account.Id
}
return ""
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) Auth(f http.HandlerFunc, action Action) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !iam.isEnabled() {
f(w, r)
return
}
identity, errCode := iam.authRequest(r, action)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
glog.V(3).Infof("auth error: %v", errCode)
}
iam.handleAuthResult(w, r, identity, errCode, f)
}
}
// AuthPostPolicy is a specialized authentication wrapper for PostPolicy requests.
// It allows requests with multipart/form-data to proceed even if classified as Anonymous,
// because the actual authentication (signature verification) for ALL PostPolicy requests is
// performed unconditionally in PostPolicyBucketHandler.doesPolicySignatureMatch().
// This delegation only defers the initial authentication classification; it does NOT bypass
// signature verification, which is mandatory for all PostPolicy uploads.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) AuthPostPolicy(f http.HandlerFunc, action Action) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !iam.isEnabled() {
f(w, r)
return
}
// Optimization: Use authRequestWithAuthType to avoid re-parsing headers for classification
identity, errCode, authType := iam.authRequestWithAuthType(r, action)
// Special handling for PostPolicy: if AccessDenied (likely because Anonymous to private bucket)
// AND it looks like a PostPolicy request, allow it to proceed to handler for verification.
if errCode == s3err.ErrAccessDenied {
if authType == authTypeAnonymous &&
r.Method == http.MethodPost &&
strings.Contains(r.Header.Get("Content-Type"), "multipart/form-data") {
glog.V(3).Infof("Delegating PostPolicy auth to handler")
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "PostPolicy")
f(w, r)
return
}
}
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
glog.V(3).Infof("auth error: %v", errCode)
}
iam.handleAuthResult(w, r, identity, errCode, f)
}
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) handleAuthResult(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, identity *Identity, errCode s3err.ErrorCode, f http.HandlerFunc) {
if errCode == s3err.ErrNone {
// Store the authenticated identity in request context (secure, cannot be spoofed)
if identity != nil && identity.Name != "" {
ctx := s3_constants.SetIdentityNameInContext(r.Context(), identity.Name)
// Also store the full identity object for handlers that need it (e.g., ListBuckets)
// This is especially important for JWT users whose identity is not in the identities list
ctx = s3_constants.SetIdentityInContext(ctx, identity)
r = r.WithContext(ctx)
}
f(w, r)
return
}
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, errCode)
}
// Wrapper to maintain backward compatibility
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authRequest(r *http.Request, action Action) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
identity, err, _ := iam.authRequestWithAuthType(r, action)
return identity, err
}
// check whether the request has valid access keys
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authRequestWithAuthType(r *http.Request, action Action) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode, authType) {
var identity *Identity
var s3Err s3err.ErrorCode
var found bool
var amzAuthType string
// SECURITY: Prevent clients from spoofing internal IAM headers
// These headers are only set by the server after successful JWT authentication
// Clearing them here prevents privilege escalation via header injection
r.Header.Del("X-SeaweedFS-Principal")
r.Header.Del("X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token")
reqAuthType := getRequestAuthType(r)
switch reqAuthType {
case authTypeUnknown:
glog.V(4).Infof("unknown auth type")
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "Unknown")
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
case authTypePresignedV2, authTypeSignedV2:
glog.V(4).Infof("v2 auth type")
identity, s3Err = iam.isReqAuthenticatedV2(r)
amzAuthType = "SigV2"
case authTypeStreamingSigned, authTypeSigned, authTypePresigned:
glog.V(4).Infof("v4 auth type")
identity, s3Err = iam.reqSignatureV4Verify(r)
amzAuthType = "SigV4"
case authTypeStreamingUnsigned:
glog.V(4).Infof("unsigned streaming upload")
identity, s3Err = iam.reqSignatureV4Verify(r)
amzAuthType = "SigV4"
case authTypeJWT:
glog.V(4).Infof("jwt auth type detected, iamIntegration != nil? %t", iam.iamIntegration != nil)
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "Jwt")
if iam.iamIntegration != nil {
identity, s3Err = iam.authenticateJWTWithIAM(r)
amzAuthType = "Jwt"
} else {
glog.V(2).Infof("IAM integration is nil, returning ErrNotImplemented")
return identity, s3err.ErrNotImplemented, reqAuthType
}
case authTypeAnonymous:
amzAuthType = "Anonymous"
if identity, found = iam.lookupAnonymous(); !found {
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, amzAuthType)
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
}
default:
return identity, s3err.ErrNotImplemented, reqAuthType
}
if len(amzAuthType) > 0 {
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, amzAuthType)
}
if s3Err != s3err.ErrNone {
return identity, s3Err, reqAuthType
}
bucket, object := s3_constants.GetBucketAndObject(r)
prefix := s3_constants.GetPrefix(r)
// For List operations, use prefix for permission checking if available
if action == s3_constants.ACTION_LIST && object == "" && prefix != "" {
// List operation with prefix - check permission for the prefix path
object = prefix
} else if (object == "/" || object == "") && prefix != "" {
// Using the aws cli with s3, and s3api, and with boto3, the object is often set to "/" or empty
// but the prefix is set to the actual object key for permission checking
object = prefix
}
// For ListBuckets, authorization is performed in the handler by iterating
// through buckets and checking permissions for each. Skip the global check here.
policyAllows := false
if action == s3_constants.ACTION_LIST && bucket == "" {
// ListBuckets operation - authorization handled per-bucket in the handler
} else {
// First check bucket policy if one exists
// Bucket policies can grant or deny access to specific users/principals
// Following AWS semantics:
// - Explicit DENY in bucket policy → immediate rejection
// - Explicit ALLOW in bucket policy → grant access (bypass IAM checks)
// - No policy or indeterminate → fall through to IAM checks
if iam.policyEngine != nil && bucket != "" {
principal := buildPrincipalARN(identity, r)
// Phase 1: Evaluate bucket policy without object entry.
// Tag-based conditions (s3:ExistingObjectTag) are re-checked by handlers
// after fetching the entry, which is the Phase 2 check.
var claims map[string]interface{}
if identity != nil {
claims = identity.Claims
}
allowed, evaluated, err := iam.policyEngine.EvaluatePolicy(bucket, object, string(action), principal, r, claims, nil)
if err != nil {
// SECURITY: Fail-close on policy evaluation errors
// If we can't evaluate the policy, deny access rather than falling through to IAM
glog.Errorf("Error evaluating bucket policy for %s/%s: %v - denying access", bucket, object, err)
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
} else if evaluated {
// A bucket policy exists and was evaluated with a matching statement
if allowed {
// Policy explicitly allows this action - grant access immediately
// This bypasses IAM checks to support cross-account access and policy-only principals
glog.V(3).Infof("Bucket policy allows %s to %s on %s/%s (bypassing IAM)", identity.Name, action, bucket, object)
policyAllows = true
} else {
// Policy explicitly denies this action - deny access immediately
// Note: Explicit Deny in bucket policy overrides all other permissions
glog.V(3).Infof("Bucket policy explicitly denies %s to %s on %s/%s", identity.Name, action, bucket, object)
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
}
}
// If not evaluated (no policy or no matching statements), fall through to IAM/identity checks
}
// Only check IAM if bucket policy didn't explicitly allow
if !policyAllows {
// Use centralized permission check
if errCode := iam.VerifyActionPermission(r, identity, action, bucket, object); errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
return identity, errCode, reqAuthType
}
}
}
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAccountId, identity.Account.Id)
return identity, s3err.ErrNone, reqAuthType
}
// AuthSignatureOnly performs only signature verification without any authorization checks.
// This is used for IAM API operations where authorization is handled separately based on
// the specific IAM action (e.g., self-service vs admin operations).
// Returns the authenticated identity and any signature verification error.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) AuthSignatureOnly(r *http.Request) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
var identity *Identity
var s3Err s3err.ErrorCode
var authType string
switch getRequestAuthType(r) {
case authTypeUnknown:
glog.V(3).Infof("unknown auth type")
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "Unknown")
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
case authTypePresignedV2, authTypeSignedV2:
glog.V(3).Infof("v2 auth type")
identity, s3Err = iam.isReqAuthenticatedV2(r)
authType = "SigV2"
case authTypeStreamingSigned, authTypeSigned, authTypePresigned:
glog.V(3).Infof("v4 auth type")
identity, s3Err = iam.reqSignatureV4Verify(r)
authType = "SigV4"
case authTypeStreamingUnsigned:
glog.V(3).Infof("unsigned streaming upload")
identity, s3Err = iam.reqSignatureV4Verify(r)
authType = "SigV4"
case authTypeJWT:
glog.V(3).Infof("jwt auth type detected, iamIntegration != nil? %t", iam.iamIntegration != nil)
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "Jwt")
if iam.iamIntegration != nil {
identity, s3Err = iam.authenticateJWTWithIAM(r)
authType = "Jwt"
} else {
glog.V(2).Infof("IAM integration is nil, returning ErrNotImplemented")
return identity, s3err.ErrNotImplemented
}
case authTypeAnonymous:
// Anonymous users cannot use IAM API
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
default:
return identity, s3err.ErrNotImplemented
}
if len(authType) > 0 {
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, authType)
}
if s3Err != s3err.ErrNone {
return identity, s3Err
}
// Set account ID header for downstream handlers
if identity != nil && identity.Account != nil {
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAccountId, identity.Account.Id)
}
return identity, s3err.ErrNone
}
func (identity *Identity) canDo(action Action, bucket string, objectKey string) bool {
if identity == nil {
return false
}
if identity.isAdmin() {
return true
}
for _, a := range identity.Actions {
// Case where the Resource provided is
// "Resource": [
// "arn:aws:s3:::*"
// ]
if a == action {
return true
}
}
// Intelligent path concatenation to avoid double slashes
fullPath := bucket
if objectKey != "" && !strings.HasPrefix(objectKey, "/") {
fullPath += "/"
}
fullPath += objectKey
if bucket == "" {
glog.V(3).Infof("identity %s is not allowed to perform action %s on %s -- bucket is empty", identity.Name, action, "/"+strings.TrimPrefix(objectKey, "/"))
return false
}
glog.V(3).Infof("checking if %s can perform %s on bucket '%s'", identity.Name, action, fullPath)
target := string(action) + ":" + fullPath
adminTarget := s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN + ":" + fullPath
limitedByBucket := string(action) + ":" + bucket
adminLimitedByBucket := s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN + ":" + bucket
for _, a := range identity.Actions {
act := string(a)
if strings.HasSuffix(act, "*") {
if strings.HasPrefix(target, act[:len(act)-1]) {
return true
}
if strings.HasPrefix(adminTarget, act[:len(act)-1]) {
return true
}
} else {
if act == limitedByBucket {
return true
}
if act == adminLimitedByBucket {
return true
}
}
}
//log error
glog.V(3).Infof("identity %s is not allowed to perform action %s on %s", identity.Name, action, bucket+"/"+objectKey)
return false
}
func (identity *Identity) isAdmin() bool {
if identity == nil {
return false
}
return slices.Contains(identity.Actions, s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN)
}
// buildPrincipalARN builds an ARN for an identity to use in bucket policy evaluation
// It first checks if a principal ARN was set by JWT authentication in request headers
func buildPrincipalARN(identity *Identity, r *http.Request) string {
// Check if principal ARN was already set by JWT authentication
if r != nil {
if principalARN := r.Header.Get("X-SeaweedFS-Principal"); principalARN != "" {
glog.V(4).Infof("buildPrincipalARN: Using principal ARN from header: %s", principalARN)
return principalARN
}
}
if identity == nil {
return "*" // Anonymous
}
// Check if this is the anonymous user identity (authenticated as anonymous)
// S3 policies expect Principal: "*" for anonymous access
if identity.Name == s3_constants.AccountAnonymousId ||
(identity.Account != nil && identity.Account.Id == s3_constants.AccountAnonymousId) {
return "*" // Anonymous user
}
// Build an AWS-compatible principal ARN
// Format: arn:aws:iam::account-id:user/user-name
accountId := identity.Account.Id
if accountId == "" {
accountId = "000000000000" // Default account ID
}
userName := identity.Name
if userName == "" {
userName = "unknown"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:iam::%s:user/%s", accountId, userName)
}
// GetCredentialManager returns the credential manager instance
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) GetCredentialManager() *credential.CredentialManager {
return iam.credentialManager
}
// LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager loads configuration using the credential manager
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager() error {
glog.V(1).Infof("Loading S3 API configuration from credential manager")
s3ApiConfiguration, err := iam.credentialManager.LoadConfiguration(context.Background())
if err != nil {
glog.Errorf("Failed to load configuration from credential manager: %v", err)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to load configuration from credential manager: %w", err)
}
glog.V(2).Infof("Credential manager returned %d identities and %d accounts",
len(s3ApiConfiguration.Identities), len(s3ApiConfiguration.Accounts))
if err := iam.loadS3ApiConfiguration(s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
glog.Errorf("Failed to load S3 API configuration: %v", err)
return err
}
glog.V(1).Infof("Successfully loaded S3 API configuration from credential manager")
return nil
}
// initializeKMSFromConfig loads KMS configuration from TOML format
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) initializeKMSFromConfig(configContent []byte) error {
// JSON-only KMS configuration
if err := iam.initializeKMSFromJSON(configContent); err == nil {
glog.V(1).Infof("Successfully loaded KMS configuration from JSON format")
return nil
}
glog.V(2).Infof("No KMS configuration found in S3 config - SSE-KMS will not be available")
return nil
}
// initializeKMSFromJSON loads KMS configuration from JSON format when provided in the same file
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) initializeKMSFromJSON(configContent []byte) error {
// Parse as generic JSON and extract optional "kms" block
var m map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(string(configContent))), &m); err != nil {
return err
}
kmsVal, ok := m["kms"]
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("no KMS section found")
}
// Load KMS configuration directly from the parsed JSON data
return kms.LoadKMSFromConfig(kmsVal)
}
// SetIAMIntegration sets the IAM integration for advanced authentication and authorization
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) SetIAMIntegration(integration *S3IAMIntegration) {
iam.m.Lock()
defer iam.m.Unlock()
iam.iamIntegration = integration
// When IAM integration is configured, authentication must be enabled
// to ensure requests go through proper auth checks
if integration != nil {
iam.isAuthEnabled = true
}
}
// authenticateJWTWithIAM authenticates JWT tokens using the IAM integration
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authenticateJWTWithIAM(r *http.Request) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
ctx := r.Context()
// Use IAM integration to authenticate JWT
iamIdentity, errCode := iam.iamIntegration.AuthenticateJWT(ctx, r)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
return nil, errCode
}
// Convert IAMIdentity to existing Identity structure
identity := &Identity{
Name: iamIdentity.Name,
Account: iamIdentity.Account,
Actions: []Action{}, // Empty - authorization handled by policy engine
PolicyNames: iamIdentity.PolicyNames,
Claims: iamIdentity.Claims,
}
// Store session info in request headers for later authorization
r.Header.Set("X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token", iamIdentity.SessionToken)
r.Header.Set("X-SeaweedFS-Principal", iamIdentity.Principal)
return identity, s3err.ErrNone
}
// IAM authorization path type constants
// iamAuthPath represents the type of IAM authorization path
type iamAuthPath string
// IAM authorization path constants
const (
iamAuthPathJWT iamAuthPath = "jwt"
iamAuthPathSTS_V4 iamAuthPath = "sts_v4"
iamAuthPathStatic_V4 iamAuthPath = "static_v4"
iamAuthPathNone iamAuthPath = "none"
)
// determineIAMAuthPath determines the IAM authorization path based on available tokens and principals
func determineIAMAuthPath(sessionToken, principal, principalArn string) iamAuthPath {
if sessionToken != "" && principal != "" {
return iamAuthPathJWT
} else if sessionToken != "" && principalArn != "" {
return iamAuthPathSTS_V4
} else if principalArn != "" {
return iamAuthPathStatic_V4
}
return iamAuthPathNone
}
// VerifyActionPermission checks if the identity is allowed to perform the action on the resource.
// It handles both traditional identities (via Actions) and IAM/STS identities (via Policy).
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) VerifyActionPermission(r *http.Request, identity *Identity, action Action, bucket, object string) s3err.ErrorCode {
// Fail closed if identity is nil
if identity == nil {
glog.V(3).Infof("VerifyActionPermission called with nil identity for action %s on %s/%s", action, bucket, object)
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Traditional identities (with Actions from -s3.config) use legacy auth,
// JWT/STS identities (no Actions) use IAM authorization
if len(identity.Actions) > 0 {
if !identity.canDo(action, bucket, object) {
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
return s3err.ErrNone
} else if iam.iamIntegration != nil {
return iam.authorizeWithIAM(r, identity, action, bucket, object)
}
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// authorizeWithIAM authorizes requests using the IAM integration policy engine
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authorizeWithIAM(r *http.Request, identity *Identity, action Action, bucket string, object string) s3err.ErrorCode {
ctx := r.Context()
// Get session info from request headers
// First check for JWT-based authentication headers (X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token)
sessionToken := r.Header.Get("X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token")
principal := r.Header.Get("X-SeaweedFS-Principal")
// Fallback to AWS Signature V4 STS token if JWT token not present
// This handles the case where STS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity generates temporary credentials
// that include an X-Amz-Security-Token header (in addition to the access key and secret)
if sessionToken == "" {
sessionToken = r.Header.Get("X-Amz-Security-Token")
if sessionToken == "" {
// Also check query parameters for presigned URLs with STS tokens
sessionToken = r.URL.Query().Get("X-Amz-Security-Token")
}
}
// Create IAMIdentity for authorization
iamIdentity := &IAMIdentity{
Name: identity.Name,
Account: identity.Account,
PolicyNames: identity.PolicyNames,
}
// Determine authorization path and configure identity
authPath := determineIAMAuthPath(sessionToken, principal, identity.PrincipalArn)
switch authPath {
case iamAuthPathJWT:
// JWT-based authentication - use session token and principal from headers
iamIdentity.Principal = principal
iamIdentity.SessionToken = sessionToken
glog.V(3).Infof("Using JWT-based IAM authorization for principal: %s", principal)
case iamAuthPathSTS_V4:
// STS V4 signature authentication - use session token (from X-Amz-Security-Token) with principal ARN
iamIdentity.Principal = identity.PrincipalArn
iamIdentity.SessionToken = sessionToken
glog.V(3).Infof("Using STS V4 signature IAM authorization for principal: %s with session token", identity.PrincipalArn)
case iamAuthPathStatic_V4:
// Static V4 signature authentication - use principal ARN without session token
iamIdentity.Principal = identity.PrincipalArn
iamIdentity.SessionToken = ""
glog.V(3).Infof("Using static V4 signature IAM authorization for principal: %s", identity.PrincipalArn)
default:
glog.V(3).Info("No valid principal information for IAM authorization")
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Use IAM integration for authorization
return iam.iamIntegration.AuthorizeAction(ctx, iamIdentity, action, bucket, object, r)
}