Files
seaweedFS/weed/s3api/s3_iam_middleware.go
Chris Lu abfa64456b Fix STS authorization in streaming/chunked uploads (#7988)
* Fix STS authorization in streaming/chunked uploads

During streaming/chunked uploads (SigV4 streaming), authorization happens
twice:
1. Initial authorization in authRequestWithAuthType() - works correctly
2. Second authorization in verifyV4Signature() - was failing for STS

The issue was that verifyV4Signature() only used identity.canDo() for
permission checks, which always denies STS identities (they have empty
Actions). This bypassed IAM authorization completely.

This commit makes verifyV4Signature() IAM-aware by adding the same
fallback logic used in authRequestWithAuthType():
- Traditional identities (with Actions) use legacy canDo() check
- STS/JWT identities (empty Actions) fall back to IAM authorization

Fixes: https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/pull/7986#issuecomment-3723196038

* Add comprehensive unit tests for STS authorization in streaming uploads

Created test suite to verify that verifyV4Signature properly handles STS
identities by falling back to IAM authorization when shouldCheckPermissions
is true.

Tests cover:
- STS identities with IAM integration (allow and deny cases)
- STS identities without IAM integration (should deny)
- Traditional identities with Actions (canDo check)
- Permission check bypass when shouldCheckPermissions=false
- Specific streaming upload scenario from bug report
- Action determination based on HTTP method

All tests pass successfully.

* Refactor authorization logic to avoid duplication

Centralized the authorization logic into IdentityAccessManagement.VerifyActionPermission.
Updated auth_signature_v4.go and auth_credentials.go to use this new helper.
Updated tests to clarify that they mirror the centralized logic.

* Refactor tests to use VerifyActionPermission directly

Introduced IAMIntegration interface to facilitate mocking of internal IAM integration logic.
Updated IdentityAccessManagement to use the interface.
Updated tests to directy call VerifyActionPermission using a mocked IAM integration, eliminating duplicated logic in tests.

* fix(s3api): ensure static config file takes precedence and refactor tests

- Track if configuration was loaded from a static file using `useStaticConfig`.
- Ignore filer-based IAM updates when a static configuration is in use to respect "Highest Priority" rule.
- Refactor `TestVerifyV4SignatureWithSTSIdentity` to use `VerifyActionPermission` directly.
- Fix typed nil interface panic in authorization test.
2026-01-08 17:06:56 -08:00

648 lines
21 KiB
Go

package s3api
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/integration"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/providers"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/sts"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
)
// IAMIntegration defines the interface for IAM integration
type IAMIntegration interface {
AuthenticateJWT(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request) (*IAMIdentity, s3err.ErrorCode)
AuthorizeAction(ctx context.Context, identity *IAMIdentity, action Action, bucket string, objectKey string, r *http.Request) s3err.ErrorCode
ValidateSessionToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (*sts.SessionInfo, error)
}
// S3IAMIntegration provides IAM integration for S3 API
type S3IAMIntegration struct {
iamManager *integration.IAMManager
stsService *sts.STSService
filerAddress string
enabled bool
}
// NewS3IAMIntegration creates a new S3 IAM integration
func NewS3IAMIntegration(iamManager *integration.IAMManager, filerAddress string) *S3IAMIntegration {
var stsService *sts.STSService
if iamManager != nil {
stsService = iamManager.GetSTSService()
}
return &S3IAMIntegration{
iamManager: iamManager,
stsService: stsService,
filerAddress: filerAddress,
enabled: iamManager != nil,
}
}
// AuthenticateJWT authenticates JWT tokens using our STS service
func (s3iam *S3IAMIntegration) AuthenticateJWT(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request) (*IAMIdentity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
if !s3iam.enabled {
return nil, s3err.ErrNotImplemented
}
// Extract bearer token from Authorization header
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
if !strings.HasPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") {
return nil, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
sessionToken := strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ")
if sessionToken == "" {
return nil, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Basic token format validation - reject obviously invalid tokens
if sessionToken == "invalid-token" || len(sessionToken) < 10 {
glog.V(3).Info("Session token format is invalid")
return nil, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Try to parse as STS session token first
tokenClaims, err := parseJWTToken(sessionToken)
if err != nil {
glog.V(3).Infof("Failed to parse JWT token: %v", err)
return nil, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Determine token type by issuer claim (more robust than checking role claim)
issuer, issuerOk := tokenClaims["iss"].(string)
if !issuerOk {
glog.V(3).Infof("Token missing issuer claim - invalid JWT")
return nil, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Check if this is an STS-issued token by examining the issuer
if !s3iam.isSTSIssuer(issuer) {
// Not an STS session token, try to validate as OIDC token with timeout
// Create a context with a reasonable timeout to prevent hanging
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 15*time.Second)
defer cancel()
identity, err := s3iam.validateExternalOIDCToken(ctx, sessionToken)
if err != nil {
return nil, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Extract role from OIDC identity
if identity.RoleArn == "" {
return nil, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Return IAM identity for OIDC token
return &IAMIdentity{
Name: identity.UserID,
Principal: identity.RoleArn,
SessionToken: sessionToken,
Account: &Account{
DisplayName: identity.UserID,
EmailAddress: identity.UserID + "@oidc.local",
Id: identity.UserID,
},
}, s3err.ErrNone
}
// This is an STS-issued token - extract STS session information
// Extract role claim from STS token
roleName, roleOk := tokenClaims["role"].(string)
if !roleOk || roleName == "" {
glog.V(3).Infof("STS token missing role claim")
return nil, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
sessionName, ok := tokenClaims["snam"].(string)
if !ok || sessionName == "" {
sessionName = "jwt-session" // Default fallback
}
subject, ok := tokenClaims["sub"].(string)
if !ok || subject == "" {
subject = "jwt-user" // Default fallback
}
// Use the principal ARN directly from token claims, or build it if not available
principalArn, ok := tokenClaims["principal"].(string)
if !ok || principalArn == "" {
// Fallback: extract role name from role ARN and build principal ARN
roleNameOnly := roleName
if strings.Contains(roleName, "/") {
parts := strings.Split(roleName, "/")
roleNameOnly = parts[len(parts)-1]
}
principalArn = fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:sts::assumed-role/%s/%s", roleNameOnly, sessionName)
}
// Validate the JWT token directly using STS service (avoid circular dependency)
// Note: We don't call IsActionAllowed here because that would create a circular dependency
// Authentication should only validate the token, authorization happens later
_, err = s3iam.stsService.ValidateSessionToken(ctx, sessionToken)
if err != nil {
glog.V(3).Infof("STS session validation failed: %v", err)
return nil, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Create IAM identity from validated token
identity := &IAMIdentity{
Name: subject,
Principal: principalArn,
SessionToken: sessionToken,
Account: &Account{
DisplayName: roleName,
EmailAddress: subject + "@seaweedfs.local",
Id: subject,
},
}
glog.V(3).Infof("JWT authentication successful for principal: %s", identity.Principal)
return identity, s3err.ErrNone
}
// ValidateSessionToken checks the validity of an STS session token
func (s3iam *S3IAMIntegration) ValidateSessionToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (*sts.SessionInfo, error) {
if s3iam.stsService == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("STS service not available")
}
return s3iam.stsService.ValidateSessionToken(ctx, token)
}
// AuthorizeAction authorizes actions using our policy engine
func (s3iam *S3IAMIntegration) AuthorizeAction(ctx context.Context, identity *IAMIdentity, action Action, bucket string, objectKey string, r *http.Request) s3err.ErrorCode {
if !s3iam.enabled {
return s3err.ErrNone // Fallback to existing authorization
}
if identity.SessionToken == "" {
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Build resource ARN for the S3 operation
resourceArn := buildS3ResourceArn(bucket, objectKey)
// Extract request context for policy conditions
requestContext := extractRequestContext(r)
// Determine the specific S3 action based on the HTTP request details
specificAction := ResolveS3Action(r, string(action), bucket, objectKey)
// Create action request
actionRequest := &integration.ActionRequest{
Principal: identity.Principal,
Action: specificAction,
Resource: resourceArn,
SessionToken: identity.SessionToken,
RequestContext: requestContext,
PolicyNames: identity.PolicyNames,
}
// Check if action is allowed using our policy engine
allowed, err := s3iam.iamManager.IsActionAllowed(ctx, actionRequest)
if err != nil {
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
if !allowed {
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
return s3err.ErrNone
}
// IAMIdentity represents an authenticated identity with session information
type IAMIdentity struct {
Name string
Principal string
SessionToken string
Account *Account
PolicyNames []string
}
// IsAdmin checks if the identity has admin privileges
func (identity *IAMIdentity) IsAdmin() bool {
// In our IAM system, admin status is determined by policies, not identity
// This is handled by the policy engine during authorization
return false
}
// Mock session structures for validation
type MockSessionInfo struct {
AssumedRoleUser MockAssumedRoleUser
}
type MockAssumedRoleUser struct {
AssumedRoleId string
Arn string
}
// Helper functions
// buildS3ResourceArn builds an S3 resource ARN from bucket and object
func buildS3ResourceArn(bucket string, objectKey string) string {
if bucket == "" {
return "arn:aws:s3:::*"
}
if objectKey == "" || objectKey == "/" {
return "arn:aws:s3:::" + bucket
}
// Remove leading slash from object key if present
objectKey = strings.TrimPrefix(objectKey, "/")
return "arn:aws:s3:::" + bucket + "/" + objectKey
}
// hasSpecificQueryParameters checks if the request has query parameters that indicate specific granular operations
func hasSpecificQueryParameters(query url.Values) bool {
// Check for object-level operation indicators
objectParams := []string{
"acl", // ACL operations
"tagging", // Tagging operations
"retention", // Object retention
"legal-hold", // Legal hold
"versions", // Versioning operations
}
// Check for multipart operation indicators
multipartParams := []string{
"uploads", // List/initiate multipart uploads
"uploadId", // Part operations, complete, abort
"partNumber", // Upload part
}
// Check for bucket-level operation indicators
bucketParams := []string{
"policy", // Bucket policy operations
"website", // Website configuration
"cors", // CORS configuration
"lifecycle", // Lifecycle configuration
"notification", // Event notification
"replication", // Cross-region replication
"encryption", // Server-side encryption
"accelerate", // Transfer acceleration
"requestPayment", // Request payment
"logging", // Access logging
"versioning", // Versioning configuration
"inventory", // Inventory configuration
"analytics", // Analytics configuration
"metrics", // CloudWatch metrics
"location", // Bucket location
}
// Check if any of these parameters are present
allParams := append(append(objectParams, multipartParams...), bucketParams...)
for _, param := range allParams {
if _, exists := query[param]; exists {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// isMethodActionMismatch detects when HTTP method doesn't align with the intended S3 action
// This provides a mechanism to use fallback action mapping when there's a semantic mismatch
func isMethodActionMismatch(method string, fallbackAction Action) bool {
switch fallbackAction {
case s3_constants.ACTION_WRITE:
// WRITE actions should typically use PUT, POST, or DELETE methods
// GET/HEAD methods indicate read-oriented operations
return method == "GET" || method == "HEAD"
case s3_constants.ACTION_READ:
// READ actions should typically use GET or HEAD methods
// PUT, POST, DELETE methods indicate write-oriented operations
return method == "PUT" || method == "POST" || method == "DELETE"
case s3_constants.ACTION_LIST:
// LIST actions should typically use GET method
// PUT, POST, DELETE methods indicate write-oriented operations
return method == "PUT" || method == "POST" || method == "DELETE"
case s3_constants.ACTION_DELETE_BUCKET:
// DELETE_BUCKET should use DELETE method
// Other methods indicate different operation types
return method != "DELETE"
default:
// For unknown actions or actions that already have s3: prefix, don't assume mismatch
return false
}
}
// mapLegacyActionToIAM provides fallback mapping for legacy actions
// This ensures backward compatibility while the system transitions to granular actions
func mapLegacyActionToIAM(legacyAction Action) string {
switch legacyAction {
case s3_constants.ACTION_READ:
return "s3:GetObject" // Fallback for unmapped read operations
case s3_constants.ACTION_WRITE:
return "s3:PutObject" // Fallback for unmapped write operations
case s3_constants.ACTION_LIST:
return "s3:ListBucket" // Fallback for unmapped list operations
case s3_constants.ACTION_TAGGING:
return "s3:GetObjectTagging" // Fallback for unmapped tagging operations
case s3_constants.ACTION_READ_ACP:
return "s3:GetObjectAcl" // Fallback for unmapped ACL read operations
case s3_constants.ACTION_WRITE_ACP:
return "s3:PutObjectAcl" // Fallback for unmapped ACL write operations
case s3_constants.ACTION_DELETE_BUCKET:
return "s3:DeleteBucket" // Fallback for unmapped bucket delete operations
case s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN:
return "s3:*" // Fallback for unmapped admin operations
// Handle granular multipart actions (already correctly mapped)
case s3_constants.ACTION_CREATE_MULTIPART_UPLOAD:
return "s3:CreateMultipartUpload"
case s3_constants.ACTION_UPLOAD_PART:
return "s3:UploadPart"
case s3_constants.ACTION_COMPLETE_MULTIPART:
return "s3:CompleteMultipartUpload"
case s3_constants.ACTION_ABORT_MULTIPART:
return "s3:AbortMultipartUpload"
case s3_constants.ACTION_LIST_MULTIPART_UPLOADS:
return s3_constants.S3_ACTION_LIST_MULTIPART_UPLOADS
case s3_constants.ACTION_LIST_PARTS:
return s3_constants.S3_ACTION_LIST_PARTS
default:
// If it's already a properly formatted S3 action, return as-is
actionStr := string(legacyAction)
if strings.HasPrefix(actionStr, "s3:") {
return actionStr
}
// Fallback: convert to S3 action format
return "s3:" + actionStr
}
}
// extractRequestContext extracts request context for policy conditions
func extractRequestContext(r *http.Request) map[string]interface{} {
context := make(map[string]interface{})
// Extract source IP for IP-based conditions
sourceIP := extractSourceIP(r)
if sourceIP != "" {
context["sourceIP"] = sourceIP
}
// Extract user agent
if userAgent := r.Header.Get("User-Agent"); userAgent != "" {
context["userAgent"] = userAgent
}
// Extract request time
context["requestTime"] = r.Context().Value("requestTime")
// Extract additional headers that might be useful for conditions
if referer := r.Header.Get("Referer"); referer != "" {
context["referer"] = referer
}
return context
}
// extractSourceIP extracts the real source IP from the request
func extractSourceIP(r *http.Request) string {
// Check X-Forwarded-For header (most common for proxied requests)
if forwardedFor := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); forwardedFor != "" {
// X-Forwarded-For can contain multiple IPs, take the first one
if ips := strings.Split(forwardedFor, ","); len(ips) > 0 {
return strings.TrimSpace(ips[0])
}
}
// Check X-Real-IP header
if realIP := r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"); realIP != "" {
return strings.TrimSpace(realIP)
}
// Fall back to RemoteAddr
if ip, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr); err == nil {
return ip
}
return r.RemoteAddr
}
// parseJWTToken parses a JWT token and returns its claims without verification
// Note: This is for extracting claims only. Verification is done by the IAM system.
func parseJWTToken(tokenString string) (jwt.MapClaims, error) {
token, _, err := new(jwt.Parser).ParseUnverified(tokenString, jwt.MapClaims{})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWT token: %v", err)
}
claims, ok := token.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token claims")
}
return claims, nil
}
// minInt returns the minimum of two integers
func minInt(a, b int) int {
if a < b {
return a
}
return b
}
// SetIAMIntegration adds advanced IAM integration to the S3ApiServer
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) SetIAMIntegration(iamManager *integration.IAMManager) {
if s3a.iam != nil {
s3a.iam.iamIntegration = NewS3IAMIntegration(iamManager, "localhost:8888")
glog.V(1).Infof("IAM integration successfully set on S3ApiServer")
} else {
glog.Errorf("Cannot set IAM integration: s3a.iam is nil")
}
}
// EnhancedS3ApiServer extends S3ApiServer with IAM integration
type EnhancedS3ApiServer struct {
*S3ApiServer
iamIntegration IAMIntegration
}
// NewEnhancedS3ApiServer creates an S3 API server with IAM integration
func NewEnhancedS3ApiServer(baseServer *S3ApiServer, iamManager *integration.IAMManager) *EnhancedS3ApiServer {
// Set the IAM integration on the base server
baseServer.SetIAMIntegration(iamManager)
return &EnhancedS3ApiServer{
S3ApiServer: baseServer,
iamIntegration: NewS3IAMIntegration(iamManager, "localhost:8888"),
}
}
// AuthenticateJWTRequest handles JWT authentication for S3 requests
func (enhanced *EnhancedS3ApiServer) AuthenticateJWTRequest(r *http.Request) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
ctx := r.Context()
// Use our IAM integration for JWT authentication
iamIdentity, errCode := enhanced.iamIntegration.AuthenticateJWT(ctx, r)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
return nil, errCode
}
// Convert IAMIdentity to the existing Identity structure
identity := &Identity{
Name: iamIdentity.Name,
Account: iamIdentity.Account,
// Note: Actions will be determined by policy evaluation
Actions: []Action{}, // Empty - authorization handled by policy engine
PolicyNames: iamIdentity.PolicyNames,
}
// Store session token for later authorization
r.Header.Set("X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token", iamIdentity.SessionToken)
r.Header.Set("X-SeaweedFS-Principal", iamIdentity.Principal)
return identity, s3err.ErrNone
}
// AuthorizeRequest handles authorization for S3 requests using policy engine
func (enhanced *EnhancedS3ApiServer) AuthorizeRequest(r *http.Request, identity *Identity, action Action) s3err.ErrorCode {
ctx := r.Context()
// Get session info from request headers (set during authentication)
sessionToken := r.Header.Get("X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token")
principal := r.Header.Get("X-SeaweedFS-Principal")
if sessionToken == "" || principal == "" {
glog.V(3).Info("No session information available for authorization")
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Extract bucket and object from request
bucket, object := s3_constants.GetBucketAndObject(r)
prefix := s3_constants.GetPrefix(r)
// For List operations, use prefix for permission checking if available
if action == s3_constants.ACTION_LIST && object == "" && prefix != "" {
object = prefix
} else if (object == "/" || object == "") && prefix != "" {
object = prefix
}
// Create IAM identity for authorization
iamIdentity := &IAMIdentity{
Name: identity.Name,
Principal: principal,
SessionToken: sessionToken,
Account: identity.Account,
}
// Use our IAM integration for authorization
return enhanced.iamIntegration.AuthorizeAction(ctx, iamIdentity, action, bucket, object, r)
}
// OIDCIdentity represents an identity validated through OIDC
type OIDCIdentity struct {
UserID string
RoleArn string
Provider string
}
// validateExternalOIDCToken validates an external OIDC token using the STS service's secure issuer-based lookup
// This method delegates to the STS service's validateWebIdentityToken for better security and efficiency
func (s3iam *S3IAMIntegration) validateExternalOIDCToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (*OIDCIdentity, error) {
if s3iam.iamManager == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("IAM manager not available")
}
// Get STS service for secure token validation
stsService := s3iam.iamManager.GetSTSService()
if stsService == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("STS service not available")
}
// Use the STS service's secure validateWebIdentityToken method
// This method uses issuer-based lookup to select the correct provider, which is more secure and efficient
externalIdentity, provider, err := stsService.ValidateWebIdentityToken(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("token validation failed: %w", err)
}
if externalIdentity == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("authentication succeeded but no identity returned")
}
// Extract role from external identity attributes
rolesAttr, exists := externalIdentity.Attributes["roles"]
if !exists || rolesAttr == "" {
glog.V(3).Infof("No roles found in external identity")
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no roles found in external identity")
}
// Parse roles (stored as comma-separated string)
rolesStr := strings.TrimSpace(rolesAttr)
roles := strings.Split(rolesStr, ",")
// Clean up role names
var cleanRoles []string
for _, role := range roles {
cleanRole := strings.TrimSpace(role)
if cleanRole != "" {
cleanRoles = append(cleanRoles, cleanRole)
}
}
if len(cleanRoles) == 0 {
glog.V(3).Infof("Empty roles list after parsing")
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no valid roles found in token")
}
// Determine the primary role using intelligent selection
roleArn := s3iam.selectPrimaryRole(cleanRoles, externalIdentity)
return &OIDCIdentity{
UserID: externalIdentity.UserID,
RoleArn: roleArn,
Provider: fmt.Sprintf("%T", provider), // Use provider type as identifier
}, nil
}
// selectPrimaryRole simply picks the first role from the list
// The OIDC provider should return roles in priority order (most important first)
func (s3iam *S3IAMIntegration) selectPrimaryRole(roles []string, externalIdentity *providers.ExternalIdentity) string {
if len(roles) == 0 {
return ""
}
// Just pick the first one - keep it simple
selectedRole := roles[0]
return selectedRole
}
// isSTSIssuer determines if an issuer belongs to the STS service
// Uses exact match against configured STS issuer for security and correctness
func (s3iam *S3IAMIntegration) isSTSIssuer(issuer string) bool {
if s3iam.stsService == nil || s3iam.stsService.Config == nil {
return false
}
// Directly compare with the configured STS issuer for exact match
// This prevents false positives from external OIDC providers that might
// contain STS-related keywords in their issuer URLs
return issuer == s3iam.stsService.Config.Issuer
}