Files
seaweedFS/weed/s3api/s3_sse_s3.go
Chris Lu ca84a8a713 S3: Directly read write volume servers (#7481)
* Lazy Versioning Check, Conditional SSE Entry Fetch, HEAD Request Optimization

* revert

Reverted the conditional versioning check to always check versioning status
Reverted the conditional SSE entry fetch to always fetch entry metadata
Reverted the conditional versioning check to always check versioning status
Reverted the conditional SSE entry fetch to always fetch entry metadata

* Lazy Entry Fetch for SSE, Skip Conditional Header Check

* SSE-KMS headers are present, this is not an SSE-C request (mutually exclusive)

* SSE-C is mutually exclusive with SSE-S3 and SSE-KMS

* refactor

* Removed Premature Mutual Exclusivity Check

* check for the presence of the X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption header

* not used

* fmt

* directly read write volume servers

* HTTP Range Request Support

* set header

* md5

* copy object

* fix sse

* fmt

* implement sse

* sse continue

* fixed the suffix range bug (bytes=-N for "last N bytes")

* debug logs

* Missing PartsCount Header

* profiling

* url encoding

* test_multipart_get_part

* headers

* debug

* adjust log level

* handle part number

* Update s3api_object_handlers.go

* nil safety

* set ModifiedTsNs

* remove

* nil check

* fix sse header

* same logic as filer

* decode values

* decode ivBase64

* s3: Fix SSE decryption JWT authentication and streaming errors

Critical fix for SSE (Server-Side Encryption) test failures:

1. **JWT Authentication Bug** (Root Cause):
   - Changed from GenJwtForFilerServer to GenJwtForVolumeServer
   - S3 API now uses correct JWT when directly reading from volume servers
   - Matches filer's authentication pattern for direct volume access
   - Fixes 'unexpected EOF' and 500 errors in SSE tests

2. **Streaming Error Handling**:
   - Added error propagation in getEncryptedStreamFromVolumes goroutine
   - Use CloseWithError() to properly communicate stream failures
   - Added debug logging for streaming errors

3. **Response Header Timing**:
   - Removed premature WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) call
   - Let Go's http package write status automatically on first write
   - Prevents header lock when errors occur during streaming

4. **Enhanced SSE Decryption Debugging**:
   - Added IV/Key validation and logging for SSE-C, SSE-KMS, SSE-S3
   - Better error messages for missing or invalid encryption metadata
   - Added glog.V(2) debugging for decryption setup

This fixes SSE integration test failures where encrypted objects
could not be retrieved due to volume server authentication failures.
The JWT bug was causing volume servers to reject requests, resulting
in truncated/empty streams (EOF) or internal errors.

* s3: Fix SSE multipart upload metadata preservation

Critical fix for SSE multipart upload test failures (SSE-C and SSE-KMS):

**Root Cause - Incomplete SSE Metadata Copying**:
The old code only tried to copy 'SeaweedFSSSEKMSKey' from the first
part to the completed object. This had TWO bugs:

1. **Wrong Constant Name** (Key Mismatch Bug):
   - Storage uses: SeaweedFSSSEKMSKeyHeader = 'X-SeaweedFS-SSE-KMS-Key'
   - Old code read: SeaweedFSSSEKMSKey = 'x-seaweedfs-sse-kms-key'
   - Result: SSE-KMS metadata was NEVER copied → 500 errors

2. **Missing SSE-C and SSE-S3 Headers**:
   - SSE-C requires: IV, Algorithm, KeyMD5
   - SSE-S3 requires: encrypted key data + standard headers
   - Old code: copied nothing for SSE-C/SSE-S3 → decryption failures

**Fix - Complete SSE Header Preservation**:
Now copies ALL SSE headers from first part to completed object:

- SSE-C: SeaweedFSSSEIV, CustomerAlgorithm, CustomerKeyMD5
- SSE-KMS: SeaweedFSSSEKMSKeyHeader, AwsKmsKeyId, ServerSideEncryption
- SSE-S3: SeaweedFSSSES3Key, ServerSideEncryption

Applied consistently to all 3 code paths:
1. Versioned buckets (creates version file)
2. Suspended versioning (creates main object with null versionId)
3. Non-versioned buckets (creates main object)

**Why This Is Correct**:
The headers copied EXACTLY match what putToFiler stores during part
upload (lines 496-521 in s3api_object_handlers_put.go). This ensures
detectPrimarySSEType() can correctly identify encrypted multipart
objects and trigger inline decryption with proper metadata.

Fixes: TestSSEMultipartUploadIntegration (SSE-C and SSE-KMS subtests)

* s3: Add debug logging for versioning state diagnosis

Temporary debug logging to diagnose test_versioning_obj_plain_null_version_overwrite_suspended failure.

Added glog.V(0) logging to show:
1. setBucketVersioningStatus: when versioning status is changed
2. PutObjectHandler: what versioning state is detected (Enabled/Suspended/none)
3. PutObjectHandler: which code path is taken (putVersionedObject vs putSuspendedVersioningObject)

This will help identify if:
- The versioning status is being set correctly in bucket config
- The cache is returning stale/incorrect versioning state
- The switch statement is correctly routing to suspended vs enabled handlers

* s3: Enhanced versioning state tracing for suspended versioning diagnosis

Added comprehensive logging across the entire versioning state flow:

PutBucketVersioningHandler:
- Log requested status (Enabled/Suspended)
- Log when calling setBucketVersioningStatus
- Log success/failure of status change

setBucketVersioningStatus:
- Log bucket and status being set
- Log when config is updated
- Log completion with error code

updateBucketConfig:
- Log versioning state being written to cache
- Immediate cache verification after Set
- Log if cache verification fails

getVersioningState:
- Log bucket name and state being returned
- Log if object lock forces VersioningEnabled
- Log errors

This will reveal:
1. If PutBucketVersioning(Suspended) is reaching the handler
2. If the cache update succeeds
3. What state getVersioningState returns during PUT
4. Any cache consistency issues

Expected to show why bucket still reports 'Enabled' after 'Suspended' call.

* s3: Add SSE chunk detection debugging for multipart uploads

Added comprehensive logging to diagnose why TestSSEMultipartUploadIntegration fails:

detectPrimarySSEType now logs:
1. Total chunk count and extended header count
2. All extended headers with 'sse'/'SSE'/'encryption' in the name
3. For each chunk: index, SseType, and whether it has metadata
4. Final SSE type counts (SSE-C, SSE-KMS, SSE-S3)

This will reveal if:
- Chunks are missing SSE metadata after multipart completion
- Extended headers are copied correctly from first part
- The SSE detection logic is working correctly

Expected to show if chunks have SseType=0 (none) or proper SSE types set.

* s3: Trace SSE chunk metadata through multipart completion and retrieval

Added end-to-end logging to track SSE chunk metadata lifecycle:

**During Multipart Completion (filer_multipart.go)**:
1. Log finalParts chunks BEFORE mkFile - shows SseType and metadata
2. Log versionEntry.Chunks INSIDE mkFile callback - shows if mkFile preserves SSE info
3. Log success after mkFile completes

**During GET Retrieval (s3api_object_handlers.go)**:
1. Log retrieved entry chunks - shows SseType and metadata after retrieval
2. Log detected SSE type result

This will reveal at which point SSE chunk metadata is lost:
- If finalParts have SSE metadata but versionEntry.Chunks don't → mkFile bug
- If versionEntry.Chunks have SSE metadata but retrieved chunks don't → storage/retrieval bug
- If chunks never have SSE metadata → multipart completion SSE processing bug

Expected to show chunks with SseType=NONE during retrieval even though
they were created with proper SseType during multipart completion.

* s3: Fix SSE-C multipart IV base64 decoding bug

**Critical Bug Found**: SSE-C multipart uploads were failing because:

Root Cause:
- entry.Extended[SeaweedFSSSEIV] stores base64-encoded IV (24 bytes for 16-byte IV)
- SerializeSSECMetadata expects raw IV bytes (16 bytes)
- During multipart completion, we were passing base64 IV directly → serialization error

Error Message:
"Failed to serialize SSE-C metadata for chunk in part X: invalid IV length: expected 16 bytes, got 24"

Fix:
- Base64-decode IV before passing to SerializeSSECMetadata
- Added error handling for decode failures

Impact:
- SSE-C multipart uploads will now correctly serialize chunk metadata
- Chunks will have proper SSE metadata for decryption during GET

This fixes the SSE-C subtest of TestSSEMultipartUploadIntegration.
SSE-KMS still has a separate issue (error code 23) being investigated.

* fixes

* kms sse

* handle retry if not found in .versions folder and should read the normal object

* quick check (no retries) to see if the .versions/ directory exists

* skip retry if object is not found

* explicit update to avoid sync delay

* fix map update lock

* Remove fmt.Printf debug statements

* Fix SSE-KMS multipart base IV fallback to fail instead of regenerating

* fmt

* Fix ACL grants storage logic

* header handling

* nil handling

* range read for sse content

* test range requests for sse objects

* fmt

* unused code

* upload in chunks

* header case

* fix url

* bucket policy error vs bucket not found

* jwt handling

* fmt

* jwt in request header

* Optimize Case-Insensitive Prefix Check

* dead code

* Eliminated Unnecessary Stream Prefetch for Multipart SSE

* range sse

* sse

* refactor

* context

* fmt

* fix type

* fix SSE-C IV Mismatch

* Fix Headers Being Set After WriteHeader

* fix url parsing

* propergate sse headers

* multipart sse-s3

* aws sig v4 authen

* sse kms

* set content range

* better errors

* Update s3api_object_handlers_copy.go

* Update s3api_object_handlers.go

* Update s3api_object_handlers.go

* avoid magic number

* clean up

* Update s3api_bucket_policy_handlers.go

* fix url parsing

* context

* data and metadata both use background context

* adjust the offset

* SSE Range Request IV Calculation

* adjust logs

* IV relative to offset in each part, not the whole file

* collect logs

* offset

* fix offset

* fix url

* logs

* variable

* jwt

* Multipart ETag semantics: conditionally set object-level Md5 for single-chunk uploads only.

* sse

* adjust IV and offset

* multipart boundaries

* ensures PUT and GET operations return consistent ETags

* Metadata Header Case

* CommonPrefixes Sorting with URL Encoding

* always sort

* remove the extra PathUnescape call

* fix the multipart get part ETag

* the FileChunk is created without setting ModifiedTsNs

* Sort CommonPrefixes lexicographically to match AWS S3 behavior

* set md5 for multipart uploads

* prevents any potential data loss or corruption in the small-file inline storage path

* compiles correctly

* decryptedReader will now be properly closed after use

* Fixed URL encoding and sort order for CommonPrefixes

* Update s3api_object_handlers_list.go

* SSE-x Chunk View Decryption

* Different IV offset calculations for single-part vs multipart objects

* still too verbose in logs

* less logs

* ensure correct conversion

* fix listing

* nil check

* minor fixes

* nil check

* single character delimiter

* optimize

* range on empty object or zero-length

* correct IV based on its position within that part, not its position in the entire object

* adjust offset

* offset

Fetch FULL encrypted chunk (not just the range)
Adjust IV by PartOffset/ChunkOffset only
Decrypt full chunk
Skip in the DECRYPTED stream to reach OffsetInChunk

* look breaking

* refactor

* error on no content

* handle intra-block byte skipping

* Incomplete HTTP Response Error Handling

* multipart SSE

* Update s3api_object_handlers.go

* address comments

* less logs

* handling directory

* Optimized rejectDirectoryObjectWithoutSlash() to avoid unnecessary lookups

* Revert "handling directory"

This reverts commit 3a335f0ac33c63f51975abc63c40e5328857a74b.

* constant

* Consolidate nil entry checks in GetObjectHandler

* add range tests

* Consolidate redundant nil entry checks in HeadObjectHandler

* adjust logs

* SSE type

* large files

* large files

Reverted the plain-object range test

* ErrNoEncryptionConfig

* Fixed SSERangeReader Infinite Loop Vulnerability

* Fixed SSE-KMS Multipart ChunkReader HTTP Body Leak

* handle empty directory in S3, added PyArrow tests

* purge unused code

* Update s3_parquet_test.py

* Update requirements.txt

* According to S3 specifications, when both partNumber and Range are present, the Range should apply within the selected part's boundaries, not to the full object.

* handle errors

* errors after writing header

* https

* fix: Wait for volume assignment readiness before running Parquet tests

The test-implicit-dir-with-server test was failing with an Internal Error
because volume assignment was not ready when tests started. This fix adds
a check that attempts a volume assignment and waits for it to succeed
before proceeding with tests.

This ensures that:
1. Volume servers are registered with the master
2. Volume growth is triggered if needed
3. The system can successfully assign volumes for writes

Fixes the timeout issue where boto3 would retry 4 times and fail with
'We encountered an internal error, please try again.'

* sse tests

* store derived IV

* fix: Clean up gRPC ports between tests to prevent port conflicts

The second test (test-implicit-dir-with-server) was failing because the
volume server's gRPC port (18080 = VOLUME_PORT + 10000) was still in use
from the first test. The cleanup code only killed HTTP port processes,
not gRPC port processes.

Added cleanup for gRPC ports in all stop targets:
- Master gRPC: MASTER_PORT + 10000 (19333)
- Volume gRPC: VOLUME_PORT + 10000 (18080)
- Filer gRPC: FILER_PORT + 10000 (18888)

This ensures clean state between test runs in CI.

* add import

* address comments

* docs: Add placeholder documentation files for Parquet test suite

Added three missing documentation files referenced in test/s3/parquet/README.md:

1. TEST_COVERAGE.md - Documents 43 total test cases (17 Go unit tests,
   6 Python integration tests, 20 Python end-to-end tests)

2. FINAL_ROOT_CAUSE_ANALYSIS.md - Explains the s3fs compatibility issue
   with PyArrow, the implicit directory problem, and how the fix works

3. MINIO_DIRECTORY_HANDLING.md - Compares MinIO's directory handling
   approach with SeaweedFS's implementation

Each file contains:
- Title and overview
- Key technical details relevant to the topic
- TODO sections for future expansion

These placeholder files resolve the broken README links and provide
structure for future detailed documentation.

* clean up if metadata operation failed

* Update s3_parquet_test.py

* clean up

* Update Makefile

* Update s3_parquet_test.py

* Update Makefile

* Handle ivSkip for non-block-aligned offsets

* Update README.md

* stop volume server faster

* stop volume server in 1 second

* different IV for each chunk in SSE-S3 and SSE-KMS

* clean up if fails

* testing upload

* error propagation

* fmt

* simplify

* fix copying

* less logs

* endian

* Added marshaling error handling

* handling invalid ranges

* error handling for adding to log buffer

* fix logging

* avoid returning too quickly and ensure proper cleaning up

* Activity Tracking for Disk Reads

* Cleanup Unused Parameters

* Activity Tracking for Kafka Publishers

* Proper Test Error Reporting

* refactoring

* less logs

* less logs

* go fmt

* guard it with if entry.Attributes.TtlSec > 0 to match the pattern used elsewhere.

* Handle bucket-default encryption config errors explicitly for multipart

* consistent activity tracking

* obsolete code for s3 on filer read/write handlers

* Update weed/s3api/s3api_object_handlers_list.go

Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2025-11-18 23:18:35 -08:00

550 lines
17 KiB
Go

package s3api
import (
"context"
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
mathrand "math/rand"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/filer_pb"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/util"
)
// SSE-S3 uses AES-256 encryption with server-managed keys
const (
SSES3Algorithm = s3_constants.SSEAlgorithmAES256
SSES3KeySize = 32 // 256 bits
)
// SSES3Key represents a server-managed encryption key for SSE-S3
type SSES3Key struct {
Key []byte
KeyID string
Algorithm string
IV []byte // Initialization Vector for this key
}
// IsSSES3RequestInternal checks if the request specifies SSE-S3 encryption
func IsSSES3RequestInternal(r *http.Request) bool {
sseHeader := r.Header.Get(s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryption)
result := sseHeader == SSES3Algorithm
// Debug: log header detection for SSE-S3 requests
if result {
glog.V(4).Infof("SSE-S3 detection: method=%s, header=%q, expected=%q, result=%t, copySource=%q", r.Method, sseHeader, SSES3Algorithm, result, r.Header.Get("X-Amz-Copy-Source"))
}
return result
}
// IsSSES3EncryptedInternal checks if the object metadata indicates SSE-S3 encryption
func IsSSES3EncryptedInternal(metadata map[string][]byte) bool {
if sseAlgorithm, exists := metadata[s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryption]; exists {
return string(sseAlgorithm) == SSES3Algorithm
}
return false
}
// GenerateSSES3Key generates a new SSE-S3 encryption key
func GenerateSSES3Key() (*SSES3Key, error) {
key := make([]byte, SSES3KeySize)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, key); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate SSE-S3 key: %w", err)
}
// Generate a key ID for tracking
keyID := fmt.Sprintf("sse-s3-key-%d", mathrand.Int63())
return &SSES3Key{
Key: key,
KeyID: keyID,
Algorithm: SSES3Algorithm,
}, nil
}
// CreateSSES3EncryptedReader creates an encrypted reader for SSE-S3
// Returns the encrypted reader and the IV for metadata storage
func CreateSSES3EncryptedReader(reader io.Reader, key *SSES3Key) (io.Reader, []byte, error) {
// Create AES cipher
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.Key)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("create AES cipher: %w", err)
}
// Generate random IV
iv := make([]byte, aes.BlockSize)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, iv); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("generate IV: %w", err)
}
// Create CTR mode cipher
stream := cipher.NewCTR(block, iv)
// Return encrypted reader and IV separately for metadata storage
encryptedReader := &cipher.StreamReader{S: stream, R: reader}
return encryptedReader, iv, nil
}
// CreateSSES3DecryptedReader creates a decrypted reader for SSE-S3 using IV from metadata
func CreateSSES3DecryptedReader(reader io.Reader, key *SSES3Key, iv []byte) (io.Reader, error) {
// Create AES cipher
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.Key)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create AES cipher: %w", err)
}
// Create CTR mode cipher with the provided IV
stream := cipher.NewCTR(block, iv)
decryptReader := &cipher.StreamReader{S: stream, R: reader}
// Wrap with closer if the underlying reader implements io.Closer
if closer, ok := reader.(io.Closer); ok {
return &decryptReaderCloser{
Reader: decryptReader,
underlyingCloser: closer,
}, nil
}
return decryptReader, nil
}
// GetSSES3Headers returns the headers for SSE-S3 encrypted objects
func GetSSES3Headers() map[string]string {
return map[string]string{
s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryption: SSES3Algorithm,
}
}
// SerializeSSES3Metadata serializes SSE-S3 metadata for storage using envelope encryption
func SerializeSSES3Metadata(key *SSES3Key) ([]byte, error) {
if err := ValidateSSES3Key(key); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Encrypt the DEK using the global key manager's super key
keyManager := GetSSES3KeyManager()
encryptedDEK, nonce, err := keyManager.encryptKeyWithSuperKey(key.Key)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt DEK: %w", err)
}
metadata := map[string]string{
"algorithm": key.Algorithm,
"keyId": key.KeyID,
"encryptedDEK": base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(encryptedDEK),
"nonce": base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(nonce),
}
// Include IV if present (needed for chunk-level decryption)
if key.IV != nil {
metadata["iv"] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(key.IV)
}
// Use JSON for proper serialization
data, err := json.Marshal(metadata)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal SSE-S3 metadata: %w", err)
}
return data, nil
}
// DeserializeSSES3Metadata deserializes SSE-S3 metadata from storage and decrypts the DEK
func DeserializeSSES3Metadata(data []byte, keyManager *SSES3KeyManager) (*SSES3Key, error) {
if len(data) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("empty SSE-S3 metadata")
}
// Parse the JSON metadata
var metadata map[string]string
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &metadata); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse SSE-S3 metadata: %w", err)
}
keyID, exists := metadata["keyId"]
if !exists {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("keyId not found in SSE-S3 metadata")
}
algorithm, exists := metadata["algorithm"]
if !exists {
algorithm = s3_constants.SSEAlgorithmAES256 // Default algorithm
}
// Decode the encrypted DEK and nonce
encryptedDEKStr, exists := metadata["encryptedDEK"]
if !exists {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encryptedDEK not found in SSE-S3 metadata")
}
encryptedDEK, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encryptedDEKStr)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode encrypted DEK: %w", err)
}
nonceStr, exists := metadata["nonce"]
if !exists {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("nonce not found in SSE-S3 metadata")
}
nonce, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(nonceStr)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode nonce: %w", err)
}
// Decrypt the DEK using the key manager
if keyManager == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("key manager is required for SSE-S3 key retrieval")
}
dekBytes, err := keyManager.decryptKeyWithSuperKey(encryptedDEK, nonce)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt DEK: %w", err)
}
// Reconstruct the key
key := &SSES3Key{
Key: dekBytes,
KeyID: keyID,
Algorithm: algorithm,
}
// Restore IV if present in metadata (for chunk-level decryption)
if ivStr, exists := metadata["iv"]; exists {
iv, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(ivStr)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode IV: %w", err)
}
key.IV = iv
}
return key, nil
}
// SSES3KeyManager manages SSE-S3 encryption keys using envelope encryption
// Instead of storing keys in memory, it uses a super key (KEK) to encrypt/decrypt DEKs
type SSES3KeyManager struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
superKey []byte // 256-bit master key (KEK - Key Encryption Key)
filerClient filer_pb.FilerClient // Filer client for KEK persistence
kekPath string // Path in filer where KEK is stored (e.g., /etc/s3/sse_kek)
}
const (
// KEK storage directory and file name in filer
SSES3KEKDirectory = "/etc/s3"
SSES3KEKParentDir = "/etc"
SSES3KEKDirName = "s3"
SSES3KEKFileName = "sse_kek"
// Full KEK path in filer
defaultKEKPath = SSES3KEKDirectory + "/" + SSES3KEKFileName
)
// NewSSES3KeyManager creates a new SSE-S3 key manager with envelope encryption
func NewSSES3KeyManager() *SSES3KeyManager {
// This will be initialized properly when attached to an S3ApiServer
return &SSES3KeyManager{
kekPath: defaultKEKPath,
}
}
// InitializeWithFiler initializes the key manager with a filer client
func (km *SSES3KeyManager) InitializeWithFiler(filerClient filer_pb.FilerClient) error {
km.mu.Lock()
defer km.mu.Unlock()
km.filerClient = filerClient
// Try to load existing KEK from filer
if err := km.loadSuperKeyFromFiler(); err != nil {
// Only generate a new key if it does not exist.
// For other errors (e.g. connectivity), we should fail fast to prevent creating a new key
// and making existing data undecryptable.
if errors.Is(err, filer_pb.ErrNotFound) {
glog.V(1).Infof("SSE-S3 KeyManager: KEK not found, generating new KEK (load from filer %s: %v)", km.kekPath, err)
if genErr := km.generateAndSaveSuperKeyToFiler(); genErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to generate and save SSE-S3 super key: %w", genErr)
}
} else {
// A different error occurred (e.g., network issue, permission denied).
// Return the error to prevent starting with a broken state.
return fmt.Errorf("failed to load SSE-S3 super key from %s: %w", km.kekPath, err)
}
} else {
glog.V(1).Infof("SSE-S3 KeyManager: Loaded KEK from filer %s", km.kekPath)
}
return nil
}
// loadSuperKeyFromFiler loads the KEK from the filer
func (km *SSES3KeyManager) loadSuperKeyFromFiler() error {
if km.filerClient == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("filer client not initialized")
}
// Get the entry from filer
entry, err := filer_pb.GetEntry(context.Background(), km.filerClient, util.FullPath(km.kekPath))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get KEK entry from filer: %w", err)
}
// Read the content
if len(entry.Content) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("KEK entry is empty")
}
// Decode hex-encoded key
key, err := hex.DecodeString(string(entry.Content))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to decode KEK: %w", err)
}
if len(key) != SSES3KeySize {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid KEK size: expected %d bytes, got %d", SSES3KeySize, len(key))
}
km.superKey = key
return nil
}
// generateAndSaveSuperKeyToFiler generates a new KEK and saves it to the filer
func (km *SSES3KeyManager) generateAndSaveSuperKeyToFiler() error {
if km.filerClient == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("filer client not initialized")
}
// Generate a random 256-bit super key (KEK)
superKey := make([]byte, SSES3KeySize)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, superKey); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to generate KEK: %w", err)
}
// Encode as hex for storage
encodedKey := []byte(hex.EncodeToString(superKey))
// Create the entry in filer
// First ensure the parent directory exists
if err := filer_pb.Mkdir(context.Background(), km.filerClient, SSES3KEKParentDir, SSES3KEKDirName, func(entry *filer_pb.Entry) {
// Set appropriate permissions for the directory
entry.Attributes.FileMode = uint32(0700 | os.ModeDir)
}); err != nil {
// Only ignore "file exists" errors.
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "file exists") {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create KEK directory %s: %w", SSES3KEKDirectory, err)
}
glog.V(3).Infof("Parent directory %s already exists, continuing.", SSES3KEKDirectory)
}
// Create the KEK file
if err := filer_pb.MkFile(context.Background(), km.filerClient, SSES3KEKDirectory, SSES3KEKFileName, nil, func(entry *filer_pb.Entry) {
entry.Content = encodedKey
entry.Attributes.FileMode = 0600 // Read/write for owner only
entry.Attributes.FileSize = uint64(len(encodedKey))
}); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create KEK file in filer: %w", err)
}
km.superKey = superKey
glog.Infof("SSE-S3 KeyManager: Generated and saved new KEK to filer %s", km.kekPath)
return nil
}
// GetOrCreateKey gets an existing key or creates a new one
// With envelope encryption, we always generate a new DEK since we don't store them
func (km *SSES3KeyManager) GetOrCreateKey(keyID string) (*SSES3Key, error) {
// Always generate a new key - we use envelope encryption so no need to cache DEKs
return GenerateSSES3Key()
}
// encryptKeyWithSuperKey encrypts a DEK using the super key (KEK) with AES-GCM
func (km *SSES3KeyManager) encryptKeyWithSuperKey(dek []byte) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
km.mu.RLock()
defer km.mu.RUnlock()
block, err := aes.NewCipher(km.superKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create cipher: %w", err)
}
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create GCM: %w", err)
}
// Generate random nonce
nonce := make([]byte, gcm.NonceSize())
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, nonce); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate nonce: %w", err)
}
// Encrypt the DEK
encryptedDEK := gcm.Seal(nil, nonce, dek, nil)
return encryptedDEK, nonce, nil
}
// decryptKeyWithSuperKey decrypts a DEK using the super key (KEK) with AES-GCM
func (km *SSES3KeyManager) decryptKeyWithSuperKey(encryptedDEK, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) {
km.mu.RLock()
defer km.mu.RUnlock()
block, err := aes.NewCipher(km.superKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create cipher: %w", err)
}
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create GCM: %w", err)
}
if len(nonce) != gcm.NonceSize() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid nonce size: expected %d, got %d", gcm.NonceSize(), len(nonce))
}
// Decrypt the DEK
dek, err := gcm.Open(nil, nonce, encryptedDEK, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt DEK: %w", err)
}
return dek, nil
}
// StoreKey is now a no-op since we use envelope encryption and don't cache DEKs
// The encrypted DEK is stored in the object metadata, not in the key manager
func (km *SSES3KeyManager) StoreKey(key *SSES3Key) {
// No-op: With envelope encryption, we don't need to store keys in memory
// The DEK is encrypted with the super key and stored in object metadata
}
// GetKey is now a no-op since we don't cache keys
// Keys are retrieved by decrypting the encrypted DEK from object metadata
func (km *SSES3KeyManager) GetKey(keyID string) (*SSES3Key, bool) {
// No-op: With envelope encryption, keys are not cached
// Each object's metadata contains the encrypted DEK
return nil, false
}
// Global SSE-S3 key manager instance
var globalSSES3KeyManager = NewSSES3KeyManager()
// GetSSES3KeyManager returns the global SSE-S3 key manager
func GetSSES3KeyManager() *SSES3KeyManager {
return globalSSES3KeyManager
}
// InitializeGlobalSSES3KeyManager initializes the global key manager with filer access
func InitializeGlobalSSES3KeyManager(s3ApiServer *S3ApiServer) error {
return globalSSES3KeyManager.InitializeWithFiler(s3ApiServer)
}
// ProcessSSES3Request processes an SSE-S3 request and returns encryption metadata
func ProcessSSES3Request(r *http.Request) (map[string][]byte, error) {
if !IsSSES3RequestInternal(r) {
return nil, nil
}
// Generate or retrieve encryption key
keyManager := GetSSES3KeyManager()
key, err := keyManager.GetOrCreateKey("")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("get SSE-S3 key: %w", err)
}
// Serialize key metadata
keyData, err := SerializeSSES3Metadata(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("serialize SSE-S3 metadata: %w", err)
}
// Store key in manager
keyManager.StoreKey(key)
// Return metadata
metadata := map[string][]byte{
s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryption: []byte(SSES3Algorithm),
s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSES3Key: keyData,
}
return metadata, nil
}
// GetSSES3KeyFromMetadata extracts SSE-S3 key from object metadata
func GetSSES3KeyFromMetadata(metadata map[string][]byte, keyManager *SSES3KeyManager) (*SSES3Key, error) {
keyData, exists := metadata[s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSES3Key]
if !exists {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SSE-S3 key not found in metadata")
}
return DeserializeSSES3Metadata(keyData, keyManager)
}
// GetSSES3IV extracts the IV for single-part SSE-S3 objects
// Priority: 1) object-level metadata (for inline/small files), 2) first chunk metadata
func GetSSES3IV(entry *filer_pb.Entry, sseS3Key *SSES3Key, keyManager *SSES3KeyManager) ([]byte, error) {
// First check if IV is in the object-level key (for small/inline files)
if len(sseS3Key.IV) > 0 {
return sseS3Key.IV, nil
}
// Fallback: Get IV from first chunk's metadata (for chunked files)
if len(entry.GetChunks()) > 0 {
chunk := entry.GetChunks()[0]
if len(chunk.GetSseMetadata()) > 0 {
chunkKey, err := DeserializeSSES3Metadata(chunk.GetSseMetadata(), keyManager)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to deserialize chunk SSE-S3 metadata: %w", err)
}
if len(chunkKey.IV) > 0 {
return chunkKey.IV, nil
}
}
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SSE-S3 IV not found in object or chunk metadata")
}
// CreateSSES3EncryptedReaderWithBaseIV creates an encrypted reader using a base IV for multipart upload consistency.
// The returned IV is the offset-derived IV, calculated from the input baseIV and offset.
func CreateSSES3EncryptedReaderWithBaseIV(reader io.Reader, key *SSES3Key, baseIV []byte, offset int64) (io.Reader, []byte /* derivedIV */, error) {
// Validate key to prevent panics and security issues
if key == nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("SSES3Key is nil")
}
if key.Key == nil || len(key.Key) != SSES3KeySize {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid SSES3Key: must be %d bytes, got %d", SSES3KeySize, len(key.Key))
}
if err := ValidateSSES3Key(key); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key.Key)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("create AES cipher: %w", err)
}
// Calculate the proper IV with offset to ensure unique IV per chunk/part
// This prevents the severe security vulnerability of IV reuse in CTR mode
// Skip is not used here because we're encrypting from the start (not reading a range)
iv, _ := calculateIVWithOffset(baseIV, offset)
stream := cipher.NewCTR(block, iv)
encryptedReader := &cipher.StreamReader{S: stream, R: reader}
return encryptedReader, iv, nil
}