Files
seaweedFS/weed/s3api/auth_credentials.go
Chris Lu 992db11d2b iam: add IAM group management (#8560)
* iam: add Group message to protobuf schema

Add Group message (name, members, policy_names, disabled) and
add groups field to S3ApiConfiguration for IAM group management
support (issue #7742).

* iam: add group CRUD to CredentialStore interface and all backends

Add group management methods (CreateGroup, GetGroup, DeleteGroup,
ListGroups, UpdateGroup) to the CredentialStore interface with
implementations for memory, filer_etc, postgres, and grpc stores.
Wire group loading/saving into filer_etc LoadConfiguration and
SaveConfiguration.

* iam: add group IAM response types

Add XML response types for group management IAM actions:
CreateGroup, DeleteGroup, GetGroup, ListGroups, AddUserToGroup,
RemoveUserFromGroup, AttachGroupPolicy, DetachGroupPolicy,
ListAttachedGroupPolicies, ListGroupsForUser.

* iam: add group management handlers to embedded IAM API

Add CreateGroup, DeleteGroup, GetGroup, ListGroups, AddUserToGroup,
RemoveUserFromGroup, AttachGroupPolicy, DetachGroupPolicy,
ListAttachedGroupPolicies, and ListGroupsForUser handlers with
dispatch in ExecuteAction.

* iam: add group management handlers to standalone IAM API

Add group handlers (CreateGroup, DeleteGroup, GetGroup, ListGroups,
AddUserToGroup, RemoveUserFromGroup, AttachGroupPolicy, DetachGroupPolicy,
ListAttachedGroupPolicies, ListGroupsForUser) and wire into DoActions
dispatch. Also add helper functions for user/policy side effects.

* iam: integrate group policies into authorization

Add groups and userGroups reverse index to IdentityAccessManagement.
Populate both maps during ReplaceS3ApiConfiguration and
MergeS3ApiConfiguration. Modify evaluateIAMPolicies to evaluate
policies from user's enabled groups in addition to user policies.
Update VerifyActionPermission to consider group policies when
checking hasAttachedPolicies.

* iam: add group side effects on user deletion and rename

When a user is deleted, remove them from all groups they belong to.
When a user is renamed, update group membership references. Applied
to both embedded and standalone IAM handlers.

* iam: watch /etc/iam/groups directory for config changes

Add groups directory to the filer subscription watcher so group
file changes trigger IAM configuration reloads.

* admin: add group management page to admin UI

Add groups page with CRUD operations, member management, policy
attachment, and enable/disable toggle. Register routes in admin
handlers and add Groups entry to sidebar navigation.

* test: add IAM group management integration tests

Add comprehensive integration tests for group CRUD, membership,
policy attachment, policy enforcement, disabled group behavior,
user deletion side effects, and multi-group membership. Add
"group" test type to CI matrix in s3-iam-tests workflow.

* iam: address PR review comments for group management

- Fix XSS vulnerability in groups.templ: replace innerHTML string
  concatenation with DOM APIs (createElement/textContent) for rendering
  member and policy lists
- Use userGroups reverse index in embedded IAM ListGroupsForUser for
  O(1) lookup instead of iterating all groups
- Add buildUserGroupsIndex helper in standalone IAM handlers; use it
  in ListGroupsForUser and removeUserFromAllGroups for efficient lookup
- Add note about gRPC store load-modify-save race condition limitation

* iam: add defensive copies, validation, and XSS fixes for group management

- Memory store: clone groups on store/retrieve to prevent mutation
- Admin dash: deep copy groups before mutation, validate user/policy exists
- HTTP handlers: translate credential errors to proper HTTP status codes,
  use *bool for Enabled field to distinguish missing vs false
- Groups templ: use data attributes + event delegation instead of inline
  onclick for XSS safety, prevent stale async responses

* iam: add explicit group methods to PropagatingCredentialStore

Add CreateGroup, GetGroup, DeleteGroup, ListGroups, and UpdateGroup
methods instead of relying on embedded interface fallthrough. Group
changes propagate via filer subscription so no RPC propagation needed.

* iam: detect postgres unique constraint violation and add groups index

Return ErrGroupAlreadyExists when INSERT hits SQLState 23505 instead of
a generic error. Add index on groups(disabled) for filtered queries.

* iam: add Marker field to group list response types

Add Marker string field to GetGroupResult, ListGroupsResult,
ListAttachedGroupPoliciesResult, and ListGroupsForUserResult to
match AWS IAM pagination response format.

* iam: check group attachment before policy deletion

Reject DeletePolicy if the policy is attached to any group, matching
AWS IAM behavior. Add PolicyArn to ListAttachedGroupPolicies response.

* iam: include group policies in IAM authorization

Merge policy names from user's enabled groups into the IAMIdentity
used for authorization, so group-attached policies are evaluated
alongside user-attached policies.

* iam: check for name collision before renaming user in UpdateUser

Scan identities and inline policies for newUserName before mutating,
returning EntityAlreadyExists if a collision is found. Reuse the
already-loaded policies instead of loading them again inside the loop.

* test: use t.Cleanup for bucket cleanup in group policy test

* iam: wrap ErrUserNotInGroup sentinel in RemoveGroupMember error

Wrap credential.ErrUserNotInGroup so errors.Is works in
groupErrorToHTTPStatus, returning proper 400 instead of 500.

* admin: regenerate groups_templ.go with XSS-safe data attributes

Regenerated from groups.templ which uses data-group-name attributes
instead of inline onclick with string interpolation.

* iam: add input validation and persist groups during migration

- Validate nil/empty group name in CreateGroup and UpdateGroup
- Save groups in migrateToMultiFile so they survive legacy migration

* admin: use groupErrorToHTTPStatus in GetGroupMembers and GetGroupPolicies

* iam: short-circuit UpdateUser when newUserName equals current name

* iam: require empty PolicyNames before group deletion

Reject DeleteGroup when group has attached policies, matching the
existing members check. Also fix GetGroup error handling in
DeletePolicy to only skip ErrGroupNotFound, not all errors.

* ci: add weed/pb/** to S3 IAM test trigger paths

* test: replace time.Sleep with require.Eventually for propagation waits

Use polling with timeout instead of fixed sleeps to reduce flakiness
in integration tests waiting for IAM policy propagation.

* fix: use credentialManager.GetPolicy for AttachGroupPolicy validation

Policies created via CreatePolicy through credentialManager are stored
in the credential store, not in s3cfg.Policies (which only has static
config policies). Change AttachGroupPolicy to use credentialManager.GetPolicy()
for policy existence validation.

* feat: add UpdateGroup handler to embedded IAM API

Add UpdateGroup action to enable/disable groups and rename groups
via the IAM API. This is a SeaweedFS extension (not in AWS SDK) used
by tests to toggle group disabled status.

* fix: authenticate raw IAM API calls in group tests

The embedded IAM endpoint rejects anonymous requests. Replace
callIAMAPI with callIAMAPIAuthenticated that uses JWT bearer token
authentication via the test framework.

* feat: add UpdateGroup handler to standalone IAM API

Mirror the embedded IAM UpdateGroup handler in the standalone IAM API
for parity.

* fix: add omitempty to Marker XML tags in group responses

Non-truncated responses should not emit an empty <Marker/> element.

* fix: distinguish backend errors from missing policies in AttachGroupPolicy

Return ServiceFailure for credential manager errors instead of masking
them as NoSuchEntity. Also switch ListGroupsForUser to use s3cfg.Groups
instead of in-memory reverse index to avoid stale data. Add duplicate
name check to UpdateGroup rename.

* fix: standalone IAM AttachGroupPolicy uses persisted policy store

Check managed policies from GetPolicies() instead of s3cfg.Policies
so dynamically created policies are found. Also add duplicate name
check to UpdateGroup rename.

* fix: rollback inline policies on UpdateUser PutPolicies failure

If PutPolicies fails after moving inline policies to the new username,
restore both the identity name and the inline policies map to their
original state to avoid a partial-write window.

* fix: correct test cleanup ordering for group tests

Replace scattered defers with single ordered t.Cleanup in each test
to ensure resources are torn down in reverse-creation order:
remove membership, detach policies, delete access keys, delete users,
delete groups, delete policies. Move bucket cleanup to parent test
scope and delete objects before bucket.

* fix: move identity nil check before map lookup and refine hasAttachedPolicies

Move the nil check on identity before accessing identity.Name to
prevent panic. Also refine hasAttachedPolicies to only consider groups
that are enabled and have actual policies attached, so membership in
a no-policy group doesn't incorrectly trigger IAM authorization.

* fix: fail group reload on unreadable or corrupt group files

Return errors instead of logging and continuing when group files
cannot be read or unmarshaled. This prevents silently applying a
partial IAM config with missing group memberships or policies.

* fix: use errors.Is for sql.ErrNoRows comparison in postgres group store

* docs: explain why group methods skip propagateChange

Group changes propagate to S3 servers via filer subscription
(watching /etc/iam/groups/) rather than gRPC RPCs, since there
are no group-specific RPCs in the S3 cache protocol.

* fix: remove unused policyNameFromArn and strings import

* fix: update service account ParentUser on user rename

When renaming a user via UpdateUser, also update ParentUser references
in service accounts to prevent them from becoming orphaned after the
next configuration reload.

* fix: wrap DetachGroupPolicy error with ErrPolicyNotAttached sentinel

Use credential.ErrPolicyNotAttached so groupErrorToHTTPStatus maps
it to 400 instead of falling back to 500.

* fix: use admin S3 client for bucket cleanup in enforcement test

The user S3 client may lack permissions by cleanup time since the
user is removed from the group in an earlier subtest. Use the admin
S3 client to ensure bucket and object cleanup always succeeds.

* fix: add nil guard for group param in propagating store log calls

Prevent potential nil dereference when logging group.Name in
CreateGroup and UpdateGroup of PropagatingCredentialStore.

* fix: validate Disabled field in UpdateGroup handlers

Reject values other than "true" or "false" with InvalidInputException
instead of silently treating them as false.

* fix: seed mergedGroups from existing groups in MergeS3ApiConfiguration

Previously the merge started with empty group maps, dropping any
static-file groups. Now seeds from existing iam.groups before
overlaying dynamic config, and builds the reverse index after
merging to avoid stale entries from overridden groups.

* fix: use errors.Is for filer_pb.ErrNotFound comparison in group loading

Replace direct equality (==) with errors.Is() to correctly match
wrapped errors, consistent with the rest of the codebase.

* fix: add ErrUserNotFound and ErrPolicyNotFound to groupErrorToHTTPStatus

Map these sentinel errors to 404 so AddGroupMember and
AttachGroupPolicy return proper HTTP status codes.

* fix: log cleanup errors in group integration tests

Replace fire-and-forget cleanup calls with error-checked versions
that log failures via t.Logf for debugging visibility.

* fix: prevent duplicate group test runs in CI matrix

The basic lane's -run "TestIAM" regex also matched TestIAMGroup*
tests, causing them to run in both the basic and group lanes.
Replace with explicit test function names.

* fix: add GIN index on groups.members JSONB for membership lookups

Without this index, ListGroupsForUser and membership queries
require full table scans on the groups table.

* fix: handle cross-directory moves in IAM config subscription

When a file is moved out of an IAM directory (e.g., /etc/iam/groups),
the dir variable was overwritten with NewParentPath, causing the
source directory change to be missed. Now also notifies handlers
about the source directory for cross-directory moves.

* fix: validate members/policies before deleting group in admin handler

AdminServer.DeleteGroup now checks for attached members and policies
before delegating to credentialManager, matching the IAM handler guards.

* fix: merge groups by name instead of blind append during filer load

Match the identity loader's merge behavior: find existing group
by name and replace, only append when no match exists. Prevents
duplicates when legacy and multi-file configs overlap.

* fix: check DeleteEntry response error when cleaning obsolete group files

Capture and log resp.Error from filer DeleteEntry calls during
group file cleanup, matching the pattern used in deleteGroupFile.

* fix: verify source user exists before no-op check in UpdateUser

Reorder UpdateUser to find the source identity first and return
NoSuchEntityException if not found, before checking if the rename
is a no-op. Previously a non-existent user renamed to itself
would incorrectly return success.

* fix: update service account parent refs on user rename in embedded IAM

The embedded IAM UpdateUser handler updated group membership but
not service account ParentUser fields, unlike the standalone handler.

* fix: replay source-side events for all handlers on cross-dir moves

Pass nil newEntry to bucket, IAM, and circuit-breaker handlers for
the source directory during cross-directory moves, so all watchers
can clear caches for the moved-away resource.

* fix: don't seed mergedGroups from existing iam.groups in merge

Groups are always dynamic (from filer), never static (from s3.config).
Seeding from iam.groups caused stale deleted groups to persist.
Now only uses config.Groups from the dynamic filer config.

* fix: add deferred user cleanup in TestIAMGroupUserDeletionSideEffect

Register t.Cleanup for the created user so it gets cleaned up
even if the test fails before the inline DeleteUser call.

* fix: assert UpdateGroup HTTP status in disabled group tests

Add require.Equal checks for 200 status after UpdateGroup calls
so the test fails immediately on API errors rather than relying
on the subsequent Eventually timeout.

* fix: trim whitespace from group name in filer store operations

Trim leading/trailing whitespace from group.Name before validation
in CreateGroup and UpdateGroup to prevent whitespace-only filenames.
Also merge groups by name during multi-file load to prevent duplicates.

* fix: add nil/empty group validation in gRPC store

Guard CreateGroup and UpdateGroup against nil group or empty name
to prevent panics and invalid persistence.

* fix: add nil/empty group validation in postgres store

Guard CreateGroup and UpdateGroup against nil group or empty name
to prevent panics from nil member access and empty-name row inserts.

* fix: add name collision check in embedded IAM UpdateUser

The embedded IAM handler renamed users without checking if the
target name already existed, unlike the standalone handler.

* fix: add ErrGroupNotEmpty sentinel and map to HTTP 409

AdminServer.DeleteGroup now wraps conflict errors with
ErrGroupNotEmpty, and groupErrorToHTTPStatus maps it to
409 Conflict instead of 500.

* fix: use appropriate error message in GetGroupDetails based on status

Return "Group not found" only for 404, use "Failed to retrieve group"
for other error statuses instead of always saying "Group not found".

* fix: use backend-normalized group.Name in CreateGroup response

After credentialManager.CreateGroup may normalize the name (e.g.,
trim whitespace), use group.Name instead of the raw input for
the returned GroupData to ensure consistency.

* fix: add nil/empty group validation in memory store

Guard CreateGroup and UpdateGroup against nil group or empty name
to prevent panics from nil pointer dereference on map access.

* fix: reorder embedded IAM UpdateUser to verify source first

Find the source identity before checking for collisions, matching
the standalone handler's logic. Previously a non-existent user
renamed to an existing name would get EntityAlreadyExists instead
of NoSuchEntity.

* fix: handle same-directory renames in metadata subscription

Replay a delete event for the old entry name during same-directory
renames so handlers like onBucketMetadataChange can clean up stale
state for the old name.

* fix: abort GetGroups on non-ErrGroupNotFound errors

Only skip groups that return ErrGroupNotFound. Other errors (e.g.,
transient backend failures) now abort the handler and return the
error to the caller instead of silently producing partial results.

* fix: add aria-label and title to icon-only group action buttons

Add accessible labels to View and Delete buttons so screen readers
and tooltips provide meaningful context.

* fix: validate group name in saveGroup to prevent invalid filenames

Trim whitespace and reject empty names before writing group JSON
files, preventing creation of files like ".json".

* fix: add /etc/iam/groups to filer subscription watched directories

The groups directory was missing from the watched directories list,
so S3 servers in a cluster would not detect group changes made by
other servers via filer. The onIamConfigChange handler already had
code to handle group directory changes but it was never triggered.

* add direct gRPC propagation for group changes to S3 servers

Groups now have the same dual propagation as identities and policies:
direct gRPC push via propagateChange + async filer subscription.

- Add PutGroup/RemoveGroup proto messages and RPCs
- Add PutGroup/RemoveGroup in-memory cache methods on IAM
- Add PutGroup/RemoveGroup gRPC server handlers
- Update PropagatingCredentialStore to call propagateChange on group mutations

* reduce log verbosity for config load summary

Change ReplaceS3ApiConfiguration log from Infof to V(1).Infof
to avoid noisy output on every config reload.

* admin: show user groups in view and edit user modals

- Add Groups field to UserDetails and populate from credential manager
- Show groups as badges in user details view modal
- Add group management to edit user modal: display current groups,
  add to group via dropdown, remove from group via badge x button

* fix: remove duplicate showAlert that broke modal-alerts.js

admin.js defined showAlert(type, message) which overwrote the
modal-alerts.js version showAlert(message, type), causing broken
unstyled alert boxes. Remove the duplicate and swap all callers
in admin.js to use the correct (message, type) argument order.

* fix: unwrap groups API response in edit user modal

The /api/groups endpoint returns {"groups": [...]}, not a bare array.

* Update object_store_users_templ.go

* test: assert AccessDenied error code in group denial tests

Replace plain assert.Error checks with awserr.Error type assertion
and AccessDenied code verification, matching the pattern used in
other IAM integration tests.

* fix: propagate GetGroups errors in ShowGroups handler

getGroupsPageData was swallowing errors and returning an empty page
with 200 status. Now returns the error so ShowGroups can respond
with a proper error status.

* fix: reject AttachGroupPolicy when credential manager is nil

Previously skipped policy existence validation when credentialManager
was nil, allowing attachment of nonexistent policies. Now returns
a ServiceFailureException error.

* fix: preserve groups during partial MergeS3ApiConfiguration updates

UpsertIdentity calls MergeS3ApiConfiguration with a partial config
containing only the updated identity (nil Groups). This was wiping
all in-memory group state. Now only replaces groups when
config.Groups is non-nil (full config reload).

* fix: propagate errors from group lookup in GetObjectStoreUserDetails

ListGroups and GetGroup errors were silently ignored, potentially
showing incomplete group data in the UI.

* fix: use DOM APIs for group badge remove button to prevent XSS

Replace innerHTML with onclick string interpolation with DOM
createElement + addEventListener pattern. Also add aria-label
and title to the add-to-group button.

* fix: snapshot group policies under RLock to prevent concurrent map access

evaluateIAMPolicies was copying the map reference via groupMap :=
iam.groups under RLock then iterating after RUnlock, while PutGroup
mutates the map in-place. Now copies the needed policy names into
a slice while holding the lock.

* fix: add nil IAM check to PutGroup and RemoveGroup gRPC handlers

Match the nil guard pattern used by PutPolicy/DeletePolicy to
prevent nil pointer dereference when IAM is not initialized.
2026-03-09 11:54:32 -07:00

2200 lines
72 KiB
Go

package s3api
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/credential"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/filer"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/filer_pb"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/iam_pb"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/policy_engine"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/util/wildcard"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/wdclient"
// Import KMS providers to register them
_ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/aws"
// _ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/azure" // TODO: Fix Azure SDK compatibility issues
_ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/gcp"
_ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/local"
_ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/openbao"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
)
type Action string
type Iam interface {
Check(f http.HandlerFunc, actions ...Action) http.HandlerFunc
}
type IdentityAccessManagement struct {
m sync.RWMutex
identities []*Identity
accessKeyIdent map[string]*Identity
nameToIdentity map[string]*Identity // O(1) lookup by identity name
policies map[string]*iam_pb.Policy
groups map[string]*iam_pb.Group // group name -> group
userGroups map[string][]string // user name -> group names (reverse index)
accounts map[string]*Account
emailAccount map[string]*Account
hashes map[string]*sync.Pool
hashCounters map[string]*int32
identityAnonymous *Identity
hashMu sync.RWMutex
domain string
externalHost string // pre-computed host for S3 signature verification (from ExternalUrl)
isAuthEnabled bool
credentialManager *credential.CredentialManager
filerClient *wdclient.FilerClient
grpcDialOption grpc.DialOption
// IAM Integration for advanced features
iamIntegration IAMIntegration
// Bucket policy engine for evaluating bucket policies
policyEngine *BucketPolicyEngine
// Cached policy engine for IAM policy fallback evaluation.
// Keyed by policy name, kept in sync by PutPolicy/DeletePolicy.
iamPolicyEngine *policy_engine.PolicyEngine
// background polling
stopChan chan struct{}
shutdownOnce sync.Once
// useStaticConfig indicates if the configuration was loaded from a static file
useStaticConfig bool
// staticIdentityNames tracks identity names loaded from the static config file
// These identities are immutable and cannot be updated by dynamic configuration
staticIdentityNames map[string]bool
}
type Identity struct {
Name string
Account *Account
Credentials []*Credential
Actions []Action
PolicyNames []string // Attached IAM policy names
PrincipalArn string // ARN for IAM authorization (e.g., "arn:aws:iam::account-id:user/username")
Disabled bool // User status: false = enabled (default), true = disabled
Claims map[string]interface{} // JWT claims for policy substitution
IsStatic bool // Whether identity was loaded from static config (immutable)
}
// Account represents a system user, a system user can
// configure multiple IAM-Users, IAM-Users can configure
// permissions respectively, and each IAM-User can
// configure multiple security credentials
type Account struct {
//Name is also used to display the "DisplayName" as the owner of the bucket or object
DisplayName string
EmailAddress string
//Id is used to identify an Account when granting cross-account access(ACLs) to buckets and objects
Id string
}
// Default account ID for all automated SeaweedFS accounts and fallback
const defaultAccountID = "000000000000"
// Predefined Accounts
var (
// AccountAdmin is used as the default account for IAM-Credentials access without Account configured
AccountAdmin = Account{
DisplayName: "admin",
EmailAddress: "admin@example.com",
Id: s3_constants.AccountAdminId,
}
// AccountAnonymous is used to represent the account for anonymous access
AccountAnonymous = Account{
DisplayName: "anonymous",
EmailAddress: "anonymous@example.com",
Id: s3_constants.AccountAnonymousId,
}
)
type Credential struct {
AccessKey string
SecretKey string
Status string // Access key status: "Active" or "Inactive" (empty treated as "Active")
Expiration int64 // Unix timestamp when credential expires (0 = no expiration)
}
// isCredentialExpired checks if a credential has expired
func (c *Credential) isCredentialExpired() bool {
return c.Expiration > 0 && c.Expiration < time.Now().Unix()
}
// NewIdentityAccessManagement creates a new IAM manager
// SetFilerClient updates the filer client and its associated credential store
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) SetFilerClient(filerClient *wdclient.FilerClient) {
iam.m.Lock()
iam.filerClient = filerClient
iam.m.Unlock()
if iam.credentialManager == nil || filerClient == nil {
return
}
// Update credential store to use FilerClient's current filer for HA
if store := iam.credentialManager.GetStore(); store != nil {
if filerFuncSetter, ok := store.(interface {
SetFilerAddressFunc(func() pb.ServerAddress, grpc.DialOption)
}); ok {
filerFuncSetter.SetFilerAddressFunc(filerClient.GetCurrentFiler, iam.grpcDialOption)
}
}
}
// parseExternalUrlToHost parses an external URL and returns the host string
// to use for S3 signature verification. It applies the same default port
// stripping rules as the AWS SDK: port 80 is stripped for HTTP, port 443
// is stripped for HTTPS, all other ports are preserved.
// Returns empty string for empty input.
func parseExternalUrlToHost(externalUrl string) (string, error) {
if externalUrl == "" {
return "", nil
}
u, err := url.Parse(externalUrl)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid external URL: parse failed")
}
if u.Host == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid external URL: missing host")
}
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(u.Host)
if err != nil {
// No port in the URL. For IPv6, strip brackets to match AWS SDK.
if strings.Contains(u.Host, ":") {
return strings.Trim(u.Host, "[]"), nil
}
return u.Host, nil
}
// Strip default ports to match AWS SDK SanitizeHostForHeader behavior
if (port == "80" && strings.EqualFold(u.Scheme, "http")) ||
(port == "443" && strings.EqualFold(u.Scheme, "https")) {
return host, nil
}
return net.JoinHostPort(host, port), nil
}
func NewIdentityAccessManagement(option *S3ApiServerOption, filerClient *wdclient.FilerClient) *IdentityAccessManagement {
return NewIdentityAccessManagementWithStore(option, filerClient, "")
}
func NewIdentityAccessManagementWithStore(option *S3ApiServerOption, filerClient *wdclient.FilerClient, explicitStore string) *IdentityAccessManagement {
var externalHost string
if option.ExternalUrl != "" {
var err error
externalHost, err = parseExternalUrlToHost(option.ExternalUrl)
if err != nil {
glog.Fatalf("failed to parse s3.externalUrl: %v", err)
}
glog.V(0).Infof("S3 signature verification will use external host: %q (from %q)", externalHost, option.ExternalUrl)
}
iam := &IdentityAccessManagement{
domain: option.DomainName,
externalHost: externalHost,
hashes: make(map[string]*sync.Pool),
hashCounters: make(map[string]*int32),
filerClient: filerClient,
}
// Always initialize credential manager with fallback to defaults
credentialManager, err := credential.NewCredentialManagerWithDefaults(credential.CredentialStoreTypeName(explicitStore))
if err != nil {
glog.Fatalf("failed to initialize credential manager: %v", err)
}
// For stores that need filer client details, set them temporarily
// This will be updated to use FilerClient's GetCurrentFiler after FilerClient is created
if store := credentialManager.GetStore(); store != nil {
if filerFuncSetter, ok := store.(interface {
SetFilerAddressFunc(func() pb.ServerAddress, grpc.DialOption)
}); ok {
// Temporary setup: use first filer until FilerClient is available
// See s3api_server.go where this is updated to FilerClient.GetCurrentFiler
if len(option.Filers) > 0 {
getFiler := func() pb.ServerAddress {
if len(option.Filers) > 0 {
return option.Filers[0]
}
return ""
}
filerFuncSetter.SetFilerAddressFunc(getFiler, option.GrpcDialOption)
glog.V(1).Infof("Credential store configured with temporary filer function (will be updated after FilerClient creation)")
}
}
}
iam.credentialManager = credentialManager
iam.stopChan = make(chan struct{})
iam.grpcDialOption = option.GrpcDialOption
// Initialize default anonymous identity
// This ensures consistent behavior for anonymous access:
// 1. In simple auth mode (no IAM integration):
// - lookupAnonymous returns this identity
// - VerifyActionPermission checks actions (which are empty) -> Denies access
// - This preserves the secure-by-default behavior for simple auth
// 2. In advanced IAM mode (with Policy Engine):
// - lookupAnonymous returns this identity
// - VerifyActionPermission proceeds to Policy Engine
// - Policy Engine evaluates against policies (DefaultEffect=Allow if no config)
// - This enables the flexible "Open by Default" for zero-config startup
iam.identityAnonymous = &Identity{
Name: "anonymous",
Account: &AccountAnonymous,
Actions: []Action{},
IsStatic: true,
}
// First, try to load configurations from file or filer
startConfigFile := option.Config
if startConfigFile == "" {
startConfigFile = option.IamConfig
}
if startConfigFile != "" {
glog.V(3).Infof("loading static config file %s", startConfigFile)
if err := iam.loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFile(startConfigFile); err != nil {
glog.Fatalf("fail to load config file %s: %v", startConfigFile, err)
}
// Track identity names from static config to protect them from dynamic updates
// Must be done under lock to avoid race conditions
iam.m.Lock()
iam.useStaticConfig = true
iam.staticIdentityNames = make(map[string]bool)
for _, identity := range iam.identities {
iam.staticIdentityNames[identity.Name] = true
identity.IsStatic = true
}
iam.m.Unlock()
}
// Always try to load/merge config from credential manager (filer/db)
// This ensures we get both static users (from file) and dynamic users (from backend)
glog.V(3).Infof("loading dynamic config from credential manager")
if err := iam.loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFiler(option); err != nil {
glog.Warningf("fail to load config: %v", err)
}
// Determine whether to start background polling for updates
// We poll if using a store that doesn't support real-time events (like Postgres)
if store := iam.credentialManager.GetStore(); store != nil {
storeName := store.GetName()
if storeName == credential.StoreTypePostgres {
glog.V(1).Infof("Starting background IAM polling for store: %s", storeName)
go iam.pollIamConfigChanges(1 * time.Minute)
}
}
// Check for AWS environment variables and merge them if present
// This serves as an in-memory "static" configuration
iam.loadEnvironmentVariableCredentials()
// Determine whether to enable S3 authentication based on configuration
// For "weed mini" without any S3 config, default to allowing all access (isAuthEnabled = false)
// If any credentials are configured (via file, filer, or env vars), enable authentication
iam.m.Lock()
iam.isAuthEnabled = len(iam.identities) > 0
iam.m.Unlock()
if iam.isAuthEnabled {
// Credentials were configured - enable authentication
glog.V(1).Infof("S3 authentication enabled (%d identities configured)", len(iam.identities))
} else {
// No credentials configured
if startConfigFile != "" {
// Config file was specified but contained no identities - this is unusual, log a warning
glog.Warningf("S3 config file %s specified but no identities loaded - authentication disabled", startConfigFile)
} else {
// No config file and no identities - this is the normal allow-all case
glog.V(1).Infof("S3 authentication disabled - no credentials configured (allowing all access)")
}
}
return iam
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) pollIamConfigChanges(interval time.Duration) {
ticker := time.NewTicker(interval)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ticker.C:
if err := iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager(); err != nil {
glog.Warningf("failed to reload IAM configuration via polling: %v", err)
}
case <-iam.stopChan:
return
}
}
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) Shutdown() {
iam.shutdownOnce.Do(func() {
if iam.stopChan != nil {
close(iam.stopChan)
}
if iam.credentialManager != nil {
iam.credentialManager.Shutdown()
}
})
}
// loadEnvironmentVariableCredentials loads AWS credentials from environment variables
// and adds them as a static admin identity. This function is idempotent and can be
// called multiple times (e.g., after configuration reloads).
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) loadEnvironmentVariableCredentials() {
accessKeyId := os.Getenv("AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID")
secretAccessKey := os.Getenv("AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY")
if accessKeyId == "" || secretAccessKey == "" {
return
}
// Create environment variable identity name
identityNameSuffix := accessKeyId
if len(accessKeyId) > 8 {
identityNameSuffix = accessKeyId[:8]
}
identityName := "admin-" + identityNameSuffix
// Create admin identity with environment variable credentials
envIdentity := &Identity{
Name: identityName,
Account: &AccountAdmin,
Credentials: []*Credential{
{
AccessKey: accessKeyId,
SecretKey: secretAccessKey,
},
},
Actions: []Action{
s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN,
},
PrincipalArn: generatePrincipalArn(identityName),
IsStatic: true,
}
iam.m.Lock()
defer iam.m.Unlock()
// Initialize maps if they are nil
if iam.staticIdentityNames == nil {
iam.staticIdentityNames = make(map[string]bool)
}
if iam.accessKeyIdent == nil {
iam.accessKeyIdent = make(map[string]*Identity)
}
if iam.nameToIdentity == nil {
iam.nameToIdentity = make(map[string]*Identity)
}
// Check if identity already exists (avoid duplicates)
exists := false
for _, ident := range iam.identities {
if ident.Name == identityName {
exists = true
break
}
}
if !exists {
glog.Infof("Added admin identity from AWS environment variables: name=%s, accessKey=%s", envIdentity.Name, accessKeyId)
// Add to identities list
iam.identities = append(iam.identities, envIdentity)
// Update credential mappings
iam.accessKeyIdent[accessKeyId] = envIdentity
iam.nameToIdentity[envIdentity.Name] = envIdentity
// Treat env var identity as static (immutable)
iam.staticIdentityNames[envIdentity.Name] = true
// Ensure defaults exist
if iam.accounts == nil {
iam.accounts = make(map[string]*Account)
}
iam.accounts[AccountAdmin.Id] = &AccountAdmin
iam.accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id] = &AccountAnonymous
if iam.emailAccount == nil {
iam.emailAccount = make(map[string]*Account)
}
iam.emailAccount[AccountAdmin.EmailAddress] = &AccountAdmin
iam.emailAccount[AccountAnonymous.EmailAddress] = &AccountAnonymous
}
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFiler(option *S3ApiServerOption) (err error) {
// Try to load configuration with retries to handle transient connectivity issues during startup
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
err = iam.doLoadS3ApiConfigurationFromFiler(option)
if err == nil {
return nil
}
if errors.Is(err, filer_pb.ErrNotFound) {
return err
}
glog.Warningf("fail to load config from filer (attempt %d/10): %v", i+1, err)
time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
}
return err
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) doLoadS3ApiConfigurationFromFiler(option *S3ApiServerOption) error {
return iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager()
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFile(fileName string) error {
content, readErr := os.ReadFile(fileName)
if readErr != nil {
glog.Warningf("fail to read %s : %v", fileName, readErr)
return fmt.Errorf("fail to read %s : %v", fileName, readErr)
}
// Initialize KMS if configuration contains KMS settings
if err := iam.initializeKMSFromConfig(content); err != nil {
glog.Warningf("KMS initialization failed: %v", err)
}
return iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromBytes(content)
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromBytes(content []byte) error {
s3ApiConfiguration := &iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration{}
if err := filer.ParseS3ConfigurationFromBytes(content, s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
glog.Warningf("unmarshal error: %v", err)
return fmt.Errorf("unmarshal error: %w", err)
}
if err := filer.CheckDuplicateAccessKey(s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := iam.loadS3ApiConfiguration(s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) loadS3ApiConfiguration(config *iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration) error {
// Check if we need to merge with existing static configuration
iam.m.RLock()
hasStaticConfig := iam.useStaticConfig && len(iam.staticIdentityNames) > 0
iam.m.RUnlock()
if hasStaticConfig {
// Merge mode: preserve static identities, add/update dynamic ones
return iam.MergeS3ApiConfiguration(config)
}
// Normal mode: completely replace configuration
return iam.ReplaceS3ApiConfiguration(config)
}
// ReplaceS3ApiConfiguration completely replaces the current configuration (used when no static config)
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) ReplaceS3ApiConfiguration(config *iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration) error {
var identities []*Identity
var identityAnonymous *Identity
accessKeyIdent := make(map[string]*Identity)
nameToIdentity := make(map[string]*Identity)
policies := make(map[string]*iam_pb.Policy)
accounts := make(map[string]*Account)
emailAccount := make(map[string]*Account)
foundAccountAdmin := false
foundAccountAnonymous := false
for _, account := range config.Accounts {
glog.V(3).Infof("loading account name=%s, id=%s", account.DisplayName, account.Id)
accounts[account.Id] = &Account{
Id: account.Id,
DisplayName: account.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: account.EmailAddress,
}
switch account.Id {
case AccountAdmin.Id:
foundAccountAdmin = true
case AccountAnonymous.Id:
foundAccountAnonymous = true
}
if account.EmailAddress != "" {
emailAccount[account.EmailAddress] = accounts[account.Id]
}
}
if !foundAccountAdmin {
accounts[AccountAdmin.Id] = &Account{
DisplayName: AccountAdmin.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: AccountAdmin.EmailAddress,
Id: AccountAdmin.Id,
}
emailAccount[AccountAdmin.EmailAddress] = accounts[AccountAdmin.Id]
}
if !foundAccountAnonymous {
accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id] = &Account{
DisplayName: AccountAnonymous.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: AccountAnonymous.EmailAddress,
Id: AccountAnonymous.Id,
}
emailAccount[AccountAnonymous.EmailAddress] = accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id]
}
for _, policy := range config.Policies {
policies[policy.Name] = policy
}
groups := make(map[string]*iam_pb.Group)
userGroupsMap := make(map[string][]string)
for _, g := range config.Groups {
groups[g.Name] = g
if !g.Disabled {
for _, member := range g.Members {
userGroupsMap[member] = append(userGroupsMap[member], g.Name)
}
}
}
for _, ident := range config.Identities {
glog.V(3).Infof("loading identity %s (disabled=%v)", ident.Name, ident.Disabled)
t := &Identity{
Name: ident.Name,
Credentials: nil,
Actions: nil,
PrincipalArn: generatePrincipalArn(ident.Name),
Disabled: ident.Disabled, // false (default) = enabled, true = disabled
PolicyNames: ident.PolicyNames,
}
switch {
case ident.Name == AccountAnonymous.Id:
t.Account = &AccountAnonymous
identityAnonymous = t
case ident.Account == nil:
t.Account = &AccountAdmin
default:
if account, ok := accounts[ident.Account.Id]; ok {
t.Account = account
} else {
t.Account = &AccountAdmin
glog.Warningf("identity %s is associated with a non exist account ID, the association is invalid", ident.Name)
}
}
for _, action := range ident.Actions {
t.Actions = append(t.Actions, Action(action))
}
for _, cred := range ident.Credentials {
t.Credentials = append(t.Credentials, &Credential{
AccessKey: cred.AccessKey,
SecretKey: cred.SecretKey,
Status: cred.Status, // Load access key status
})
accessKeyIdent[cred.AccessKey] = t
}
identities = append(identities, t)
nameToIdentity[t.Name] = t
}
// Load service accounts and add their credentials to the parent identity
for _, sa := range config.ServiceAccounts {
if sa.Credential == nil {
continue
}
// Skip disabled service accounts - they should not be able to authenticate
if sa.Disabled {
glog.V(3).Infof("Skipping disabled service account %s", sa.Id)
continue
}
// Find the parent identity
parentIdent, ok := nameToIdentity[sa.ParentUser]
if !ok {
glog.Warningf("Service account %s has non-existent parent user %s, skipping", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser)
continue
}
// Add service account credential to parent identity with expiration
cred := &Credential{
AccessKey: sa.Credential.AccessKey,
SecretKey: sa.Credential.SecretKey,
Status: sa.Credential.Status,
Expiration: sa.Expiration, // Populate expiration from service account
}
parentIdent.Credentials = append(parentIdent.Credentials, cred)
accessKeyIdent[sa.Credential.AccessKey] = parentIdent
glog.V(3).Infof("Loaded service account %s for parent %s (expiration: %d)", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser, sa.Expiration)
}
iam.m.Lock()
// Save existing environment-based identities before replacement
// This ensures AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID credentials are preserved
envIdentities := make([]*Identity, 0)
for _, ident := range iam.identities {
if ident.IsStatic && strings.HasPrefix(ident.Name, "admin-") {
// This is an environment-based admin identity, preserve it
envIdentities = append(envIdentities, ident)
}
}
// Ensure anonymous identity exists
if identityAnonymous == nil {
identityAnonymous = &Identity{
Name: "anonymous",
Account: accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id],
Actions: []Action{},
IsStatic: true,
}
}
// atomically switch
iam.identities = identities
iam.identityAnonymous = identityAnonymous
iam.accounts = accounts
iam.emailAccount = emailAccount
iam.nameToIdentity = nameToIdentity
iam.accessKeyIdent = accessKeyIdent
iam.policies = policies
iam.groups = groups
iam.userGroups = userGroupsMap
iam.rebuildIAMPolicyEngineLocked()
// Re-add environment-based identities that were preserved
for _, envIdent := range envIdentities {
// Check if this identity already exists in the new config
exists := false
for _, ident := range iam.identities {
if ident.Name == envIdent.Name {
exists = true
break
}
}
if !exists {
if len(envIdent.Credentials) == 0 {
continue
}
iam.identities = append(iam.identities, envIdent)
iam.accessKeyIdent[envIdent.Credentials[0].AccessKey] = envIdent
iam.nameToIdentity[envIdent.Name] = envIdent
}
}
// Update authentication state based on whether identities exist
// Once enabled, keep it enabled (one-way toggle)
authJustEnabled := iam.updateAuthenticationState(len(iam.identities))
iam.m.Unlock()
if authJustEnabled {
glog.V(1).Infof("S3 authentication enabled - credentials were added dynamically")
}
// Re-add environment variable credentials if they exist
// This ensures env var credentials persist across configuration reloads
iam.loadEnvironmentVariableCredentials()
// Log configuration summary - always log to help debugging
glog.V(1).Infof("Loaded %d identities, %d accounts, %d access keys. Auth enabled: %v",
len(iam.identities), len(iam.accounts), len(iam.accessKeyIdent), iam.isAuthEnabled)
if glog.V(2) {
glog.V(2).Infof("Access key to identity mapping:")
iam.m.RLock()
for accessKey, identity := range iam.accessKeyIdent {
glog.V(2).Infof(" %s -> %s (actions: %d)", accessKey, identity.Name, len(identity.Actions))
}
iam.m.RUnlock()
}
return nil
}
// MergeS3ApiConfiguration merges dynamic configuration with existing static configuration
// Static identities (from file) are preserved and cannot be updated
// Dynamic identities (from filer/admin) can be added or updated
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) MergeS3ApiConfiguration(config *iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration) error {
// Start with current configuration (which includes static identities)
iam.m.RLock()
identities := make([]*Identity, len(iam.identities))
copy(identities, iam.identities)
identityAnonymous := iam.identityAnonymous
accessKeyIdent := make(map[string]*Identity)
for k, v := range iam.accessKeyIdent {
accessKeyIdent[k] = v
}
nameToIdentity := make(map[string]*Identity)
for k, v := range iam.nameToIdentity {
nameToIdentity[k] = v
}
policies := make(map[string]*iam_pb.Policy)
for k, v := range iam.policies {
policies[k] = v
}
accounts := make(map[string]*Account)
for k, v := range iam.accounts {
accounts[k] = v
}
emailAccount := make(map[string]*Account)
for k, v := range iam.emailAccount {
emailAccount[k] = v
}
staticNames := make(map[string]bool)
for k, v := range iam.staticIdentityNames {
staticNames[k] = v
}
iam.m.RUnlock()
// Process accounts from dynamic config (can add new accounts)
for _, account := range config.Accounts {
if _, exists := accounts[account.Id]; !exists {
glog.V(3).Infof("adding dynamic account: name=%s, id=%s", account.DisplayName, account.Id)
accounts[account.Id] = &Account{
Id: account.Id,
DisplayName: account.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: account.EmailAddress,
}
if account.EmailAddress != "" {
emailAccount[account.EmailAddress] = accounts[account.Id]
}
}
}
// Ensure default accounts exist
if _, exists := accounts[AccountAdmin.Id]; !exists {
accounts[AccountAdmin.Id] = &Account{
DisplayName: AccountAdmin.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: AccountAdmin.EmailAddress,
Id: AccountAdmin.Id,
}
emailAccount[AccountAdmin.EmailAddress] = accounts[AccountAdmin.Id]
}
if _, exists := accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id]; !exists {
accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id] = &Account{
DisplayName: AccountAnonymous.DisplayName,
EmailAddress: AccountAnonymous.EmailAddress,
Id: AccountAnonymous.Id,
}
emailAccount[AccountAnonymous.EmailAddress] = accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id]
}
// Process identities from dynamic config
for _, ident := range config.Identities {
// Skip static identities - they cannot be updated
if staticNames[ident.Name] {
glog.V(3).Infof("skipping static identity %s (immutable)", ident.Name)
continue
}
glog.V(3).Infof("loading/updating dynamic identity %s (disabled=%v)", ident.Name, ident.Disabled)
t := &Identity{
Name: ident.Name,
Credentials: nil,
Actions: nil,
PrincipalArn: generatePrincipalArn(ident.Name),
Disabled: ident.Disabled,
PolicyNames: ident.PolicyNames,
}
switch {
case ident.Name == AccountAnonymous.Id:
t.Account = &AccountAnonymous
identityAnonymous = t
case ident.Account == nil:
t.Account = &AccountAdmin
default:
if account, ok := accounts[ident.Account.Id]; ok {
t.Account = account
} else {
t.Account = &AccountAdmin
glog.Warningf("identity %s is associated with a non exist account ID, the association is invalid", ident.Name)
}
}
for _, action := range ident.Actions {
t.Actions = append(t.Actions, Action(action))
}
for _, cred := range ident.Credentials {
t.Credentials = append(t.Credentials, &Credential{
AccessKey: cred.AccessKey,
SecretKey: cred.SecretKey,
Status: cred.Status,
})
accessKeyIdent[cred.AccessKey] = t
}
// Update or add the identity
existingIdx := -1
for i, existing := range identities {
if existing.Name == ident.Name {
existingIdx = i
break
}
}
if existingIdx >= 0 {
// Before replacing, remove stale accessKeyIdent entries for the old identity
oldIdentity := identities[existingIdx]
for _, oldCred := range oldIdentity.Credentials {
// Only remove if it still points to this identity
if accessKeyIdent[oldCred.AccessKey] == oldIdentity {
delete(accessKeyIdent, oldCred.AccessKey)
}
}
// Replace existing dynamic identity
identities[existingIdx] = t
} else {
// Add new dynamic identity
identities = append(identities, t)
}
nameToIdentity[t.Name] = t
}
// Process service accounts from dynamic config
for _, sa := range config.ServiceAccounts {
if sa.Credential == nil {
continue
}
// Skip disabled service accounts
if sa.Disabled {
glog.V(3).Infof("Skipping disabled service account %s", sa.Id)
continue
}
// Find the parent identity
parentIdent, ok := nameToIdentity[sa.ParentUser]
if !ok {
glog.Warningf("Service account %s has non-existent parent user %s, skipping", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser)
continue
}
// Skip if parent is a static identity (we don't modify static identities)
if staticNames[sa.ParentUser] {
glog.V(3).Infof("Skipping service account %s for static parent %s", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser)
continue
}
// Check if this access key already exists in parent's credentials to avoid duplicates
alreadyExists := false
for _, existingCred := range parentIdent.Credentials {
if existingCred.AccessKey == sa.Credential.AccessKey {
alreadyExists = true
break
}
}
if alreadyExists {
glog.V(3).Infof("Service account %s credential already exists for parent %s, skipping", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser)
// Ensure accessKeyIdent mapping is correct
accessKeyIdent[sa.Credential.AccessKey] = parentIdent
continue
}
// Add service account credential to parent identity
cred := &Credential{
AccessKey: sa.Credential.AccessKey,
SecretKey: sa.Credential.SecretKey,
Status: sa.Credential.Status,
Expiration: sa.Expiration,
}
parentIdent.Credentials = append(parentIdent.Credentials, cred)
accessKeyIdent[sa.Credential.AccessKey] = parentIdent
glog.V(3).Infof("Loaded service account %s for dynamic parent %s (expiration: %d)", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser, sa.Expiration)
}
for _, policy := range config.Policies {
policies[policy.Name] = policy
}
iam.m.Lock()
// atomically switch
iam.identities = identities
iam.identityAnonymous = identityAnonymous
iam.accounts = accounts
iam.emailAccount = emailAccount
iam.nameToIdentity = nameToIdentity
iam.accessKeyIdent = accessKeyIdent
iam.policies = policies
// Process groups: only replace if config.Groups is non-nil (full config reload).
// Partial updates (e.g., UpsertIdentity) pass nil Groups and should preserve existing state.
if config.Groups != nil {
mergedGroups := make(map[string]*iam_pb.Group)
mergedUserGroups := make(map[string][]string)
for _, g := range config.Groups {
mergedGroups[g.Name] = g
if !g.Disabled {
for _, member := range g.Members {
mergedUserGroups[member] = append(mergedUserGroups[member], g.Name)
}
}
}
iam.groups = mergedGroups
iam.userGroups = mergedUserGroups
}
iam.rebuildIAMPolicyEngineLocked()
// Update authentication state based on whether identities exist
// Once enabled, keep it enabled (one-way toggle)
authJustEnabled := iam.updateAuthenticationState(len(identities))
iam.m.Unlock()
if authJustEnabled {
glog.V(1).Infof("S3 authentication enabled because credentials were added dynamically")
}
// Log configuration summary
staticCount := len(staticNames)
dynamicCount := len(identities) - staticCount
glog.V(1).Infof("Merged config: %d static + %d dynamic identities = %d total, %d accounts, %d access keys. Auth enabled: %v",
staticCount, dynamicCount, len(identities), len(accounts), len(accessKeyIdent), iam.isAuthEnabled)
if glog.V(2) {
glog.V(2).Infof("Access key to identity mapping:")
for accessKey, identity := range accessKeyIdent {
identityType := "dynamic"
if staticNames[identity.Name] {
identityType = "static"
}
glog.V(2).Infof(" %s -> %s (%s, actions: %d)", accessKey, identity.Name, identityType, len(identity.Actions))
}
}
return nil
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) RemoveIdentity(name string) {
glog.V(1).Infof("IAM: remove identity %s", name)
iam.m.Lock()
defer iam.m.Unlock()
identity, ok := iam.nameToIdentity[name]
if !ok {
return
}
if identity.IsStatic {
glog.V(1).Infof("IAM: skipping removal of static identity %s (immutable)", name)
return
}
// Remove from identities slice
for i, ident := range iam.identities {
if ident.Name == name {
iam.identities = append(iam.identities[:i], iam.identities[i+1:]...)
break
}
}
// Remove from maps
delete(iam.nameToIdentity, name)
for _, cred := range identity.Credentials {
if iam.accessKeyIdent[cred.AccessKey] == identity {
delete(iam.accessKeyIdent, cred.AccessKey)
}
}
if identity == iam.identityAnonymous {
iam.identityAnonymous = nil
}
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) UpsertIdentity(ident *iam_pb.Identity) error {
if ident == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("upsert identity failed: nil identity")
}
if ident.Name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("upsert identity failed: empty identity name")
}
glog.V(1).Infof("IAM: upsert identity %s", ident.Name)
return iam.MergeS3ApiConfiguration(&iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration{
Identities: []*iam_pb.Identity{ident},
})
}
// isEnabled reports whether S3 auth should be enforced for this server.
//
// Auth is considered enabled if either:
// - we have any locally managed identities/credentials (iam.isAuthEnabled), or
// - an external IAM integration has been configured (iam.iamIntegration != nil).
//
// The iamIntegration check is intentionally included so that when an external
// IAM provider is configured (and the server relies solely on it), auth is
// still treated as enabled even if there are no local identities yet or
// before any sync logic flips isAuthEnabled to true. Removing this check or
// relying only on isAuthEnabled would change when auth is enforced and could
// unintentionally allow unauthenticated access in integration-only setups.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) isEnabled() bool {
return iam.isAuthEnabled || iam.iamIntegration != nil
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) updateAuthenticationState(identitiesCount int) bool {
if !iam.isAuthEnabled && identitiesCount > 0 {
iam.isAuthEnabled = true
return true
}
return false
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) IsStaticConfig() bool {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
return iam.useStaticConfig
}
// IsStaticIdentity checks if an identity was loaded from the static config file
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) IsStaticIdentity(identityName string) bool {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
return iam.staticIdentityNames[identityName]
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) lookupByAccessKey(accessKey string) (identity *Identity, cred *Credential, found bool) {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
// Helper function to truncate access key for logging to avoid credential exposure
truncate := func(key string) string {
const mask = "***"
if len(key) > 4 {
return key[:4] + mask
}
// For very short keys, never log the full key
return mask
}
truncatedKey := truncate(accessKey)
glog.V(4).Infof("Looking up access key: %s (len=%d, total keys registered: %d)",
truncatedKey, len(accessKey), len(iam.accessKeyIdent))
if ident, ok := iam.accessKeyIdent[accessKey]; ok {
// Check if user is disabled
if ident.Disabled {
glog.V(2).Infof("User %s is disabled, rejecting access key %s", ident.Name, truncatedKey)
return nil, nil, false
}
for _, credential := range ident.Credentials {
if credential.AccessKey == accessKey {
// Check if access key is inactive (empty Status treated as Active for backward compatibility)
if credential.Status == iamAccessKeyStatusInactive {
glog.V(2).Infof("Access key %s for identity %s is inactive", truncatedKey, ident.Name)
return nil, nil, false
}
glog.V(4).Infof("Found access key %s for identity %s", truncatedKey, ident.Name)
return ident, credential, true
}
}
}
glog.V(2).Infof("Could not find access key %s (len=%d). Available keys: %d, Auth enabled: %v",
truncatedKey, len(accessKey), len(iam.accessKeyIdent), iam.isAuthEnabled)
// Log all registered access keys at higher verbosity for debugging
if glog.V(3) {
glog.V(3).Infof("Registered access keys:")
for key := range iam.accessKeyIdent {
glog.V(3).Infof(" - %s (len=%d)", truncate(key), len(key))
}
}
return nil, nil, false
}
// LookupByAccessKey is an exported wrapper for lookupByAccessKey.
// It returns the identity and credential associated with the given access key.
//
// WARNING: The returned pointers reference internal data structures.
// Callers MUST NOT modify the returned Identity or Credential objects.
// If mutation is needed, make a copy first.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) LookupByAccessKey(accessKey string) (identity *Identity, cred *Credential, found bool) {
return iam.lookupByAccessKey(accessKey)
}
// LookupAnonymous returns the anonymous identity if it exists
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) LookupAnonymous() (identity *Identity, found bool) {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
if iam.identityAnonymous != nil {
return iam.identityAnonymous, true
}
return nil, false
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) lookupByIdentityName(name string) *Identity {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
return iam.nameToIdentity[name]
}
// generatePrincipalArn generates an ARN for a user identity
func generatePrincipalArn(identityName string) string {
// Handle special cases
switch identityName {
case AccountAnonymous.Id:
return "*" // Use universal wildcard for anonymous allowed by bucket policy
case AccountAdmin.Id:
return fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:iam::%s:user/admin", defaultAccountID)
default:
return fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:iam::%s:user/%s", defaultAccountID, identityName)
}
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) GetAccountNameById(canonicalId string) string {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
if account, ok := iam.accounts[canonicalId]; ok {
return account.DisplayName
}
return ""
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) GetAccountIdByEmail(email string) string {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
if account, ok := iam.emailAccount[email]; ok {
return account.Id
}
return ""
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) Auth(f http.HandlerFunc, action Action) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !iam.isEnabled() {
f(w, r)
return
}
identity, errCode := iam.authRequest(r, action)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
glog.V(3).Infof("auth error: %v", errCode)
}
iam.handleAuthResult(w, r, identity, errCode, f)
}
}
// AuthPostPolicy is a specialized authentication wrapper for PostPolicy requests.
// It allows requests with multipart/form-data to proceed even if classified as Anonymous,
// because the actual authentication (signature verification) for ALL PostPolicy requests is
// performed unconditionally in PostPolicyBucketHandler.doesPolicySignatureMatch().
// This delegation only defers the initial authentication classification; it does NOT bypass
// signature verification, which is mandatory for all PostPolicy uploads.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) AuthPostPolicy(f http.HandlerFunc, action Action) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !iam.isEnabled() {
f(w, r)
return
}
// Optimization: Use authRequestWithAuthType to avoid re-parsing headers for classification
identity, errCode, authType := iam.authRequestWithAuthType(r, action)
// Special handling for PostPolicy: if AccessDenied (likely because Anonymous to private bucket)
// AND it looks like a PostPolicy request, allow it to proceed to handler for verification.
if errCode == s3err.ErrAccessDenied {
if authType == authTypeAnonymous &&
r.Method == http.MethodPost &&
strings.Contains(r.Header.Get("Content-Type"), "multipart/form-data") {
glog.V(3).Infof("Delegating PostPolicy auth to handler")
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "PostPolicy")
f(w, r)
return
}
}
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
glog.V(3).Infof("auth error: %v", errCode)
}
iam.handleAuthResult(w, r, identity, errCode, f)
}
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) handleAuthResult(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, identity *Identity, errCode s3err.ErrorCode, f http.HandlerFunc) {
if errCode == s3err.ErrNone {
// Store the authenticated identity in request context (secure, cannot be spoofed)
if identity != nil && identity.Name != "" {
ctx := s3_constants.SetIdentityNameInContext(r.Context(), identity.Name)
// Also store the full identity object for handlers that need it (e.g., ListBuckets)
// This is especially important for JWT users whose identity is not in the identities list
ctx = s3_constants.SetIdentityInContext(ctx, identity)
r = r.WithContext(ctx)
}
f(w, r)
return
}
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, errCode)
}
// Wrapper to maintain backward compatibility
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authRequest(r *http.Request, action Action) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
identity, err, _ := iam.authRequestWithAuthType(r, action)
if err != s3err.ErrNone {
return nil, err
}
return identity, err
}
// check whether the request has valid access keys
// AuthenticateRequest verifies the credentials in the request and returns the identity.
// It bypasses permission checks (authorization).
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) AuthenticateRequest(r *http.Request) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
if !iam.isAuthEnabled {
return &Identity{
Name: "admin",
Account: &AccountAdmin,
Actions: []Action{s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN},
}, s3err.ErrNone
}
ident, err, _ := iam.authenticateRequestInternal(r)
return ident, err
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authenticateRequestInternal(r *http.Request) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode, authType) {
var identity *Identity
var s3Err s3err.ErrorCode
var found bool
var amzAuthType string
// SECURITY: Prevent clients from spoofing internal IAM headers
// These headers are only set by the server after successful JWT authentication
// Clearing them here prevents privilege escalation via header injection
r.Header.Del("X-SeaweedFS-Principal")
r.Header.Del("X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token")
reqAuthType := getRequestAuthType(r)
switch reqAuthType {
case authTypeUnknown:
glog.V(4).Infof("unknown auth type")
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "Unknown")
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
case authTypePresignedV2, authTypeSignedV2:
glog.V(4).Infof("v2 auth type")
identity, s3Err = iam.isReqAuthenticatedV2(r)
amzAuthType = "SigV2"
case authTypeStreamingSigned, authTypeSigned, authTypePresigned:
glog.V(4).Infof("v4 auth type")
identity, s3Err = iam.reqSignatureV4Verify(r)
amzAuthType = "SigV4"
case authTypeStreamingUnsigned:
glog.V(4).Infof("unsigned streaming upload")
identity, s3Err = iam.reqSignatureV4Verify(r)
amzAuthType = "SigV4"
case authTypeJWT:
glog.V(4).Infof("jwt auth type detected, iamIntegration != nil? %t", iam.iamIntegration != nil)
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "Jwt")
if iam.iamIntegration != nil {
identity, s3Err = iam.authenticateJWTWithIAM(r)
amzAuthType = "Jwt"
} else {
glog.V(2).Infof("IAM integration is nil, returning ErrNotImplemented")
return identity, s3err.ErrNotImplemented, reqAuthType
}
case authTypeAnonymous:
amzAuthType = "Anonymous"
if identity, found = iam.LookupAnonymous(); !found {
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, amzAuthType)
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
}
default:
return identity, s3err.ErrNotImplemented, reqAuthType
}
if len(amzAuthType) > 0 {
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, amzAuthType)
}
return identity, s3Err, reqAuthType
}
// authRequestWithAuthType authenticates and then authorizes a request for a given action.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authRequestWithAuthType(r *http.Request, action Action) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode, authType) {
identity, s3Err, reqAuthType := iam.authenticateRequestInternal(r)
if s3Err != s3err.ErrNone {
return identity, s3Err, reqAuthType
}
bucket, object := s3_constants.GetBucketAndObject(r)
prefix := s3_constants.GetPrefix(r)
// For List operations, use prefix for permission checking if available
if action == s3_constants.ACTION_LIST && object == "" && prefix != "" {
// List operation with prefix - check permission for the prefix path
object = prefix
} else if (object == "/" || object == "") && prefix != "" {
// Using the aws cli with s3, and s3api, and with boto3, the object is often set to "/" or empty
// but the prefix is set to the actual object key for permission checking
object = prefix
}
// For ListBuckets, authorization is performed in the handler by iterating
// through buckets and checking permissions for each. Skip the global check here.
policyAllows := false
if action == s3_constants.ACTION_LIST && bucket == "" && identity.Name != s3_constants.AccountAnonymousId {
// ListBuckets operation for authenticated users - authorization handled per-bucket in the handler
} else {
// First check bucket policy if one exists
// Bucket policies can grant or deny access to specific users/principals
// Following AWS semantics:
// - Explicit DENY in bucket policy → immediate rejection
// - Explicit ALLOW in bucket policy → grant access (bypass IAM checks)
// - No policy or indeterminate → fall through to IAM checks
if iam.policyEngine != nil && bucket != "" {
principal := buildPrincipalARN(identity, r)
// Phase 1: Evaluate bucket policy without object entry.
// Tag-based conditions (s3:ExistingObjectTag) are re-checked by handlers
// after fetching the entry, which is the Phase 2 check.
var claims map[string]interface{}
if identity != nil {
claims = identity.Claims
}
allowed, evaluated, err := iam.policyEngine.EvaluatePolicy(bucket, object, string(action), principal, r, claims, nil)
if err != nil {
// SECURITY: Fail-close on policy evaluation errors
// If we can't evaluate the policy, deny access rather than falling through to IAM
glog.Errorf("Error evaluating bucket policy for %s/%s: %v - denying access", bucket, object, err)
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
} else if evaluated {
// A bucket policy exists and was evaluated with a matching statement
if allowed {
// Policy explicitly allows this action - grant access immediately
// This bypasses IAM checks to support cross-account access and policy-only principals
glog.V(3).Infof("Bucket policy allows %s to %s on %s/%s (bypassing IAM)", identity.Name, action, bucket, object)
policyAllows = true
} else {
// Policy explicitly denies this action - deny access immediately
// Note: Explicit Deny in bucket policy overrides all other permissions
glog.V(3).Infof("Bucket policy explicitly denies %s to %s on %s/%s", identity.Name, action, bucket, object)
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
}
}
// If not evaluated (no policy or no matching statements), fall through to IAM/identity checks
}
// Only check IAM if bucket policy didn't explicitly allow
if !policyAllows {
// Use centralized permission check
if errCode := iam.VerifyActionPermission(r, identity, action, bucket, object); errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
return identity, errCode, reqAuthType
}
}
}
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAccountId, identity.Account.Id)
return identity, s3err.ErrNone, reqAuthType
}
// AuthSignatureOnly performs only signature verification without any authorization checks.
// This is used for IAM API operations where authorization is handled separately based on
// the specific IAM action (e.g., self-service vs admin operations).
// Returns the authenticated identity and any signature verification error.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) AuthSignatureOnly(r *http.Request) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
var identity *Identity
var s3Err s3err.ErrorCode
var authType string
switch getRequestAuthType(r) {
case authTypeUnknown:
glog.V(3).Infof("unknown auth type")
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "Unknown")
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
case authTypePresignedV2, authTypeSignedV2:
glog.V(3).Infof("v2 auth type")
identity, s3Err = iam.isReqAuthenticatedV2(r)
authType = "SigV2"
case authTypeStreamingSigned, authTypeSigned, authTypePresigned:
glog.V(3).Infof("v4 auth type")
identity, s3Err = iam.reqSignatureV4Verify(r)
authType = "SigV4"
case authTypeStreamingUnsigned:
glog.V(3).Infof("unsigned streaming upload")
identity, s3Err = iam.reqSignatureV4Verify(r)
authType = "SigV4"
case authTypeJWT:
glog.V(3).Infof("jwt auth type detected, iamIntegration != nil? %t", iam.iamIntegration != nil)
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "Jwt")
if iam.iamIntegration != nil {
identity, s3Err = iam.authenticateJWTWithIAM(r)
authType = "Jwt"
} else {
glog.V(2).Infof("IAM integration is nil, returning ErrNotImplemented")
return identity, s3err.ErrNotImplemented
}
case authTypeAnonymous:
// Anonymous users can be authenticated, but authorization is handled separately
return iam.identityAnonymous, s3err.ErrNone
default:
return identity, s3err.ErrNotImplemented
}
if len(authType) > 0 {
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, authType)
}
if s3Err != s3err.ErrNone {
return identity, s3Err
}
// Set account ID header for downstream handlers
if identity != nil && identity.Account != nil {
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAccountId, identity.Account.Id)
}
return identity, s3err.ErrNone
}
func (identity *Identity) CanDo(action Action, bucket string, objectKey string) bool {
if identity == nil {
return false
}
if identity.isAdmin() {
return true
}
for _, a := range identity.Actions {
// Case where the Resource provided is
// "Resource": [
// "arn:aws:s3:::*"
// ]
if a == action {
return true
}
}
// Intelligent path concatenation to avoid double slashes
fullPath := bucket
if objectKey != "" && !strings.HasPrefix(objectKey, "/") {
fullPath += "/"
}
fullPath += objectKey
if bucket == "" {
glog.V(3).Infof("identity %s is not allowed to perform action %s on %s -- bucket is empty", identity.Name, action, "/"+strings.TrimPrefix(objectKey, "/"))
return false
}
glog.V(3).Infof("checking if %s can perform %s on bucket '%s'", identity.Name, action, fullPath)
target := string(action) + ":" + fullPath
adminTarget := s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN + ":" + fullPath
limitedByBucket := string(action) + ":" + bucket
adminLimitedByBucket := s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN + ":" + bucket
for _, a := range identity.Actions {
act := string(a)
if strings.ContainsAny(act, "*?") {
// Pattern has wildcards - use smart matching
if wildcard.MatchesWildcard(act, target) {
return true
}
if wildcard.MatchesWildcard(act, adminTarget) {
return true
}
} else {
// No wildcards - exact match only
if act == limitedByBucket {
return true
}
if act == adminLimitedByBucket {
return true
}
}
}
//log error
glog.V(3).Infof("identity %s is not allowed to perform action %s on %s", identity.Name, action, bucket+"/"+objectKey)
return false
}
func (identity *Identity) isAdmin() bool {
if identity == nil {
return false
}
return slices.Contains(identity.Actions, s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN)
}
// buildPrincipalARN builds an ARN for an identity to use in bucket policy evaluation
// It first checks if a principal ARN was set by JWT authentication in request headers
func buildPrincipalARN(identity *Identity, r *http.Request) string {
// Check if principal ARN was already set by JWT authentication
if r != nil {
if principalARN := r.Header.Get("X-SeaweedFS-Principal"); principalARN != "" {
glog.V(4).Infof("buildPrincipalARN: Using principal ARN from header: %s", principalARN)
return principalARN
}
}
if identity == nil {
return "*" // Anonymous
}
// Priority 1: Use principal ARN if explicitly set (from STS JWT or IAM user)
if identity.PrincipalArn != "" {
return identity.PrincipalArn
}
// Priority 2: Check if this is the anonymous user identity (authenticated as anonymous)
// S3 policies expect Principal: "*" for anonymous access
if identity.Name == s3_constants.AccountAnonymousId ||
(identity.Account != nil && identity.Account.Id == s3_constants.AccountAnonymousId) {
return "*" // Anonymous user
}
// Build an AWS-compatible principal ARN
// Format: arn:aws:iam::account-id:user/user-name
accountID := defaultAccountID // Default account ID
if identity.Account != nil && identity.Account.Id != "" {
accountID = identity.Account.Id
}
userName := identity.Name
if userName == "" {
userName = "unknown"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:iam::%s:user/%s", accountID, userName)
}
// GetCredentialManager returns the credential manager instance
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) GetCredentialManager() *credential.CredentialManager {
return iam.credentialManager
}
type managedPolicyLoader interface {
LoadManagedPolicies(ctx context.Context) ([]*iam_pb.Policy, error)
}
type inlinePolicyLoader interface {
LoadInlinePolicies(ctx context.Context) (map[string]map[string]policy_engine.PolicyDocument, error)
}
func inlinePolicyRuntimeName(userName, policyName string) string {
return "__inline_policy__/" + userName + "/" + policyName
}
func mergePoliciesIntoConfiguration(config *iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration, policies []*iam_pb.Policy) {
if len(policies) == 0 {
return
}
existingPolicies := make(map[string]int, len(config.Policies))
for idx, policy := range config.Policies {
if policy == nil || policy.Name == "" {
continue
}
existingPolicies[policy.Name] = idx
}
for _, policy := range policies {
if policy == nil || policy.Name == "" {
continue
}
policyCopy := &iam_pb.Policy{Name: policy.Name, Content: policy.Content}
if existingIdx, found := existingPolicies[policy.Name]; found {
config.Policies[existingIdx] = policyCopy
continue
}
config.Policies = append(config.Policies, policyCopy)
existingPolicies[policy.Name] = len(config.Policies) - 1
}
}
func appendUniquePolicyName(policyNames []string, policyName string) []string {
for _, existingPolicyName := range policyNames {
if existingPolicyName == policyName {
return policyNames
}
}
return append(policyNames, policyName)
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) loadManagedPoliciesForRuntime(ctx context.Context) ([]*iam_pb.Policy, error) {
store := iam.credentialManager.GetStore()
if store == nil {
return nil, nil
}
if loader, ok := store.(managedPolicyLoader); ok {
return loader.LoadManagedPolicies(ctx)
}
policies, err := iam.credentialManager.GetPolicies(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
managedPolicies := make([]*iam_pb.Policy, 0, len(policies))
for name, policyDocument := range policies {
content, err := json.Marshal(policyDocument)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal policy %q: %w", name, err)
}
managedPolicies = append(managedPolicies, &iam_pb.Policy{
Name: name,
Content: string(content),
})
}
return managedPolicies, nil
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) hydrateRuntimePolicies(ctx context.Context, config *iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration) error {
if iam.credentialManager == nil || config == nil {
return nil
}
managedPolicies, err := iam.loadManagedPoliciesForRuntime(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to load managed policies for runtime: %w", err)
}
mergePoliciesIntoConfiguration(config, managedPolicies)
store := iam.credentialManager.GetStore()
if store == nil {
return nil
}
inlineLoader, ok := store.(inlinePolicyLoader)
if !ok {
return nil
}
inlinePoliciesByUser, err := inlineLoader.LoadInlinePolicies(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to load inline policies for runtime: %w", err)
}
if len(inlinePoliciesByUser) == 0 {
return nil
}
identityByName := make(map[string]*iam_pb.Identity, len(config.Identities))
for _, identity := range config.Identities {
identityByName[identity.Name] = identity
}
inlinePolicies := make([]*iam_pb.Policy, 0)
for userName, userPolicies := range inlinePoliciesByUser {
identity, found := identityByName[userName]
if !found {
continue
}
for policyName, policyDocument := range userPolicies {
content, err := json.Marshal(policyDocument)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal inline policy %q for user %q: %w", policyName, userName, err)
}
runtimePolicyName := inlinePolicyRuntimeName(userName, policyName)
inlinePolicies = append(inlinePolicies, &iam_pb.Policy{
Name: runtimePolicyName,
Content: string(content),
})
identity.PolicyNames = appendUniquePolicyName(identity.PolicyNames, runtimePolicyName)
}
}
mergePoliciesIntoConfiguration(config, inlinePolicies)
return nil
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) syncRuntimePoliciesToIAMManager(ctx context.Context, policies []*iam_pb.Policy) error {
if iam == nil || iam.iamIntegration == nil {
return nil
}
provider, ok := iam.iamIntegration.(IAMManagerProvider)
if !ok {
return nil
}
manager := provider.GetIAMManager()
if manager == nil {
return nil
}
return manager.SyncRuntimePolicies(ctx, policies)
}
// LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager loads configuration using the credential manager
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager() error {
glog.V(1).Infof("Loading S3 API configuration from credential manager")
s3ApiConfiguration, err := iam.credentialManager.LoadConfiguration(context.Background())
if err != nil {
glog.Errorf("Failed to load configuration from credential manager: %v", err)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to load configuration from credential manager: %w", err)
}
glog.V(2).Infof("Credential manager returned %d identities and %d accounts",
len(s3ApiConfiguration.Identities), len(s3ApiConfiguration.Accounts))
if err := iam.hydrateRuntimePolicies(context.Background(), s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
glog.Errorf("Failed to hydrate runtime IAM policies: %v", err)
return err
}
if err := iam.syncRuntimePoliciesToIAMManager(context.Background(), s3ApiConfiguration.Policies); err != nil {
glog.Errorf("Failed to sync runtime IAM policies to advanced IAM manager: %v", err)
return err
}
if err := iam.loadS3ApiConfiguration(s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
glog.Errorf("Failed to load S3 API configuration: %v", err)
return err
}
glog.V(1).Infof("Successfully loaded S3 API configuration from credential manager")
return nil
}
// initializeKMSFromConfig loads KMS configuration from TOML format
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) initializeKMSFromConfig(configContent []byte) error {
// JSON-only KMS configuration
if err := iam.initializeKMSFromJSON(configContent); err == nil {
glog.V(1).Infof("Successfully loaded KMS configuration from JSON format")
return nil
}
glog.V(2).Infof("No KMS configuration found in S3 config - SSE-KMS will not be available")
return nil
}
// initializeKMSFromJSON loads KMS configuration from JSON format when provided in the same file
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) initializeKMSFromJSON(configContent []byte) error {
// Parse as generic JSON and extract optional "kms" block
var m map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(string(configContent))), &m); err != nil {
return err
}
kmsVal, ok := m["kms"]
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("no KMS section found")
}
// Load KMS configuration directly from the parsed JSON data
return kms.LoadKMSFromConfig(kmsVal)
}
// SetIAMIntegration sets the IAM integration for advanced authentication and authorization
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) SetIAMIntegration(integration *S3IAMIntegration) {
iam.m.Lock()
defer iam.m.Unlock()
iam.iamIntegration = integration
// When IAM integration is configured, authentication must be enabled
// to ensure requests go through proper auth checks
if integration != nil {
iam.isAuthEnabled = true
}
}
// authenticateJWTWithIAM authenticates JWT tokens using the IAM integration
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authenticateJWTWithIAM(r *http.Request) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
ctx := r.Context()
// Use IAM integration to authenticate JWT
iamIdentity, errCode := iam.iamIntegration.AuthenticateJWT(ctx, r)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
return nil, errCode
}
// Convert IAMIdentity to existing Identity structure
identity := &Identity{
Name: iamIdentity.Name,
Account: iamIdentity.Account,
Actions: []Action{}, // Empty - authorization handled by policy engine
PolicyNames: iamIdentity.PolicyNames,
Claims: iamIdentity.Claims,
}
// Store session info in request headers for later authorization
r.Header.Set("X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token", iamIdentity.SessionToken)
r.Header.Set("X-SeaweedFS-Principal", iamIdentity.Principal)
return identity, s3err.ErrNone
}
// IAM authorization path type constants
// iamAuthPath represents the type of IAM authorization path
type iamAuthPath string
// IAM authorization path constants
const (
iamAuthPathJWT iamAuthPath = "jwt"
iamAuthPathSTS_V4 iamAuthPath = "sts_v4"
iamAuthPathStatic_V4 iamAuthPath = "static_v4"
iamAuthPathNone iamAuthPath = "none"
)
// determineIAMAuthPath determines the IAM authorization path based on available tokens and principals
func determineIAMAuthPath(sessionToken, principal, principalArn string) iamAuthPath {
if sessionToken != "" && principal != "" {
return iamAuthPathJWT
} else if sessionToken != "" && principalArn != "" {
return iamAuthPathSTS_V4
} else if principalArn != "" {
return iamAuthPathStatic_V4
}
return iamAuthPathNone
}
// evaluateIAMPolicies evaluates attached IAM policies for a user identity.
// Returns true if any matching statement explicitly allows the action.
// Uses the cached iamPolicyEngine to avoid re-parsing policy JSON on every request.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) evaluateIAMPolicies(r *http.Request, identity *Identity, action Action, bucket, object string) bool {
if identity == nil {
return false
}
iam.m.RLock()
engine := iam.iamPolicyEngine
groupNames := iam.userGroups[identity.Name]
// Snapshot group policy names to avoid holding the lock during evaluation.
// We copy the needed data since PutGroup/RemoveGroup mutate iam.groups in-place.
var groupPolicies [][]string
for _, gName := range groupNames {
g, ok := iam.groups[gName]
if !ok || g.Disabled {
continue
}
policyNames := make([]string, len(g.PolicyNames))
copy(policyNames, g.PolicyNames)
groupPolicies = append(groupPolicies, policyNames)
}
iam.m.RUnlock()
// Collect all policy names: user policies + group policies
if len(identity.PolicyNames) == 0 && len(groupPolicies) == 0 {
return false
}
if engine == nil {
return false
}
resource := buildResourceARN(bucket, object)
principal := buildPrincipalARN(identity, r)
s3Action := ResolveS3Action(r, string(action), bucket, object)
explicitAllow := false
conditions := policy_engine.ExtractConditionValuesFromRequest(r)
for k, v := range policy_engine.ExtractPrincipalVariables(principal) {
conditions[k] = v
}
evalArgs := &policy_engine.PolicyEvaluationArgs{
Action: s3Action,
Resource: resource,
Principal: principal,
Conditions: conditions,
Claims: identity.Claims,
}
// Evaluate user's own policies
for _, policyName := range identity.PolicyNames {
result := engine.EvaluatePolicy(policyName, evalArgs)
if result == policy_engine.PolicyResultDeny {
return false
}
if result == policy_engine.PolicyResultAllow {
explicitAllow = true
}
}
// Evaluate policies from user's groups
for _, policyNames := range groupPolicies {
for _, policyName := range policyNames {
result := engine.EvaluatePolicy(policyName, evalArgs)
if result == policy_engine.PolicyResultDeny {
return false
}
if result == policy_engine.PolicyResultAllow {
explicitAllow = true
}
}
}
return explicitAllow
}
// VerifyActionPermission checks if the identity is allowed to perform the action on the resource.
// It handles both traditional identities (via Actions) and IAM/STS identities (via Policy).
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) VerifyActionPermission(r *http.Request, identity *Identity, action Action, bucket, object string) s3err.ErrorCode {
// Fail closed if identity is nil
if identity == nil {
glog.V(3).Infof("VerifyActionPermission called with nil identity for action %s on %s/%s", action, bucket, object)
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Traditional identities (with Actions from -s3.config) use legacy auth,
// JWT/STS identities (no Actions or having a session token) use IAM authorization.
// IMPORTANT: We MUST prioritize IAM authorization for any request with a session token
// to ensure that session policies are correctly enforced.
hasSessionToken := r.Header.Get("X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token") != "" ||
r.Header.Get("X-Amz-Security-Token") != "" ||
r.URL.Query().Get("X-Amz-Security-Token") != ""
iam.m.RLock()
userGroupNames := iam.userGroups[identity.Name]
groupsHavePolicies := false
for _, gn := range userGroupNames {
if g, ok := iam.groups[gn]; ok && !g.Disabled && len(g.PolicyNames) > 0 {
groupsHavePolicies = true
break
}
}
iam.m.RUnlock()
hasAttachedPolicies := len(identity.PolicyNames) > 0 || groupsHavePolicies
if (len(identity.Actions) == 0 || hasSessionToken || hasAttachedPolicies) && iam.iamIntegration != nil {
return iam.authorizeWithIAM(r, identity, action, bucket, object)
}
// Attached IAM policies are authoritative for IAM users. The legacy Actions
// field is a lossy projection that cannot represent deny statements,
// conditions, or fine-grained action differences such as PutObject vs
// DeleteObject.
if hasAttachedPolicies {
if iam.evaluateIAMPolicies(r, identity, action, bucket, object) {
return s3err.ErrNone
}
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Traditional actions-based authorization from static S3 config.
if len(identity.Actions) > 0 {
if !identity.CanDo(action, bucket, object) {
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
return s3err.ErrNone
}
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// authorizeWithIAM authorizes requests using the IAM integration policy engine
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authorizeWithIAM(r *http.Request, identity *Identity, action Action, bucket string, object string) s3err.ErrorCode {
ctx := r.Context()
// Get session info from request headers
// First check for JWT-based authentication headers (X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token)
sessionToken := r.Header.Get("X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token")
principal := r.Header.Get("X-SeaweedFS-Principal")
// Fallback to AWS Signature V4 STS token if JWT token not present
// This handles the case where STS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity generates temporary credentials
// that include an X-Amz-Security-Token header (in addition to the access key and secret)
if sessionToken == "" {
sessionToken = r.Header.Get("X-Amz-Security-Token")
if sessionToken == "" {
// Also check query parameters for presigned URLs with STS tokens
sessionToken = r.URL.Query().Get("X-Amz-Security-Token")
}
}
// Create IAMIdentity for authorization — copy PolicyNames to avoid mutating shared identity
policyNames := make([]string, len(identity.PolicyNames))
copy(policyNames, identity.PolicyNames)
// Include policies inherited from user's groups
iam.m.RLock()
if groupNames, ok := iam.userGroups[identity.Name]; ok {
for _, gn := range groupNames {
if g, exists := iam.groups[gn]; exists && !g.Disabled {
policyNames = append(policyNames, g.PolicyNames...)
}
}
}
iam.m.RUnlock()
iamIdentity := &IAMIdentity{
Name: identity.Name,
Account: identity.Account,
PolicyNames: policyNames,
Claims: identity.Claims, // Copy claims for policy variable substitution
}
// Determine authorization path and configure identity
authPath := determineIAMAuthPath(sessionToken, principal, identity.PrincipalArn)
switch authPath {
case iamAuthPathJWT:
// JWT-based authentication - use session token and principal from headers
iamIdentity.Principal = principal
iamIdentity.SessionToken = sessionToken
glog.V(3).Infof("Using JWT-based IAM authorization for principal: %s", principal)
case iamAuthPathSTS_V4:
// STS V4 signature authentication - use session token (from X-Amz-Security-Token) with principal ARN
iamIdentity.Principal = identity.PrincipalArn
iamIdentity.SessionToken = sessionToken
glog.V(3).Infof("Using STS V4 signature IAM authorization for principal: %s with session token", identity.PrincipalArn)
case iamAuthPathStatic_V4:
// Static V4 signature authentication - use principal ARN without session token
iamIdentity.Principal = identity.PrincipalArn
iamIdentity.SessionToken = ""
glog.V(3).Infof("Using static V4 signature IAM authorization for principal: %s", identity.PrincipalArn)
default:
glog.V(3).Info("No valid principal information for IAM authorization")
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
}
// Use IAM integration for authorization
return iam.iamIntegration.AuthorizeAction(ctx, iamIdentity, action, bucket, object, r)
}
// PutPolicy adds or updates a policy
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) PutPolicy(name string, content string) error {
iam.m.Lock()
defer iam.m.Unlock()
if iam.policies == nil {
iam.policies = make(map[string]*iam_pb.Policy)
}
iam.policies[name] = &iam_pb.Policy{Name: name, Content: content}
iam.ensureIAMPolicyEngine()
// Remove old entry first so that a parse failure doesn't leave a stale allow.
_ = iam.iamPolicyEngine.DeleteBucketPolicy(name)
if err := iam.iamPolicyEngine.SetBucketPolicy(name, content); err != nil {
glog.Warningf("IAM policy %q is stored but could not be compiled for cache: %v", name, err)
}
return nil
}
// GetPolicy retrieves a policy by name
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) GetPolicy(name string) (*iam_pb.Policy, error) {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
if policy, ok := iam.policies[name]; ok {
return policy, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("policy not found: %s", name)
}
// DeletePolicy removes a policy
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) DeletePolicy(name string) error {
iam.m.Lock()
defer iam.m.Unlock()
delete(iam.policies, name)
if iam.iamPolicyEngine != nil {
_ = iam.iamPolicyEngine.DeleteBucketPolicy(name)
}
return nil
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) PutGroup(group *iam_pb.Group) error {
if group == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("put group failed: nil group")
}
if group.Name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("put group failed: empty group name")
}
glog.V(1).Infof("IAM: put group %s", group.Name)
iam.m.Lock()
defer iam.m.Unlock()
// Remove old reverse index entries for this group
if old, ok := iam.groups[group.Name]; ok && !old.Disabled {
for _, member := range old.Members {
iam.removeUserGroupLocked(member, group.Name)
}
}
iam.groups[group.Name] = group
// Add new reverse index entries if group is enabled
if !group.Disabled {
for _, member := range group.Members {
iam.userGroups[member] = append(iam.userGroups[member], group.Name)
}
}
return nil
}
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) RemoveGroup(groupName string) {
glog.V(1).Infof("IAM: remove group %s", groupName)
iam.m.Lock()
defer iam.m.Unlock()
if g, ok := iam.groups[groupName]; ok && !g.Disabled {
for _, member := range g.Members {
iam.removeUserGroupLocked(member, groupName)
}
}
delete(iam.groups, groupName)
}
// removeUserGroupLocked removes a group from a user's group list.
// Must be called with iam.m held.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) removeUserGroupLocked(username, groupName string) {
groups := iam.userGroups[username]
for i, g := range groups {
if g == groupName {
iam.userGroups[username] = append(groups[:i], groups[i+1:]...)
if len(iam.userGroups[username]) == 0 {
delete(iam.userGroups, username)
}
return
}
}
}
// ensureIAMPolicyEngine lazily initializes the shared IAM policy engine.
// Must be called with iam.m held.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) ensureIAMPolicyEngine() {
if iam.iamPolicyEngine == nil {
iam.iamPolicyEngine = policy_engine.NewPolicyEngine()
}
}
// rebuildIAMPolicyEngineLocked rebuilds the entire IAM policy engine cache
// from the current policies map. Must be called with iam.m held.
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) rebuildIAMPolicyEngineLocked() {
if len(iam.policies) == 0 {
iam.iamPolicyEngine = nil
return
}
engine := policy_engine.NewPolicyEngine()
for name, p := range iam.policies {
if err := engine.SetBucketPolicy(name, p.Content); err != nil {
glog.Warningf("IAM policy cache rebuild: skipping invalid policy %q: %v", name, err)
}
}
iam.iamPolicyEngine = engine
}
// ListPolicies lists all policies
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) ListPolicies() []*iam_pb.Policy {
iam.m.RLock()
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
var policies []*iam_pb.Policy
for _, p := range iam.policies {
policies = append(policies, p)
}
return policies
}