Files
seaweedFS/weed/s3api/auth_credentials.go
blitt001 3d81d5bef7 Fix S3 signature verification behind reverse proxies (#8444)
* Fix S3 signature verification behind reverse proxies

When SeaweedFS is deployed behind a reverse proxy (e.g. nginx, Kong,
Traefik), AWS S3 Signature V4 verification fails because the Host header
the client signed with (e.g. "localhost:9000") differs from the Host
header SeaweedFS receives on the backend (e.g. "seaweedfs:8333").

This commit adds a new -s3.externalUrl parameter (and S3_EXTERNAL_URL
environment variable) that tells SeaweedFS what public-facing URL clients
use to connect. When set, SeaweedFS uses this host value for signature
verification instead of the Host header from the incoming request.

New parameter:
  -s3.externalUrl  (flag) or S3_EXTERNAL_URL (environment variable)
  Example: -s3.externalUrl=http://localhost:9000
  Example: S3_EXTERNAL_URL=https://s3.example.com

The environment variable is particularly useful in Docker/Kubernetes
deployments where the external URL is injected via container config.
The flag takes precedence over the environment variable when both are set.

At startup, the URL is parsed and default ports are stripped to match
AWS SDK behavior (port 80 for HTTP, port 443 for HTTPS), so
"http://s3.example.com:80" and "http://s3.example.com" are equivalent.

Bugs fixed:
- Default port stripping was removed by a prior PR, causing signature
  mismatches when clients connect on standard ports (80/443)
- X-Forwarded-Port was ignored when X-Forwarded-Host was not present
- Scheme detection now uses proper precedence: X-Forwarded-Proto >
  TLS connection > URL scheme > "http"
- Test expectations for standard port stripping were incorrect
- expectedHost field in TestSignatureV4WithForwardedPort was declared
  but never actually checked (self-referential test)

* Add Docker integration test for S3 proxy signature verification

Docker Compose setup with nginx reverse proxy to validate that the
-s3.externalUrl parameter (or S3_EXTERNAL_URL env var) correctly
resolves S3 signature verification when SeaweedFS runs behind a proxy.

The test uses nginx proxying port 9000 to SeaweedFS on port 8333,
with X-Forwarded-Host/Port/Proto headers set. SeaweedFS is configured
with -s3.externalUrl=http://localhost:9000 so it uses "localhost:9000"
for signature verification, matching what the AWS CLI signs with.

The test can be run with aws CLI on the host or without it by using
the amazon/aws-cli Docker image with --network host.

Test covers: create-bucket, list-buckets, put-object, head-object,
list-objects-v2, get-object, content round-trip integrity,
delete-object, and delete-bucket — all through the reverse proxy.

* Create s3-proxy-signature-tests.yml

* fix CLI

* fix CI

* Update s3-proxy-signature-tests.yml

* address comments

* Update Dockerfile

* add user

* no need for fuse

* Update s3-proxy-signature-tests.yml

* debug

* weed mini

* fix health check

* health check

* fix health checking

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris Lu <chris.lu@gmail.com>
2026-02-26 14:20:42 -08:00

1786 lines
60 KiB
Go

package s3api
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/credential"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/filer"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/filer_pb"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/iam_pb"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/policy_engine"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/wdclient"
// Import KMS providers to register them
_ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/aws"
// _ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/azure" // TODO: Fix Azure SDK compatibility issues
_ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/gcp"
_ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/local"
_ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/openbao"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
)
type Action string
type Iam interface {
Check(f http.HandlerFunc, actions ...Action) http.HandlerFunc
}
type IdentityAccessManagement struct {
m sync.RWMutex
identities []*Identity
accessKeyIdent map[string]*Identity
nameToIdentity map[string]*Identity // O(1) lookup by identity name
policies map[string]*iam_pb.Policy
accounts map[string]*Account
emailAccount map[string]*Account
hashes map[string]*sync.Pool
hashCounters map[string]*int32
identityAnonymous *Identity
hashMu sync.RWMutex
domain string
externalHost string // pre-computed host for S3 signature verification (from ExternalUrl)
isAuthEnabled bool
credentialManager *credential.CredentialManager
filerClient *wdclient.FilerClient
grpcDialOption grpc.DialOption
// IAM Integration for advanced features
iamIntegration IAMIntegration
// Bucket policy engine for evaluating bucket policies
policyEngine *BucketPolicyEngine
// background polling
stopChan chan struct{}
shutdownOnce sync.Once
// useStaticConfig indicates if the configuration was loaded from a static file
useStaticConfig bool
// staticIdentityNames tracks identity names loaded from the static config file
// These identities are immutable and cannot be updated by dynamic configuration
staticIdentityNames map[string]bool
}
type Identity struct {
Name string
Account *Account
Credentials []*Credential
Actions []Action
PolicyNames []string // Attached IAM policy names
PrincipalArn string // ARN for IAM authorization (e.g., "arn:aws:iam::account-id:user/username")
Disabled bool // User status: false = enabled (default), true = disabled
Claims map[string]interface{} // JWT claims for policy substitution
IsStatic bool // Whether identity was loaded from static config (immutable)
}
// Account represents a system user, a system user can
// configure multiple IAM-Users, IAM-Users can configure
// permissions respectively, and each IAM-User can
// configure multiple security credentials
type Account struct {
//Name is also used to display the "DisplayName" as the owner of the bucket or object
DisplayName string
EmailAddress string
//Id is used to identify an Account when granting cross-account access(ACLs) to buckets and objects
Id string
}
// Default account ID for all automated SeaweedFS accounts and fallback
const defaultAccountID = "000000000000"
// Predefined Accounts
var (
// AccountAdmin is used as the default account for IAM-Credentials access without Account configured
AccountAdmin = Account{
DisplayName: "admin",
EmailAddress: "admin@example.com",
Id: s3_constants.AccountAdminId,
}
// AccountAnonymous is used to represent the account for anonymous access
AccountAnonymous = Account{
DisplayName: "anonymous",
EmailAddress: "anonymous@example.com",
Id: s3_constants.AccountAnonymousId,
}
)
type Credential struct {
AccessKey string
SecretKey string
Status string // Access key status: "Active" or "Inactive" (empty treated as "Active")
Expiration int64 // Unix timestamp when credential expires (0 = no expiration)
}
// isCredentialExpired checks if a credential has expired
func (c *Credential) isCredentialExpired() bool {
return c.Expiration > 0 && c.Expiration < time.Now().Unix()
}
// NewIdentityAccessManagement creates a new IAM manager
// SetFilerClient updates the filer client and its associated credential store
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) SetFilerClient(filerClient *wdclient.FilerClient) {
iam.m.Lock()
iam.filerClient = filerClient
iam.m.Unlock()
if iam.credentialManager == nil || filerClient == nil {
return
}
// Update credential store to use FilerClient's current filer for HA
if store := iam.credentialManager.GetStore(); store != nil {
if filerFuncSetter, ok := store.(interface {
SetFilerAddressFunc(func() pb.ServerAddress, grpc.DialOption)
}); ok {
filerFuncSetter.SetFilerAddressFunc(filerClient.GetCurrentFiler, iam.grpcDialOption)
}
}
}
// parseExternalUrlToHost parses an external URL and returns the host string
// to use for S3 signature verification. It applies the same default port
// stripping rules as the AWS SDK: port 80 is stripped for HTTP, port 443
// is stripped for HTTPS, all other ports are preserved.
// Returns empty string for empty input.
func parseExternalUrlToHost(externalUrl string) (string, error) {
if externalUrl == "" {
return "", nil
}
u, err := url.Parse(externalUrl)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid external URL: parse failed")
}
if u.Host == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid external URL: missing host")
}
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(u.Host)
if err != nil {
// No port in the URL. For IPv6, strip brackets to match AWS SDK.
if strings.Contains(u.Host, ":") {
return strings.Trim(u.Host, "[]"), nil
}
return u.Host, nil
}
// Strip default ports to match AWS SDK SanitizeHostForHeader behavior
if (port == "80" && strings.EqualFold(u.Scheme, "http")) ||
(port == "443" && strings.EqualFold(u.Scheme, "https")) {
return host, nil
}
return net.JoinHostPort(host, port), nil
}
func NewIdentityAccessManagement(option *S3ApiServerOption, filerClient *wdclient.FilerClient) *IdentityAccessManagement {
return NewIdentityAccessManagementWithStore(option, filerClient, "")
}
func NewIdentityAccessManagementWithStore(option *S3ApiServerOption, filerClient *wdclient.FilerClient, explicitStore string) *IdentityAccessManagement {
var externalHost string
if option.ExternalUrl != "" {
var err error
externalHost, err = parseExternalUrlToHost(option.ExternalUrl)
if err != nil {
glog.Fatalf("failed to parse s3.externalUrl: %v", err)
}
glog.V(0).Infof("S3 signature verification will use external host: %q (from %q)", externalHost, option.ExternalUrl)
}
iam := &IdentityAccessManagement{
domain: option.DomainName,
externalHost: externalHost,
hashes: make(map[string]*sync.Pool),
hashCounters: make(map[string]*int32),
filerClient: filerClient,
}
// Always initialize credential manager with fallback to defaults
credentialManager, err := credential.NewCredentialManagerWithDefaults(credential.CredentialStoreTypeName(explicitStore))
if err != nil {
glog.Fatalf("failed to initialize credential manager: %v", err)
}
// For stores that need filer client details, set them temporarily
// This will be updated to use FilerClient's GetCurrentFiler after FilerClient is created
if store := credentialManager.GetStore(); store != nil {
if filerFuncSetter, ok := store.(interface {
SetFilerAddressFunc(func() pb.ServerAddress, grpc.DialOption)
}); ok {
// Temporary setup: use first filer until FilerClient is available
// See s3api_server.go where this is updated to FilerClient.GetCurrentFiler
if len(option.Filers) > 0 {
getFiler := func() pb.ServerAddress {
if len(option.Filers) > 0 {
return option.Filers[0]
}
return ""
}
filerFuncSetter.SetFilerAddressFunc(getFiler, option.GrpcDialOption)
glog.V(1).Infof("Credential store configured with temporary filer function (will be updated after FilerClient creation)")
}
}
}
iam.credentialManager = credentialManager
iam.stopChan = make(chan struct{})
iam.grpcDialOption = option.GrpcDialOption
// Initialize default anonymous identity
// This ensures consistent behavior for anonymous access:
// 1. In simple auth mode (no IAM integration):
// - lookupAnonymous returns this identity
// - VerifyActionPermission checks actions (which are empty) -> Denies access
// - This preserves the secure-by-default behavior for simple auth
// 2. In advanced IAM mode (with Policy Engine):
// - lookupAnonymous returns this identity
// - VerifyActionPermission proceeds to Policy Engine
// - Policy Engine evaluates against policies (DefaultEffect=Allow if no config)
// - This enables the flexible "Open by Default" for zero-config startup
iam.identityAnonymous = &Identity{
Name: "anonymous",
Account: &AccountAnonymous,
Actions: []Action{},
IsStatic: true,
}
// First, try to load configurations from file or filer
startConfigFile := option.Config
if startConfigFile == "" {
startConfigFile = option.IamConfig
}
if startConfigFile != "" {
glog.V(3).Infof("loading static config file %s", startConfigFile)
if err := iam.loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFile(startConfigFile); err != nil {
glog.Fatalf("fail to load config file %s: %v", startConfigFile, err)
}
// Track identity names from static config to protect them from dynamic updates
// Must be done under lock to avoid race conditions
iam.m.Lock()
iam.useStaticConfig = true
iam.staticIdentityNames = make(map[string]bool)
for _, identity := range iam.identities {
iam.staticIdentityNames[identity.Name] = true
identity.IsStatic = true
}
iam.m.Unlock()
}
// Always try to load/merge config from credential manager (filer/db)
// This ensures we get both static users (from file) and dynamic users (from backend)
glog.V(3).Infof("loading dynamic config from credential manager")
if err := iam.loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFiler(option); err != nil {
glog.Warningf("fail to load config: %v", err)
}
// Determine whether to start background polling for updates
// We poll if using a store that doesn't support real-time events (like Postgres)
if store := iam.credentialManager.GetStore(); store != nil {
storeName := store.GetName()
if storeName == credential.StoreTypePostgres {
glog.V(1).Infof("Starting background IAM polling for store: %s", storeName)
go iam.pollIamConfigChanges(1 * time.Minute)
}
}
// Check for AWS environment variables and merge them if present
// This serves as an in-memory "static" configuration
iam.loadEnvironmentVariableCredentials()
// Determine whether to enable S3 authentication based on configuration
// For "weed mini" without any S3 config, default to allowing all access (isAuthEnabled = false)
// If any credentials are configured (via file, filer, or env vars), enable authentication
iam.m.Lock()
iam.isAuthEnabled = len(iam.identities) > 0
iam.m.Unlock()
if iam.isAuthEnabled {
// Credentials were configured - enable authentication
glog.V(1).Infof("S3 authentication enabled (%d identities configured)", len(iam.identities))
} else {
// No credentials configured
if startConfigFile != "" {
// Config file was specified but contained no identities - this is unusual, log a warning
glog.Warningf("S3 config file %s specified but no identities loaded - authentication disabled", startConfigFile)
} else {
// No config file and no identities - this is the normal allow-all case
glog.V(1).Infof("S3 authentication disabled - no credentials configured (allowing all access)")
}
}
return iam
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) pollIamConfigChanges(interval time.Duration) {
ticker := time.NewTicker(interval)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ticker.C:
if err := iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager(); err != nil {
glog.Warningf("failed to reload IAM configuration via polling: %v", err)
}
case <-iam.stopChan:
return
}
}
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) Shutdown() {
iam.shutdownOnce.Do(func() {
if iam.stopChan != nil {
close(iam.stopChan)
}
if iam.credentialManager != nil {
iam.credentialManager.Shutdown()
}
})
}
// loadEnvironmentVariableCredentials loads AWS credentials from environment variables
// and adds them as a static admin identity. This function is idempotent and can be
// called multiple times (e.g., after configuration reloads).
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) loadEnvironmentVariableCredentials() {
accessKeyId := os.Getenv("AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID")
secretAccessKey := os.Getenv("AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY")
if accessKeyId == "" || secretAccessKey == "" {
return
}
// Create environment variable identity name
identityNameSuffix := accessKeyId
if len(accessKeyId) > 8 {
identityNameSuffix = accessKeyId[:8]
}
identityName := "admin-" + identityNameSuffix
// Create admin identity with environment variable credentials
envIdentity := &Identity{
Name: identityName,
Account: &AccountAdmin,
Credentials: []*Credential{
{
AccessKey: accessKeyId,
SecretKey: secretAccessKey,
},
},
Actions: []Action{
s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN,
},
PrincipalArn: generatePrincipalArn(identityName),
IsStatic: true,
}
iam.m.Lock()
defer iam.m.Unlock()
// Initialize maps if they are nil
if iam.staticIdentityNames == nil {
iam.staticIdentityNames = make(map[string]bool)
}
if iam.accessKeyIdent == nil {
iam.accessKeyIdent = make(map[string]*Identity)
}
if iam.nameToIdentity == nil {
iam.nameToIdentity = make(map[string]*Identity)
}
// Check if identity already exists (avoid duplicates)
exists := false
for _, ident := range iam.identities {
if ident.Name == identityName {
exists = true
break
}
}
if !exists {
glog.Infof("Added admin identity from AWS environment variables: name=%s, accessKey=%s", envIdentity.Name, accessKeyId)
// Add to identities list
iam.identities = append(iam.identities, envIdentity)
// Update credential mappings
iam.accessKeyIdent[accessKeyId] = envIdentity
iam.nameToIdentity[envIdentity.Name] = envIdentity
// Treat env var identity as static (immutable)
iam.staticIdentityNames[envIdentity.Name] = true
// Ensure defaults exist
if iam.accounts == nil {
iam.accounts = make(map[string]*Account)
}
iam.accounts[AccountAdmin.Id] = &AccountAdmin
iam.accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id] = &AccountAnonymous
if iam.emailAccount == nil {
iam.emailAccount = make(map[string]*Account)
}
iam.emailAccount[AccountAdmin.EmailAddress] = &AccountAdmin
iam.emailAccount[AccountAnonymous.EmailAddress] = &AccountAnonymous
}
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFiler(option *S3ApiServerOption) (err error) {
// Try to load configuration with retries to handle transient connectivity issues during startup
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
err = iam.doLoadS3ApiConfigurationFromFiler(option)
if err == nil {
return nil
}
if errors.Is(err, filer_pb.ErrNotFound) {
return err
}
glog.Warningf("fail to load config from filer (attempt %d/10): %v", i+1, err)
time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
}
return err
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) doLoadS3ApiConfigurationFromFiler(option *S3ApiServerOption) error {
return iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager()
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFile(fileName string) error {
content, readErr := os.ReadFile(fileName)
if readErr != nil {
glog.Warningf("fail to read %s : %v", fileName, readErr)
return fmt.Errorf("fail to read %s : %v", fileName, readErr)
}
// Initialize KMS if configuration contains KMS settings
if err := iam.initializeKMSFromConfig(content); err != nil {
glog.Warningf("KMS initialization failed: %v", err)
}
return iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromBytes(content)
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromBytes(content []byte) error {
s3ApiConfiguration := &iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration{}
if err := filer.ParseS3ConfigurationFromBytes(content, s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
glog.Warningf("unmarshal error: %v", err)
return fmt.Errorf("unmarshal error: %w", err)
}
if err := filer.CheckDuplicateAccessKey(s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := iam.loadS3ApiConfiguration(s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) loadS3ApiConfiguration(config *iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration) error {
// Check if we need to merge with existing static configuration
iam.m.RLock()
hasStaticConfig := iam.useStaticConfig && len(iam.staticIdentityNames) > 0
iam.m.RUnlock()
if hasStaticConfig {
// Merge mode: preserve static identities, add/update dynamic ones
return iam.MergeS3ApiConfiguration(config)
}
// Normal mode: completely replace configuration
return iam.ReplaceS3ApiConfiguration(config)
}
// ReplaceS3ApiConfiguration completely replaces the current configuration (used when no static config)
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) ReplaceS3ApiConfiguration(config *iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration) error {
var identities []*Identity
var identityAnonymous *Identity
accessKeyIdent := make(map[string]*Identity)
nameToIdentity := make(map[string]*Identity)
policies := make(map[string]*iam_pb.Policy)
accounts := make(map[string]*Account)
emailAccount := make(map[string]*Account)
foundAccountAdmin := false
foundAccountAnonymous := false
for _, account := range config.Accounts {
glog.V(3).Infof("loading account name=%s, id=%s", account.DisplayName, account.Id)
accounts[account.Id] = &Account{
Id: account.Id,
DisplayName: account.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: account.EmailAddress,
}
switch account.Id {
case AccountAdmin.Id:
foundAccountAdmin = true
case AccountAnonymous.Id:
foundAccountAnonymous = true
}
if account.EmailAddress != "" {
emailAccount[account.EmailAddress] = accounts[account.Id]
}
}
if !foundAccountAdmin {
accounts[AccountAdmin.Id] = &Account{
DisplayName: AccountAdmin.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: AccountAdmin.EmailAddress,
Id: AccountAdmin.Id,
}
emailAccount[AccountAdmin.EmailAddress] = accounts[AccountAdmin.Id]
}
if !foundAccountAnonymous {
accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id] = &Account{
DisplayName: AccountAnonymous.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: AccountAnonymous.EmailAddress,
Id: AccountAnonymous.Id,
}
emailAccount[AccountAnonymous.EmailAddress] = accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id]
}
for _, policy := range config.Policies {
policies[policy.Name] = policy
}
for _, ident := range config.Identities {
glog.V(3).Infof("loading identity %s (disabled=%v)", ident.Name, ident.Disabled)
t := &Identity{
Name: ident.Name,
Credentials: nil,
Actions: nil,
PrincipalArn: generatePrincipalArn(ident.Name),
Disabled: ident.Disabled, // false (default) = enabled, true = disabled
PolicyNames: ident.PolicyNames,
}
switch {
case ident.Name == AccountAnonymous.Id:
t.Account = &AccountAnonymous
identityAnonymous = t
case ident.Account == nil:
t.Account = &AccountAdmin
default:
if account, ok := accounts[ident.Account.Id]; ok {
t.Account = account
} else {
t.Account = &AccountAdmin
glog.Warningf("identity %s is associated with a non exist account ID, the association is invalid", ident.Name)
}
}
for _, action := range ident.Actions {
t.Actions = append(t.Actions, Action(action))
}
for _, cred := range ident.Credentials {
t.Credentials = append(t.Credentials, &Credential{
AccessKey: cred.AccessKey,
SecretKey: cred.SecretKey,
Status: cred.Status, // Load access key status
})
accessKeyIdent[cred.AccessKey] = t
}
identities = append(identities, t)
nameToIdentity[t.Name] = t
}
// Load service accounts and add their credentials to the parent identity
for _, sa := range config.ServiceAccounts {
if sa.Credential == nil {
continue
}
// Skip disabled service accounts - they should not be able to authenticate
if sa.Disabled {
glog.V(3).Infof("Skipping disabled service account %s", sa.Id)
continue
}
// Find the parent identity
parentIdent, ok := nameToIdentity[sa.ParentUser]
if !ok {
glog.Warningf("Service account %s has non-existent parent user %s, skipping", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser)
continue
}
// Add service account credential to parent identity with expiration
cred := &Credential{
AccessKey: sa.Credential.AccessKey,
SecretKey: sa.Credential.SecretKey,
Status: sa.Credential.Status,
Expiration: sa.Expiration, // Populate expiration from service account
}
parentIdent.Credentials = append(parentIdent.Credentials, cred)
accessKeyIdent[sa.Credential.AccessKey] = parentIdent
glog.V(3).Infof("Loaded service account %s for parent %s (expiration: %d)", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser, sa.Expiration)
}
iam.m.Lock()
// Save existing environment-based identities before replacement
// This ensures AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID credentials are preserved
envIdentities := make([]*Identity, 0)
for _, ident := range iam.identities {
if ident.IsStatic && strings.HasPrefix(ident.Name, "admin-") {
// This is an environment-based admin identity, preserve it
envIdentities = append(envIdentities, ident)
}
}
// Ensure anonymous identity exists
if identityAnonymous == nil {
identityAnonymous = &Identity{
Name: "anonymous",
Account: accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id],
Actions: []Action{},
IsStatic: true,
}
}
// atomically switch
iam.identities = identities
iam.identityAnonymous = identityAnonymous
iam.accounts = accounts
iam.emailAccount = emailAccount
iam.nameToIdentity = nameToIdentity
iam.accessKeyIdent = accessKeyIdent
iam.policies = policies
// Re-add environment-based identities that were preserved
for _, envIdent := range envIdentities {
// Check if this identity already exists in the new config
exists := false
for _, ident := range iam.identities {
if ident.Name == envIdent.Name {
exists = true
break
}
}
if !exists {
if len(envIdent.Credentials) == 0 {
continue
}
iam.identities = append(iam.identities, envIdent)
iam.accessKeyIdent[envIdent.Credentials[0].AccessKey] = envIdent
iam.nameToIdentity[envIdent.Name] = envIdent
}
}
// Update authentication state based on whether identities exist
// Once enabled, keep it enabled (one-way toggle)
authJustEnabled := iam.updateAuthenticationState(len(iam.identities))
iam.m.Unlock()
if authJustEnabled {
glog.V(1).Infof("S3 authentication enabled - credentials were added dynamically")
}
// Re-add environment variable credentials if they exist
// This ensures env var credentials persist across configuration reloads
iam.loadEnvironmentVariableCredentials()
// Log configuration summary - always log to help debugging
glog.Infof("Loaded %d identities, %d accounts, %d access keys. Auth enabled: %v",
len(iam.identities), len(iam.accounts), len(iam.accessKeyIdent), iam.isAuthEnabled)
if glog.V(2) {
glog.V(2).Infof("Access key to identity mapping:")
iam.m.RLock()
for accessKey, identity := range iam.accessKeyIdent {
glog.V(2).Infof(" %s -> %s (actions: %d)", accessKey, identity.Name, len(identity.Actions))
}
iam.m.RUnlock()
}
return nil
}
// MergeS3ApiConfiguration merges dynamic configuration with existing static configuration
// Static identities (from file) are preserved and cannot be updated
// Dynamic identities (from filer/admin) can be added or updated
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) MergeS3ApiConfiguration(config *iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration) error {
// Start with current configuration (which includes static identities)
iam.m.RLock()
identities := make([]*Identity, len(iam.identities))
copy(identities, iam.identities)
identityAnonymous := iam.identityAnonymous
accessKeyIdent := make(map[string]*Identity)
for k, v := range iam.accessKeyIdent {
accessKeyIdent[k] = v
}
nameToIdentity := make(map[string]*Identity)
for k, v := range iam.nameToIdentity {
nameToIdentity[k] = v
}
policies := make(map[string]*iam_pb.Policy)
for k, v := range iam.policies {
policies[k] = v
}
accounts := make(map[string]*Account)
for k, v := range iam.accounts {
accounts[k] = v
}
emailAccount := make(map[string]*Account)
for k, v := range iam.emailAccount {
emailAccount[k] = v
}
staticNames := make(map[string]bool)
for k, v := range iam.staticIdentityNames {
staticNames[k] = v
}
iam.m.RUnlock()
// Process accounts from dynamic config (can add new accounts)
for _, account := range config.Accounts {
if _, exists := accounts[account.Id]; !exists {
glog.V(3).Infof("adding dynamic account: name=%s, id=%s", account.DisplayName, account.Id)
accounts[account.Id] = &Account{
Id: account.Id,
DisplayName: account.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: account.EmailAddress,
}
if account.EmailAddress != "" {
emailAccount[account.EmailAddress] = accounts[account.Id]
}
}
}
// Ensure default accounts exist
if _, exists := accounts[AccountAdmin.Id]; !exists {
accounts[AccountAdmin.Id] = &Account{
DisplayName: AccountAdmin.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: AccountAdmin.EmailAddress,
Id: AccountAdmin.Id,
}
emailAccount[AccountAdmin.EmailAddress] = accounts[AccountAdmin.Id]
}
if _, exists := accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id]; !exists {
accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id] = &Account{
DisplayName: AccountAnonymous.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: AccountAnonymous.EmailAddress,
Id: AccountAnonymous.Id,
}
emailAccount[AccountAnonymous.EmailAddress] = accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id]
}
// Process identities from dynamic config
for _, ident := range config.Identities {
// Skip static identities - they cannot be updated
if staticNames[ident.Name] {
glog.V(3).Infof("skipping static identity %s (immutable)", ident.Name)
continue
}
glog.V(3).Infof("loading/updating dynamic identity %s (disabled=%v)", ident.Name, ident.Disabled)
t := &Identity{
Name: ident.Name,
Credentials: nil,
Actions: nil,
PrincipalArn: generatePrincipalArn(ident.Name),
Disabled: ident.Disabled,
PolicyNames: ident.PolicyNames,
}
switch {
case ident.Name == AccountAnonymous.Id:
t.Account = &AccountAnonymous
identityAnonymous = t
case ident.Account == nil:
t.Account = &AccountAdmin
default:
if account, ok := accounts[ident.Account.Id]; ok {
t.Account = account
} else {
t.Account = &AccountAdmin
glog.Warningf("identity %s is associated with a non exist account ID, the association is invalid", ident.Name)
}
}
for _, action := range ident.Actions {
t.Actions = append(t.Actions, Action(action))
}
for _, cred := range ident.Credentials {
t.Credentials = append(t.Credentials, &Credential{
AccessKey: cred.AccessKey,
SecretKey: cred.SecretKey,
Status: cred.Status,
})
accessKeyIdent[cred.AccessKey] = t
}
// Update or add the identity
existingIdx := -1
for i, existing := range identities {
if existing.Name == ident.Name {
existingIdx = i
break
}
}
if existingIdx >= 0 {
// Before replacing, remove stale accessKeyIdent entries for the old identity
oldIdentity := identities[existingIdx]
for _, oldCred := range oldIdentity.Credentials {
// Only remove if it still points to this identity
if accessKeyIdent[oldCred.AccessKey] == oldIdentity {
delete(accessKeyIdent, oldCred.AccessKey)
}
}
// Replace existing dynamic identity
identities[existingIdx] = t
} else {
// Add new dynamic identity
identities = append(identities, t)
}
nameToIdentity[t.Name] = t
}
// Process service accounts from dynamic config
for _, sa := range config.ServiceAccounts {
if sa.Credential == nil {
continue
}
// Skip disabled service accounts
if sa.Disabled {
glog.V(3).Infof("Skipping disabled service account %s", sa.Id)
continue
}
// Find the parent identity
parentIdent, ok := nameToIdentity[sa.ParentUser]
if !ok {
glog.Warningf("Service account %s has non-existent parent user %s, skipping", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser)
continue
}
// Skip if parent is a static identity (we don't modify static identities)
if staticNames[sa.ParentUser] {
glog.V(3).Infof("Skipping service account %s for static parent %s", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser)
continue
}
// Check if this access key already exists in parent's credentials to avoid duplicates
alreadyExists := false
for _, existingCred := range parentIdent.Credentials {
if existingCred.AccessKey == sa.Credential.AccessKey {
alreadyExists = true
break
}
}
if alreadyExists {
glog.V(3).Infof("Service account %s credential already exists for parent %s, skipping", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser)
// Ensure accessKeyIdent mapping is correct
accessKeyIdent[sa.Credential.AccessKey] = parentIdent
continue
}
// Add service account credential to parent identity
cred := &Credential{
AccessKey: sa.Credential.AccessKey,
SecretKey: sa.Credential.SecretKey,
Status: sa.Credential.Status,
Expiration: sa.Expiration,
}
parentIdent.Credentials = append(parentIdent.Credentials, cred)
accessKeyIdent[sa.Credential.AccessKey] = parentIdent
glog.V(3).Infof("Loaded service account %s for dynamic parent %s (expiration: %d)", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser, sa.Expiration)
}
for _, policy := range config.Policies {
policies[policy.Name] = policy
}
iam.m.Lock()
// atomically switch
iam.identities = identities
iam.identityAnonymous = identityAnonymous
iam.accounts = accounts
iam.emailAccount = emailAccount
iam.nameToIdentity = nameToIdentity
iam.accessKeyIdent = accessKeyIdent
iam.policies = policies
// Update authentication state based on whether identities exist
// Once enabled, keep it enabled (one-way toggle)
authJustEnabled := iam.updateAuthenticationState(len(identities))
iam.m.Unlock()
if authJustEnabled {
glog.V(1).Infof("S3 authentication enabled because credentials were added dynamically")
}
// Log configuration summary
staticCount := len(staticNames)
dynamicCount := len(identities) - staticCount
glog.V(1).Infof("Merged config: %d static + %d dynamic identities = %d total, %d accounts, %d access keys. Auth enabled: %v",
staticCount, dynamicCount, len(identities), len(accounts), len(accessKeyIdent), iam.isAuthEnabled)
if glog.V(2) {
glog.V(2).Infof("Access key to identity mapping:")
for accessKey, identity := range accessKeyIdent {
identityType := "dynamic"
if staticNames[identity.Name] {
identityType = "static"
}
glog.V(2).Infof(" %s -> %s (%s, actions: %d)", accessKey, identity.Name, identityType, len(identity.Actions))
}
}
return nil
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) RemoveIdentity(name string) {
glog.V(1).Infof("IAM: remove identity %s", name)
iam.m.Lock()
defer iam.m.Unlock()
identity, ok := iam.nameToIdentity[name]
if !ok {
return
}
if identity.IsStatic {
glog.V(1).Infof("IAM: skipping removal of static identity %s (immutable)", name)
return
}
// Remove from identities slice
for i, ident := range iam.identities {
if ident.Name == name {
iam.identities = append(iam.identities[:i], iam.identities[i+1:]...)
break
}
}
// Remove from maps
delete(iam.nameToIdentity, name)
for _, cred := range identity.Credentials {
if iam.accessKeyIdent[cred.AccessKey] == identity {
delete(iam.accessKeyIdent, cred.AccessKey)
}
}
if identity == iam.identityAnonymous {
iam.identityAnonymous = nil
}
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) UpsertIdentity(ident *iam_pb.Identity) error {
if ident == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("upsert identity failed: nil identity")
}
if ident.Name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("upsert identity failed: empty identity name")
}
glog.V(1).Infof("IAM: upsert identity %s", ident.Name)
return iam.MergeS3ApiConfiguration(&iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration{
Identities: []*iam_pb.Identity{ident},
})
}
// isEnabled reports whether S3 auth should be enforced for this server.
//
// Auth is considered enabled if either:
// - we have any locally managed identities/credentials (iam.isAuthEnabled), or
// - an external IAM integration has been configured (iam.iamIntegration != nil).
//
// The iamIntegration check is intentionally included so that when an external
// IAM provider is configured (and the server relies solely on it), auth is
// still treated as enabled even if there are no local identities yet or
// before any sync logic flips isAuthEnabled to true. Removing this check or
// relying only on isAuthEnabled would change when auth is enforced and could
// unintentionally allow unauthenticated access in integration-only setups.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) isEnabled() bool {
return iam.isAuthEnabled || iam.iamIntegration != nil
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) updateAuthenticationState(identitiesCount int) bool {
if !iam.isAuthEnabled && identitiesCount > 0 {
iam.isAuthEnabled = true
return true
}
return false
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) IsStaticConfig() bool {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
return iam.useStaticConfig
}
// IsStaticIdentity checks if an identity was loaded from the static config file
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) IsStaticIdentity(identityName string) bool {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
return iam.staticIdentityNames[identityName]
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) lookupByAccessKey(accessKey string) (identity *Identity, cred *Credential, found bool) {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
// Helper function to truncate access key for logging to avoid credential exposure
truncate := func(key string) string {
const mask = "***"
if len(key) > 4 {
return key[:4] + mask
}
// For very short keys, never log the full key
return mask
}
truncatedKey := truncate(accessKey)
glog.V(4).Infof("Looking up access key: %s (len=%d, total keys registered: %d)",
truncatedKey, len(accessKey), len(iam.accessKeyIdent))
if ident, ok := iam.accessKeyIdent[accessKey]; ok {
// Check if user is disabled
if ident.Disabled {
glog.V(2).Infof("User %s is disabled, rejecting access key %s", ident.Name, truncatedKey)
return nil, nil, false
}
for _, credential := range ident.Credentials {
if credential.AccessKey == accessKey {
// Check if access key is inactive (empty Status treated as Active for backward compatibility)
if credential.Status == iamAccessKeyStatusInactive {
glog.V(2).Infof("Access key %s for identity %s is inactive", truncatedKey, ident.Name)
return nil, nil, false
}
glog.V(4).Infof("Found access key %s for identity %s", truncatedKey, ident.Name)
return ident, credential, true
}
}
}
glog.V(2).Infof("Could not find access key %s (len=%d). Available keys: %d, Auth enabled: %v",
truncatedKey, len(accessKey), len(iam.accessKeyIdent), iam.isAuthEnabled)
// Log all registered access keys at higher verbosity for debugging
if glog.V(3) {
glog.V(3).Infof("Registered access keys:")
for key := range iam.accessKeyIdent {
glog.V(3).Infof(" - %s (len=%d)", truncate(key), len(key))
}
}
return nil, nil, false
}
// LookupByAccessKey is an exported wrapper for lookupByAccessKey.
// It returns the identity and credential associated with the given access key.
//
// WARNING: The returned pointers reference internal data structures.
// Callers MUST NOT modify the returned Identity or Credential objects.
// If mutation is needed, make a copy first.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) LookupByAccessKey(accessKey string) (identity *Identity, cred *Credential, found bool) {
return iam.lookupByAccessKey(accessKey)
}
// LookupAnonymous returns the anonymous identity if it exists
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) LookupAnonymous() (identity *Identity, found bool) {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
if iam.identityAnonymous != nil {
return iam.identityAnonymous, true
}
return nil, false
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) lookupByIdentityName(name string) *Identity {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
return iam.nameToIdentity[name]
}
// generatePrincipalArn generates an ARN for a user identity
func generatePrincipalArn(identityName string) string {
// Handle special cases
switch identityName {
case AccountAnonymous.Id:
return "*" // Use universal wildcard for anonymous allowed by bucket policy
case AccountAdmin.Id:
return fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:iam::%s:user/admin", defaultAccountID)
default:
return fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:iam::%s:user/%s", defaultAccountID, identityName)
}
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) GetAccountNameById(canonicalId string) string {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
if account, ok := iam.accounts[canonicalId]; ok {
return account.DisplayName
}
return ""
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) GetAccountIdByEmail(email string) string {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
if account, ok := iam.emailAccount[email]; ok {
return account.Id
}
return ""
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) Auth(f http.HandlerFunc, action Action) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !iam.isEnabled() {
f(w, r)
return
}
identity, errCode := iam.authRequest(r, action)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
glog.V(3).Infof("auth error: %v", errCode)
}
iam.handleAuthResult(w, r, identity, errCode, f)
}
}
// AuthPostPolicy is a specialized authentication wrapper for PostPolicy requests.
// It allows requests with multipart/form-data to proceed even if classified as Anonymous,
// because the actual authentication (signature verification) for ALL PostPolicy requests is
// performed unconditionally in PostPolicyBucketHandler.doesPolicySignatureMatch().
// This delegation only defers the initial authentication classification; it does NOT bypass
// signature verification, which is mandatory for all PostPolicy uploads.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) AuthPostPolicy(f http.HandlerFunc, action Action) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !iam.isEnabled() {
f(w, r)
return
}
// Optimization: Use authRequestWithAuthType to avoid re-parsing headers for classification
identity, errCode, authType := iam.authRequestWithAuthType(r, action)
// Special handling for PostPolicy: if AccessDenied (likely because Anonymous to private bucket)
// AND it looks like a PostPolicy request, allow it to proceed to handler for verification.
if errCode == s3err.ErrAccessDenied {
if authType == authTypeAnonymous &&
r.Method == http.MethodPost &&
strings.Contains(r.Header.Get("Content-Type"), "multipart/form-data") {
glog.V(3).Infof("Delegating PostPolicy auth to handler")
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "PostPolicy")
f(w, r)
return
}
}
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
glog.V(3).Infof("auth error: %v", errCode)
}
iam.handleAuthResult(w, r, identity, errCode, f)
}
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) handleAuthResult(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, identity *Identity, errCode s3err.ErrorCode, f http.HandlerFunc) {
if errCode == s3err.ErrNone {
// Store the authenticated identity in request context (secure, cannot be spoofed)
if identity != nil && identity.Name != "" {
ctx := s3_constants.SetIdentityNameInContext(r.Context(), identity.Name)
// Also store the full identity object for handlers that need it (e.g., ListBuckets)
// This is especially important for JWT users whose identity is not in the identities list
ctx = s3_constants.SetIdentityInContext(ctx, identity)
r = r.WithContext(ctx)
}
f(w, r)
return
}
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, errCode)
}
// Wrapper to maintain backward compatibility
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authRequest(r *http.Request, action Action) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
identity, err, _ := iam.authRequestWithAuthType(r, action)
if err != s3err.ErrNone {
return nil, err
}
return identity, err
}
// check whether the request has valid access keys
// AuthenticateRequest verifies the credentials in the request and returns the identity.
// It bypasses permission checks (authorization).
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) AuthenticateRequest(r *http.Request) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
if !iam.isAuthEnabled {
return &Identity{
Name: "admin",
Account: &AccountAdmin,
Actions: []Action{s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN},
}, s3err.ErrNone
}
ident, err, _ := iam.authenticateRequestInternal(r)
return ident, err
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authenticateRequestInternal(r *http.Request) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode, authType) {
var identity *Identity
var s3Err s3err.ErrorCode
var found bool
var amzAuthType string
// SECURITY: Prevent clients from spoofing internal IAM headers
// These headers are only set by the server after successful JWT authentication
// Clearing them here prevents privilege escalation via header injection
r.Header.Del("X-SeaweedFS-Principal")
r.Header.Del("X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token")
reqAuthType := getRequestAuthType(r)
switch reqAuthType {
case authTypeUnknown:
glog.V(4).Infof("unknown auth type")
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "Unknown")
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
case authTypePresignedV2, authTypeSignedV2:
glog.V(4).Infof("v2 auth type")
identity, s3Err = iam.isReqAuthenticatedV2(r)
amzAuthType = "SigV2"
case authTypeStreamingSigned, authTypeSigned, authTypePresigned:
glog.V(4).Infof("v4 auth type")
identity, s3Err = iam.reqSignatureV4Verify(r)
amzAuthType = "SigV4"
case authTypeStreamingUnsigned:
glog.V(4).Infof("unsigned streaming upload")
identity, s3Err = iam.reqSignatureV4Verify(r)
amzAuthType = "SigV4"
case authTypeJWT:
glog.V(4).Infof("jwt auth type detected, iamIntegration != nil? %t", iam.iamIntegration != nil)
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "Jwt")
if iam.iamIntegration != nil {
identity, s3Err = iam.authenticateJWTWithIAM(r)
amzAuthType = "Jwt"
} else {
glog.V(2).Infof("IAM integration is nil, returning ErrNotImplemented")
return identity, s3err.ErrNotImplemented, reqAuthType
}
case authTypeAnonymous:
amzAuthType = "Anonymous"
if identity, found = iam.LookupAnonymous(); !found {
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, amzAuthType)
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
}
default:
return identity, s3err.ErrNotImplemented, reqAuthType
}
if len(amzAuthType) > 0 {
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, amzAuthType)
}
return identity, s3Err, reqAuthType
}
// authRequestWithAuthType authenticates and then authorizes a request for a given action.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authRequestWithAuthType(r *http.Request, action Action) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode, authType) {
identity, s3Err, reqAuthType := iam.authenticateRequestInternal(r)
if s3Err != s3err.ErrNone {
return identity, s3Err, reqAuthType
}
bucket, object := s3_constants.GetBucketAndObject(r)
prefix := s3_constants.GetPrefix(r)
// For List operations, use prefix for permission checking if available
if action == s3_constants.ACTION_LIST && object == "" && prefix != "" {
// List operation with prefix - check permission for the prefix path
object = prefix
} else if (object == "/" || object == "") && prefix != "" {
// Using the aws cli with s3, and s3api, and with boto3, the object is often set to "/" or empty
// but the prefix is set to the actual object key for permission checking
object = prefix
}
// For ListBuckets, authorization is performed in the handler by iterating
// through buckets and checking permissions for each. Skip the global check here.
policyAllows := false
if action == s3_constants.ACTION_LIST && bucket == "" && identity.Name != s3_constants.AccountAnonymousId {
// ListBuckets operation for authenticated users - authorization handled per-bucket in the handler
} else {
// First check bucket policy if one exists
// Bucket policies can grant or deny access to specific users/principals
// Following AWS semantics:
// - Explicit DENY in bucket policy → immediate rejection
// - Explicit ALLOW in bucket policy → grant access (bypass IAM checks)
// - No policy or indeterminate → fall through to IAM checks
if iam.policyEngine != nil && bucket != "" {
principal := buildPrincipalARN(identity, r)
// Phase 1: Evaluate bucket policy without object entry.
// Tag-based conditions (s3:ExistingObjectTag) are re-checked by handlers
// after fetching the entry, which is the Phase 2 check.
var claims map[string]interface{}
if identity != nil {
claims = identity.Claims
}
allowed, evaluated, err := iam.policyEngine.EvaluatePolicy(bucket, object, string(action), principal, r, claims, nil)
if err != nil {
// SECURITY: Fail-close on policy evaluation errors
// If we can't evaluate the policy, deny access rather than falling through to IAM
glog.Errorf("Error evaluating bucket policy for %s/%s: %v - denying access", bucket, object, err)
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
} else if evaluated {
// A bucket policy exists and was evaluated with a matching statement
if allowed {
// Policy explicitly allows this action - grant access immediately
// This bypasses IAM checks to support cross-account access and policy-only principals
glog.V(3).Infof("Bucket policy allows %s to %s on %s/%s (bypassing IAM)", identity.Name, action, bucket, object)
policyAllows = true
} else {
// Policy explicitly denies this action - deny access immediately
// Note: Explicit Deny in bucket policy overrides all other permissions
glog.V(3).Infof("Bucket policy explicitly denies %s to %s on %s/%s", identity.Name, action, bucket, object)
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
}
}
// If not evaluated (no policy or no matching statements), fall through to IAM/identity checks
}
// Only check IAM if bucket policy didn't explicitly allow
if !policyAllows {
// Use centralized permission check
if errCode := iam.VerifyActionPermission(r, identity, action, bucket, object); errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
return identity, errCode, reqAuthType
}
}
}
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAccountId, identity.Account.Id)
return identity, s3err.ErrNone, reqAuthType
}
// AuthSignatureOnly performs only signature verification without any authorization checks.
// This is used for IAM API operations where authorization is handled separately based on
// the specific IAM action (e.g., self-service vs admin operations).
// Returns the authenticated identity and any signature verification error.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) AuthSignatureOnly(r *http.Request) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
var identity *Identity
var s3Err s3err.ErrorCode
var authType string
switch getRequestAuthType(r) {
case authTypeUnknown:
glog.V(3).Infof("unknown auth type")
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "Unknown")
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
case authTypePresignedV2, authTypeSignedV2:
glog.V(3).Infof("v2 auth type")
identity, s3Err = iam.isReqAuthenticatedV2(r)
authType = "SigV2"
case authTypeStreamingSigned, authTypeSigned, authTypePresigned:
glog.V(3).Infof("v4 auth type")
identity, s3Err = iam.reqSignatureV4Verify(r)
authType = "SigV4"
case authTypeStreamingUnsigned:
glog.V(3).Infof("unsigned streaming upload")
identity, s3Err = iam.reqSignatureV4Verify(r)
authType = "SigV4"
case authTypeJWT:
glog.V(3).Infof("jwt auth type detected, iamIntegration != nil? %t", iam.iamIntegration != nil)
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "Jwt")
if iam.iamIntegration != nil {
identity, s3Err = iam.authenticateJWTWithIAM(r)
authType = "Jwt"
} else {
glog.V(2).Infof("IAM integration is nil, returning ErrNotImplemented")
return identity, s3err.ErrNotImplemented
}
case authTypeAnonymous:
// Anonymous users can be authenticated, but authorization is handled separately
return iam.identityAnonymous, s3err.ErrNone
default:
return identity, s3err.ErrNotImplemented
}
if len(authType) > 0 {
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, authType)
}
if s3Err != s3err.ErrNone {
return identity, s3Err
}
// Set account ID header for downstream handlers
if identity != nil && identity.Account != nil {
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAccountId, identity.Account.Id)
}
return identity, s3err.ErrNone
}
func (identity *Identity) CanDo(action Action, bucket string, objectKey string) bool {
if identity == nil {
return false
}
if identity.isAdmin() {
return true
}
for _, a := range identity.Actions {
// Case where the Resource provided is
// "Resource": [
// "arn:aws:s3:::*"
// ]
if a == action {
return true
}
}
// Intelligent path concatenation to avoid double slashes
fullPath := bucket
if objectKey != "" && !strings.HasPrefix(objectKey, "/") {
fullPath += "/"
}
fullPath += objectKey
if bucket == "" {
glog.V(3).Infof("identity %s is not allowed to perform action %s on %s -- bucket is empty", identity.Name, action, "/"+strings.TrimPrefix(objectKey, "/"))
return false
}
glog.V(3).Infof("checking if %s can perform %s on bucket '%s'", identity.Name, action, fullPath)
target := string(action) + ":" + fullPath
adminTarget := s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN + ":" + fullPath
limitedByBucket := string(action) + ":" + bucket
adminLimitedByBucket := s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN + ":" + bucket
for _, a := range identity.Actions {
act := string(a)
if strings.ContainsAny(act, "*?") {
// Pattern has wildcards - use smart matching
if policy_engine.MatchesWildcard(act, target) {
return true
}
if policy_engine.MatchesWildcard(act, adminTarget) {
return true
}
} else {
// No wildcards - exact match only
if act == limitedByBucket {
return true
}
if act == adminLimitedByBucket {
return true
}
}
}
//log error
glog.V(3).Infof("identity %s is not allowed to perform action %s on %s", identity.Name, action, bucket+"/"+objectKey)
return false
}
func (identity *Identity) isAdmin() bool {
if identity == nil {
return false
}
return slices.Contains(identity.Actions, s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN)
}
// buildPrincipalARN builds an ARN for an identity to use in bucket policy evaluation
// It first checks if a principal ARN was set by JWT authentication in request headers
func buildPrincipalARN(identity *Identity, r *http.Request) string {
// Check if principal ARN was already set by JWT authentication
if r != nil {
if principalARN := r.Header.Get("X-SeaweedFS-Principal"); principalARN != "" {
glog.V(4).Infof("buildPrincipalARN: Using principal ARN from header: %s", principalARN)
return principalARN
}
}
if identity == nil {
return "*" // Anonymous
}
// Priority 1: Use principal ARN if explicitly set (from STS JWT or IAM user)
if identity.PrincipalArn != "" {
return identity.PrincipalArn
}
// Priority 2: Check if this is the anonymous user identity (authenticated as anonymous)
// S3 policies expect Principal: "*" for anonymous access
if identity.Name == s3_constants.AccountAnonymousId ||
(identity.Account != nil && identity.Account.Id == s3_constants.AccountAnonymousId) {
return "*" // Anonymous user
}
// Build an AWS-compatible principal ARN
// Format: arn:aws:iam::account-id:user/user-name
accountID := defaultAccountID // Default account ID
if identity.Account != nil && identity.Account.Id != "" {
accountID = identity.Account.Id
}
userName := identity.Name
if userName == "" {
userName = "unknown"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:iam::%s:user/%s", accountID, userName)
}
// GetCredentialManager returns the credential manager instance
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) GetCredentialManager() *credential.CredentialManager {
return iam.credentialManager
}
// LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager loads configuration using the credential manager
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager() error {
glog.V(1).Infof("Loading S3 API configuration from credential manager")
s3ApiConfiguration, err := iam.credentialManager.LoadConfiguration(context.Background())
if err != nil {
glog.Errorf("Failed to load configuration from credential manager: %v", err)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to load configuration from credential manager: %w", err)
}
glog.V(2).Infof("Credential manager returned %d identities and %d accounts",
len(s3ApiConfiguration.Identities), len(s3ApiConfiguration.Accounts))
if err := iam.loadS3ApiConfiguration(s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
glog.Errorf("Failed to load S3 API configuration: %v", err)
return err
}
glog.V(1).Infof("Successfully loaded S3 API configuration from credential manager")
return nil
}
// initializeKMSFromConfig loads KMS configuration from TOML format
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) initializeKMSFromConfig(configContent []byte) error {
// JSON-only KMS configuration
if err := iam.initializeKMSFromJSON(configContent); err == nil {
glog.V(1).Infof("Successfully loaded KMS configuration from JSON format")
return nil
}
glog.V(2).Infof("No KMS configuration found in S3 config - SSE-KMS will not be available")
return nil
}
// initializeKMSFromJSON loads KMS configuration from JSON format when provided in the same file
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) initializeKMSFromJSON(configContent []byte) error {
// Parse as generic JSON and extract optional "kms" block
var m map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(string(configContent))), &m); err != nil {
return err
}
kmsVal, ok := m["kms"]
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("no KMS section found")
}
// Load KMS configuration directly from the parsed JSON data
return kms.LoadKMSFromConfig(kmsVal)
}
// SetIAMIntegration sets the IAM integration for advanced authentication and authorization
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) SetIAMIntegration(integration *S3IAMIntegration) {
iam.m.Lock()
defer iam.m.Unlock()
iam.iamIntegration = integration
// When IAM integration is configured, authentication must be enabled
// to ensure requests go through proper auth checks
if integration != nil {
iam.isAuthEnabled = true
}
}
// authenticateJWTWithIAM authenticates JWT tokens using the IAM integration
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authenticateJWTWithIAM(r *http.Request) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
ctx := r.Context()
// Use IAM integration to authenticate JWT
iamIdentity, errCode := iam.iamIntegration.AuthenticateJWT(ctx, r)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
return nil, errCode
}
// Convert IAMIdentity to existing Identity structure
identity := &Identity{
Name: iamIdentity.Name,
Account: iamIdentity.Account,
Actions: []Action{}, // Empty - authorization handled by policy engine
PolicyNames: iamIdentity.PolicyNames,
Claims: iamIdentity.Claims,
}
// Store session info in request headers for later authorization
r.Header.Set("X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token", iamIdentity.SessionToken)
r.Header.Set("X-SeaweedFS-Principal", iamIdentity.Principal)
return identity, s3err.ErrNone
}
// IAM authorization path type constants
// iamAuthPath represents the type of IAM authorization path
type iamAuthPath string
// IAM authorization path constants
const (
iamAuthPathJWT iamAuthPath = "jwt"
iamAuthPathSTS_V4 iamAuthPath = "sts_v4"
iamAuthPathStatic_V4 iamAuthPath = "static_v4"
iamAuthPathNone iamAuthPath = "none"
)
// determineIAMAuthPath determines the IAM authorization path based on available tokens and principals
func determineIAMAuthPath(sessionToken, principal, principalArn string) iamAuthPath {
if sessionToken != "" && principal != "" {
return iamAuthPathJWT
} else if sessionToken != "" && principalArn != "" {
return iamAuthPathSTS_V4
} else if principalArn != "" {
return iamAuthPathStatic_V4
}
return iamAuthPathNone
}
// VerifyActionPermission checks if the identity is allowed to perform the action on the resource.
// It handles both traditional identities (via Actions) and IAM/STS identities (via Policy).
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) VerifyActionPermission(r *http.Request, identity *Identity, action Action, bucket, object string) s3err.ErrorCode {
// Fail closed if identity is nil
if identity == nil {
glog.V(3).Infof("VerifyActionPermission called with nil identity for action %s on %s/%s", action, bucket, object)
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Traditional identities (with Actions from -s3.config) use legacy auth,
// JWT/STS identities (no Actions or having a session token) use IAM authorization.
// IMPORTANT: We MUST prioritize IAM authorization for any request with a session token
// to ensure that session policies are correctly enforced.
hasSessionToken := r.Header.Get("X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token") != "" ||
r.Header.Get("X-Amz-Security-Token") != "" ||
r.URL.Query().Get("X-Amz-Security-Token") != ""
if (len(identity.Actions) == 0 || hasSessionToken) && iam.iamIntegration != nil {
return iam.authorizeWithIAM(r, identity, action, bucket, object)
}
if len(identity.Actions) > 0 {
if !identity.CanDo(action, bucket, object) {
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
return s3err.ErrNone
}
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// authorizeWithIAM authorizes requests using the IAM integration policy engine
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authorizeWithIAM(r *http.Request, identity *Identity, action Action, bucket string, object string) s3err.ErrorCode {
ctx := r.Context()
// Get session info from request headers
// First check for JWT-based authentication headers (X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token)
sessionToken := r.Header.Get("X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token")
principal := r.Header.Get("X-SeaweedFS-Principal")
// Fallback to AWS Signature V4 STS token if JWT token not present
// This handles the case where STS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity generates temporary credentials
// that include an X-Amz-Security-Token header (in addition to the access key and secret)
if sessionToken == "" {
sessionToken = r.Header.Get("X-Amz-Security-Token")
if sessionToken == "" {
// Also check query parameters for presigned URLs with STS tokens
sessionToken = r.URL.Query().Get("X-Amz-Security-Token")
}
}
// Create IAMIdentity for authorization
iamIdentity := &IAMIdentity{
Name: identity.Name,
Account: identity.Account,
PolicyNames: identity.PolicyNames,
Claims: identity.Claims, // Copy claims for policy variable substitution
}
// Determine authorization path and configure identity
authPath := determineIAMAuthPath(sessionToken, principal, identity.PrincipalArn)
switch authPath {
case iamAuthPathJWT:
// JWT-based authentication - use session token and principal from headers
iamIdentity.Principal = principal
iamIdentity.SessionToken = sessionToken
glog.V(3).Infof("Using JWT-based IAM authorization for principal: %s", principal)
case iamAuthPathSTS_V4:
// STS V4 signature authentication - use session token (from X-Amz-Security-Token) with principal ARN
iamIdentity.Principal = identity.PrincipalArn
iamIdentity.SessionToken = sessionToken
glog.V(3).Infof("Using STS V4 signature IAM authorization for principal: %s with session token", identity.PrincipalArn)
case iamAuthPathStatic_V4:
// Static V4 signature authentication - use principal ARN without session token
iamIdentity.Principal = identity.PrincipalArn
iamIdentity.SessionToken = ""
glog.V(3).Infof("Using static V4 signature IAM authorization for principal: %s", identity.PrincipalArn)
default:
glog.V(3).Info("No valid principal information for IAM authorization")
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Use IAM integration for authorization
return iam.iamIntegration.AuthorizeAction(ctx, iamIdentity, action, bucket, object, r)
}
// PutPolicy adds or updates a policy
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) PutPolicy(name string, content string) error {
iam.m.Lock()
defer iam.m.Unlock()
if iam.policies == nil {
iam.policies = make(map[string]*iam_pb.Policy)
}
iam.policies[name] = &iam_pb.Policy{Name: name, Content: content}
return nil
}
// GetPolicy retrieves a policy by name
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) GetPolicy(name string) (*iam_pb.Policy, error) {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
if policy, ok := iam.policies[name]; ok {
return policy, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("policy not found: %s", name)
}
// DeletePolicy removes a policy
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) DeletePolicy(name string) error {
iam.m.Lock()
defer iam.m.Unlock()
delete(iam.policies, name)
return nil
}
// ListPolicies lists all policies
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) ListPolicies() []*iam_pb.Policy {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
var policies []*iam_pb.Policy
for _, p := range iam.policies {
policies = append(policies, p)
}
return policies
}