* iam: add ServiceAccount protobuf schema Add ServiceAccount message type to iam.proto with support for: - Unique ID and parent user linkage - Optional expiration timestamp - Separate credentials (access key/secret) - Action restrictions (subset of parent) - Enable/disable status This is the first step toward implementing issue #7744 (IAM Service Account Support). * iam: add service account response types Add IAM API response types for service account operations: - ServiceAccountInfo struct for marshaling account details - CreateServiceAccountResponse - DeleteServiceAccountResponse - ListServiceAccountsResponse - GetServiceAccountResponse - UpdateServiceAccountResponse Also add type aliases in iamapi package for backwards compatibility. Part of issue #7744 (IAM Service Account Support). * iam: implement service account API handlers Add CRUD operations for service accounts: - CreateServiceAccount: Creates service account with ABIA key prefix - DeleteServiceAccount: Removes service account and parent linkage - ListServiceAccounts: Lists all or filtered by parent user - GetServiceAccount: Retrieves service account details - UpdateServiceAccount: Modifies status, description, expiration Service accounts inherit parent user's actions by default and support optional expiration timestamps. Part of issue #7744 (IAM Service Account Support). * sts: add AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity HTTP endpoint Add STS API HTTP endpoint for AWS SDK compatibility: - Create s3api_sts.go with HTTP handlers matching AWS STS spec - Support AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity action with JWT token - Return XML response with temporary credentials (AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, SessionToken) matching AWS format - Register STS route at POST /?Action=AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity This enables AWS SDKs (boto3, AWS CLI, etc.) to obtain temporary S3 credentials using OIDC/JWT tokens. Part of issue #7744 (IAM Service Account Support). * test: add service account and STS integration tests Add integration tests for new IAM features: s3_service_account_test.go: - TestServiceAccountLifecycle: Create, Get, List, Update, Delete - TestServiceAccountValidation: Error handling for missing params s3_sts_test.go: - TestAssumeRoleWithWebIdentityValidation: Parameter validation - TestAssumeRoleWithWebIdentityWithMockJWT: JWT token handling Tests skip gracefully when SeaweedFS is not running or when IAM features are not configured. Part of issue #7744 (IAM Service Account Support). * iam: address code review comments - Add constants for service account ID and key lengths - Use strconv.ParseInt instead of fmt.Sscanf for better error handling - Allow clearing descriptions by checking key existence in url.Values - Replace magic numbers (12, 20, 40) with named constants Addresses review comments from gemini-code-assist[bot] * test: add proper error handling in service account tests Use require.NoError(t, err) for io.ReadAll and xml.Unmarshal to prevent silent failures and ensure test reliability. Addresses review comment from gemini-code-assist[bot] * test: add proper error handling in STS tests Use require.NoError(t, err) for io.ReadAll and xml.Unmarshal to prevent silent failures and ensure test reliability. Repeated this fix throughout the file. Addresses review comment from gemini-code-assist[bot] in PR #7901. * iam: address additional code review comments - Specific error code mapping for STS service errors - Distinguish between Sender and Receiver error types in STS responses - Add nil checks for credentials in List/GetServiceAccount - Validate expiration date is in the future - Improve integration test error messages (include response body) - Add credential verification step in service account tests Addresses remaining review comments from gemini-code-assist[bot] across multiple files. * iam: fix shared slice reference in service account creation Copy parent's actions to create an independent slice for the service account instead of sharing the underlying array. This prevents unexpected mutations when the parent's actions are modified later. Addresses review comment from coderabbitai[bot] in PR #7901. * iam: remove duplicate unused constant Removed redundant iamServiceAccountKeyPrefix as ServiceAccountKeyPrefix is already defined and used. Addresses remaining cleanup task. * sts: document limitation of string-based error mapping Added TODO comment explaining that the current string-based error mapping approach is fragile and should be replaced with typed errors from the STS service in a future refactoring. This addresses the architectural concern raised in code review while deferring the actual implementation to a separate PR to avoid scope creep in the current service account feature addition. * iam: fix remaining review issues - Add future-date validation for expiration in UpdateServiceAccount - Reorder tests so credential verification happens before deletion - Fix compilation error by using correct JWT generation methods Addresses final review comments from coderabbitai[bot]. * iam: fix service account access key length The access key IDs were incorrectly generated with 24 characters instead of the AWS-standard 20 characters. This was caused by generating 20 random characters and then prepending the 4-character ABIA prefix. Fixed by subtracting the prefix length from AccessKeyLength, so the final key is: ABIA (4 chars) + random (16 chars) = 20 chars total. This ensures compatibility with S3 clients that validate key length. * test: add comprehensive service account security tests Added comprehensive integration tests for service account functionality: - TestServiceAccountS3Access: Verify SA credentials work for S3 operations - TestServiceAccountExpiration: Test expiration date validation and enforcement - TestServiceAccountInheritedPermissions: Verify parent-child relationship - TestServiceAccountAccessKeyFormat: Validate AWS-compatible key format (ABIA prefix, 20 char length) These tests ensure SeaweedFS service accounts are compatible with AWS conventions and provide robust security coverage. * iam: remove unused UserAccessKeyPrefix constant Code cleanup to remove unused constants. * iam: remove unused iamCommonResponse type alias Code cleanup to remove unused type aliases. * iam: restore and use UserAccessKeyPrefix constant Restored UserAccessKeyPrefix constant and updated s3api tests to use it instead of hardcoded strings for better maintainability and consistency. * test: improve error handling in service account security tests Added explicit error checking for io.ReadAll and xml.Unmarshal in TestServiceAccountExpiration to ensure failures are reported correctly and cleanup is performed only when appropriate. Also added logging for failed responses. * test: use t.Cleanup for reliable resource cleanup Replaced defer with t.Cleanup to ensure service account cleanup runs even when require.NoError fails. Also switched from manual error checking to require.NoError for more idiomatic testify usage. * iam: add CreatedBy field and optimize identity lookups - Added createdBy parameter to CreateServiceAccount to track who created each service account - Extract creator identity from request context using GetIdentityNameFromContext - Populate created_by field in ServiceAccount protobuf - Added findIdentityByName helper function to optimize identity lookups - Replaced nested loops with O(n) helper function calls in CreateServiceAccount and DeleteServiceAccount This addresses code review feedback for better auditing and performance. * iam: prevent user deletion when service accounts exist Following AWS IAM behavior, prevent deletion of users that have active service accounts. This ensures explicit cleanup and prevents orphaned service account resources with invalid ParentUser references. Users must delete all associated service accounts before deleting the parent user, providing safer resource management. * sts: enhance TODO with typed error implementation guidance Updated TODO comment with detailed implementation approach for replacing string-based error matching with typed errors using errors.Is(). This provides a clear roadmap for a follow-up PR to improve error handling robustness and maintainability. * iam: add operational limits for service account creation Added AWS IAM-compatible safeguards to prevent resource exhaustion: - Maximum 100 service accounts per user (LimitExceededException) - Maximum 1000 character description length (InvalidInputException) These limits prevent accidental or malicious resource exhaustion while not impacting legitimate use cases. * iam: add missing operational limit constants Added MaxServiceAccountsPerUser and MaxDescriptionLength constants that were referenced in the previous commit but not defined. * iam: enforce service account expiration during authentication CRITICAL SECURITY FIX: Expired service account credentials were not being rejected during authentication, allowing continued access after expiration. Changes: - Added Expiration field to Credential struct - Populate expiration when loading service accounts from configuration - Check expiration in all authentication paths (V2 and V4 signatures) - Return ErrExpiredToken for expired credentials This ensures expired service accounts are properly rejected at authentication time, matching AWS IAM behavior and preventing unauthorized access. * iam: fix error code for expired service account credentials Use ErrAccessDenied instead of non-existent ErrExpiredToken for expired service account credentials. This provides appropriate access denial for expired credentials while maintaining AWS-compatible error responses. * iam: fix remaining ErrExpiredToken references Replace all remaining instances of non-existent ErrExpiredToken with ErrAccessDenied for expired service account credentials. * iam: apply AWS-standard key format to user access keys Updated CreateAccessKey to generate AWS-standard 20-character access keys with AKIA prefix for regular users, matching the format used for service accounts. This ensures consistency across all access key types and full AWS compatibility. - Access keys: AKIA + 16 random chars = 20 total (was 21 chars, no prefix) - Secret keys: 40 random chars (was 42, now matches AWS standard) - Uses AccessKeyLength and UserAccessKeyPrefix constants * sts: replace fragile string-based error matching with typed errors Implemented robust error handling using typed errors and errors.Is() instead of fragile strings.Contains() matching. This decouples the HTTP layer from service implementation details and prevents errors from being miscategorized if error messages change. Changes: - Added typed error variables to weed/iam/sts/constants.go: * ErrTypedTokenExpired * ErrTypedInvalidToken * ErrTypedInvalidIssuer * ErrTypedInvalidAudience * ErrTypedMissingClaims - Updated STS service to wrap provider authentication errors with typed errors - Replaced strings.Contains() with errors.Is() in HTTP layer for error checking - Removed TODO comment as the improvement is now implemented This makes error handling more maintainable and reliable. * sts: eliminate all string-based error matching with provider-level typed errors Completed the typed error implementation by adding provider-level typed errors and updating provider implementations to return them. This eliminates ALL fragile string matching throughout the entire error handling stack. Changes: - Added typed error definitions to weed/iam/providers/errors.go: * ErrProviderTokenExpired * ErrProviderInvalidToken * ErrProviderInvalidIssuer * ErrProviderInvalidAudience * ErrProviderMissingClaims - Updated OIDC provider to wrap JWT validation errors with typed provider errors - Replaced strings.Contains() with errors.Is() in STS service for error mapping - Complete error chain: Provider -> STS -> HTTP layer, all using errors.Is() This provides: - Reliable error classification independent of error message content - Type-safe error checking throughout the stack - No order-dependent string matching - Maintainable error handling that won't break with message changes * oidc: use jwt.ErrTokenExpired instead of string matching Replaced the last remaining string-based error check with the JWT library's exported typed error. This makes the error detection independent of error message content and more robust against library updates. Changed from: strings.Contains(errMsg, "expired") To: errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenExpired) This completes the elimination of ALL string-based error matching throughout the entire authentication stack. * iam: add description length validation to UpdateServiceAccount Fixed inconsistency where UpdateServiceAccount didn't validate description length against MaxDescriptionLength, allowing operational limits to be bypassed during updates. Now validates that updated descriptions don't exceed 1000 characters, matching the validation in CreateServiceAccount. * iam: refactor expiration check into helper method Extracted duplicated credential expiration check logic into a helper method to reduce code duplication and improve maintainability. Added Credential.isCredentialExpired() method and replaced 5 instances of inline expiration checks across auth_signature_v2.go and auth_signature_v4.go. * iam: address critical Copilot security and consistency feedback Fixed three critical issues identified by Copilot code review: 1. SECURITY: Prevent loading disabled service account credentials - Added check to skip disabled service accounts during credential loading - Disabled accounts can no longer authenticate 2. Add DurationSeconds validation for STS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity - Enforce AWS-compatible range: 900-43200 seconds (15 min - 12 hours) - Returns proper error for out-of-range values 3. Fix expiration update consistency in UpdateServiceAccount - Added key existence check like Description field - Allows explicit clearing of expiration by setting to empty string - Distinguishes between "not updating" and "clearing expiration" * sts: remove unused durationSecondsStr variable Fixed build error from unused variable after refactoring duration parsing. * iam: address remaining Copilot feedback and remove dead code Completed remaining Copilot code review items: 1. Remove unused getPermission() method (dead code) - Method was defined but never called anywhere 2. Improve slice modification safety in DeleteServiceAccount - Replaced append-with-slice-operations with filter pattern - Avoids potential issues from mutating slice during iteration 3. Fix route registration order - Moved STS route registration BEFORE IAM route - Prevents IAM route from intercepting STS requests - More specific route (with query parameter) now registered first * iam: improve expiration validation and test cleanup robustness Addressed additional Copilot feedback: 1. Make expiration validation more explicit - Added explicit check for negative values - Added comment clarifying that 0 is allowed to clear expiration - Improves code readability and intent 2. Fix test cleanup order in s3_service_account_test.go - Track created service accounts in a slice - Delete all service accounts before deleting parent user - Prevents DeleteConflictException during cleanup - More robust cleanup even if test fails mid-execution Note: s3_service_account_security_test.go already had correct cleanup order due to LIFO defer execution. * test: remove redundant variable assignments Removed duplicate assignments of createdSAId, createdAccessKeyId, and createdSecretAccessKey on lines 148-150 that were already assigned on lines 132-134.
872 lines
32 KiB
Go
872 lines
32 KiB
Go
package sts
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"strconv"
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"time"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/providers"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/utils"
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)
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// TrustPolicyValidator interface for validating trust policies during role assumption
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type TrustPolicyValidator interface {
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// ValidateTrustPolicyForWebIdentity validates if a web identity token can assume a role
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ValidateTrustPolicyForWebIdentity(ctx context.Context, roleArn string, webIdentityToken string) error
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// ValidateTrustPolicyForCredentials validates if credentials can assume a role
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ValidateTrustPolicyForCredentials(ctx context.Context, roleArn string, identity *providers.ExternalIdentity) error
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}
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// FlexibleDuration wraps time.Duration to support both integer nanoseconds and duration strings in JSON
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type FlexibleDuration struct {
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time.Duration
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}
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// UnmarshalJSON implements JSON unmarshaling for FlexibleDuration
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// Supports both: 3600000000000 (nanoseconds) and "1h" (duration string)
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func (fd *FlexibleDuration) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
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// Try to unmarshal as a duration string first (e.g., "1h", "30m")
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var durationStr string
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if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &durationStr); err == nil {
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duration, parseErr := time.ParseDuration(durationStr)
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if parseErr != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid duration string %q: %w", durationStr, parseErr)
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}
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fd.Duration = duration
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return nil
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}
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// If that fails, try to unmarshal as an integer (nanoseconds for backward compatibility)
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var nanoseconds int64
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if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &nanoseconds); err == nil {
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fd.Duration = time.Duration(nanoseconds)
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return nil
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}
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// If both fail, try unmarshaling as a quoted number string (edge case)
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var numberStr string
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if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &numberStr); err == nil {
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if nanoseconds, parseErr := strconv.ParseInt(numberStr, 10, 64); parseErr == nil {
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fd.Duration = time.Duration(nanoseconds)
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return nil
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}
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("unable to parse duration from %s (expected duration string like \"1h\" or integer nanoseconds)", data)
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}
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// MarshalJSON implements JSON marshaling for FlexibleDuration
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// Always marshals as a human-readable duration string
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func (fd FlexibleDuration) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
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return json.Marshal(fd.Duration.String())
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}
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// STSService provides Security Token Service functionality
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// This service is now completely stateless - all session information is embedded
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// in JWT tokens, eliminating the need for session storage and enabling true
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// distributed operation without shared state
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type STSService struct {
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Config *STSConfig // Public for access by other components
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initialized bool
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providers map[string]providers.IdentityProvider
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issuerToProvider map[string]providers.IdentityProvider // Efficient issuer-based provider lookup
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tokenGenerator *TokenGenerator
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trustPolicyValidator TrustPolicyValidator // Interface for trust policy validation
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}
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// STSConfig holds STS service configuration
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type STSConfig struct {
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// TokenDuration is the default duration for issued tokens
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TokenDuration FlexibleDuration `json:"tokenDuration"`
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// MaxSessionLength is the maximum duration for any session
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MaxSessionLength FlexibleDuration `json:"maxSessionLength"`
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// Issuer is the STS issuer identifier
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Issuer string `json:"issuer"`
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// SigningKey is used to sign session tokens
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SigningKey []byte `json:"signingKey"`
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// Providers configuration - enables automatic provider loading
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Providers []*ProviderConfig `json:"providers,omitempty"`
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}
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// ProviderConfig holds identity provider configuration
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type ProviderConfig struct {
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// Name is the unique identifier for the provider
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Name string `json:"name"`
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// Type specifies the provider type (oidc, ldap, etc.)
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Type string `json:"type"`
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// Config contains provider-specific configuration
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Config map[string]interface{} `json:"config"`
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// Enabled indicates if this provider should be active
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Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
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}
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// AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest represents a request to assume role with web identity
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type AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest struct {
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// RoleArn is the ARN of the role to assume
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RoleArn string `json:"RoleArn"`
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// WebIdentityToken is the OIDC token from the identity provider
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WebIdentityToken string `json:"WebIdentityToken"`
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// RoleSessionName is a name for the assumed role session
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RoleSessionName string `json:"RoleSessionName"`
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// DurationSeconds is the duration of the role session (optional)
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DurationSeconds *int64 `json:"DurationSeconds,omitempty"`
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// Policy is an optional session policy (optional)
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Policy *string `json:"Policy,omitempty"`
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}
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// AssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest represents a request to assume role with username/password
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type AssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest struct {
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// RoleArn is the ARN of the role to assume
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RoleArn string `json:"RoleArn"`
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// Username is the username for authentication
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Username string `json:"Username"`
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// Password is the password for authentication
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Password string `json:"Password"`
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// RoleSessionName is a name for the assumed role session
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RoleSessionName string `json:"RoleSessionName"`
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// ProviderName is the name of the identity provider to use
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ProviderName string `json:"ProviderName"`
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// DurationSeconds is the duration of the role session (optional)
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DurationSeconds *int64 `json:"DurationSeconds,omitempty"`
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}
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// AssumeRoleResponse represents the response from assume role operations
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type AssumeRoleResponse struct {
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// Credentials contains the temporary security credentials
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Credentials *Credentials `json:"Credentials"`
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// AssumedRoleUser contains information about the assumed role user
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AssumedRoleUser *AssumedRoleUser `json:"AssumedRoleUser"`
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// PackedPolicySize is the percentage of max policy size used (AWS compatibility)
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PackedPolicySize *int64 `json:"PackedPolicySize,omitempty"`
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}
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// Credentials represents temporary security credentials
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type Credentials struct {
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// AccessKeyId is the access key ID
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AccessKeyId string `json:"AccessKeyId"`
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// SecretAccessKey is the secret access key
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SecretAccessKey string `json:"SecretAccessKey"`
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// SessionToken is the session token
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SessionToken string `json:"SessionToken"`
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// Expiration is when the credentials expire
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Expiration time.Time `json:"Expiration"`
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}
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// AssumedRoleUser contains information about the assumed role user
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type AssumedRoleUser struct {
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// AssumedRoleId is the unique identifier of the assumed role
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AssumedRoleId string `json:"AssumedRoleId"`
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// Arn is the ARN of the assumed role user
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Arn string `json:"Arn"`
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// Subject is the subject identifier from the identity provider
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Subject string `json:"Subject,omitempty"`
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}
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// SessionInfo represents information about an active session
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type SessionInfo struct {
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// SessionId is the unique identifier for the session
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SessionId string `json:"sessionId"`
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// SessionName is the name of the role session
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SessionName string `json:"sessionName"`
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// RoleArn is the ARN of the assumed role
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RoleArn string `json:"roleArn"`
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// AssumedRoleUser contains information about the assumed role user
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AssumedRoleUser string `json:"assumedRoleUser"`
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// Principal is the principal ARN
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Principal string `json:"principal"`
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// Subject is the subject identifier from the identity provider
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Subject string `json:"subject"`
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// Provider is the identity provider used (legacy field)
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Provider string `json:"provider"`
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// IdentityProvider is the identity provider used
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IdentityProvider string `json:"identityProvider"`
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// ExternalUserId is the external user identifier from the provider
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ExternalUserId string `json:"externalUserId"`
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// ProviderIssuer is the issuer from the identity provider
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ProviderIssuer string `json:"providerIssuer"`
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// Policies are the policies associated with this session
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Policies []string `json:"policies"`
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// RequestContext contains additional request context for policy evaluation
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RequestContext map[string]interface{} `json:"requestContext,omitempty"`
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// CreatedAt is when the session was created
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CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
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// ExpiresAt is when the session expires
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ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"expiresAt"`
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// Credentials are the temporary credentials for this session
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Credentials *Credentials `json:"credentials"`
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}
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// NewSTSService creates a new STS service
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func NewSTSService() *STSService {
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return &STSService{
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providers: make(map[string]providers.IdentityProvider),
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issuerToProvider: make(map[string]providers.IdentityProvider),
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}
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}
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// Initialize initializes the STS service with configuration
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func (s *STSService) Initialize(config *STSConfig) error {
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if config == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf(ErrConfigCannotBeNil)
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}
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if err := s.validateConfig(config); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid STS configuration: %w", err)
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}
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s.Config = config
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// Initialize token generator for stateless JWT operations
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s.tokenGenerator = NewTokenGenerator(config.SigningKey, config.Issuer)
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// Load identity providers from configuration
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if err := s.loadProvidersFromConfig(config); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to load identity providers: %w", err)
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}
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s.initialized = true
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return nil
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}
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// validateConfig validates the STS configuration
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func (s *STSService) validateConfig(config *STSConfig) error {
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if config.TokenDuration.Duration <= 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf(ErrInvalidTokenDuration)
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}
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if config.MaxSessionLength.Duration <= 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf(ErrInvalidMaxSessionLength)
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}
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if config.Issuer == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf(ErrIssuerRequired)
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}
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if len(config.SigningKey) < MinSigningKeyLength {
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return fmt.Errorf(ErrSigningKeyTooShort, MinSigningKeyLength)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// loadProvidersFromConfig loads identity providers from configuration
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func (s *STSService) loadProvidersFromConfig(config *STSConfig) error {
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if len(config.Providers) == 0 {
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glog.V(2).Infof("No providers configured in STS config")
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return nil
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}
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factory := NewProviderFactory()
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// Load all providers from configuration
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providersMap, err := factory.LoadProvidersFromConfig(config.Providers)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to load providers from config: %w", err)
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}
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// Replace current providers with new ones
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s.providers = providersMap
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// Also populate the issuerToProvider map for efficient and secure JWT validation
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s.issuerToProvider = make(map[string]providers.IdentityProvider)
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for name, provider := range s.providers {
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issuer := s.extractIssuerFromProvider(provider)
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if issuer != "" {
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if _, exists := s.issuerToProvider[issuer]; exists {
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glog.Warningf("Duplicate issuer %s found for provider %s. Overwriting.", issuer, name)
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}
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s.issuerToProvider[issuer] = provider
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glog.V(2).Infof("Registered provider %s with issuer %s for efficient lookup", name, issuer)
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}
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}
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glog.V(1).Infof("Successfully loaded %d identity providers: %v",
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len(s.providers), s.getProviderNames())
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return nil
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}
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// getProviderNames returns list of loaded provider names
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func (s *STSService) getProviderNames() []string {
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names := make([]string, 0, len(s.providers))
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for name := range s.providers {
|
|
names = append(names, name)
|
|
}
|
|
return names
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// IsInitialized returns whether the service is initialized
|
|
func (s *STSService) IsInitialized() bool {
|
|
return s.initialized
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RegisterProvider registers an identity provider
|
|
func (s *STSService) RegisterProvider(provider providers.IdentityProvider) error {
|
|
if provider == nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(ErrProviderCannotBeNil)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
name := provider.Name()
|
|
if name == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(ErrProviderNameEmpty)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s.providers[name] = provider
|
|
|
|
// Try to extract issuer information for efficient lookup
|
|
// This is a best-effort approach for different provider types
|
|
issuer := s.extractIssuerFromProvider(provider)
|
|
if issuer != "" {
|
|
s.issuerToProvider[issuer] = provider
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("Registered provider %s with issuer %s for efficient lookup", name, issuer)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// extractIssuerFromProvider attempts to extract issuer information from different provider types
|
|
func (s *STSService) extractIssuerFromProvider(provider providers.IdentityProvider) string {
|
|
// Handle different provider types
|
|
switch p := provider.(type) {
|
|
case interface{ GetIssuer() string }:
|
|
// For providers that implement GetIssuer() method
|
|
return p.GetIssuer()
|
|
default:
|
|
// For other provider types, we'll rely on JWT parsing during validation
|
|
// This is still more efficient than the current brute-force approach
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetProviders returns all registered identity providers
|
|
func (s *STSService) GetProviders() map[string]providers.IdentityProvider {
|
|
return s.providers
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetTrustPolicyValidator sets the trust policy validator for role assumption validation
|
|
func (s *STSService) SetTrustPolicyValidator(validator TrustPolicyValidator) {
|
|
s.trustPolicyValidator = validator
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity assumes a role using a web identity token (OIDC)
|
|
// This method is now completely stateless - all session information is embedded in the JWT token
|
|
func (s *STSService) AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity(ctx context.Context, request *AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest) (*AssumeRoleResponse, error) {
|
|
if !s.initialized {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf(ErrSTSServiceNotInitialized)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if request == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request cannot be nil")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate request parameters
|
|
if err := s.validateAssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest(request); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid request: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check for unsupported session policy
|
|
if request.Policy != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("session policies are not currently supported - Policy parameter must be omitted")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 1. Validate the web identity token with appropriate provider
|
|
externalIdentity, provider, err := s.validateWebIdentityToken(ctx, request.WebIdentityToken)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to validate web identity token: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 2. Check if the role exists and can be assumed (includes trust policy validation)
|
|
if err := s.validateRoleAssumptionForWebIdentity(ctx, request.RoleArn, request.WebIdentityToken); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("role assumption denied: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 3. Calculate session duration, capping at the source token's expiration
|
|
// This ensures sessions from short-lived tokens (e.g., GitLab CI job tokens) don't outlive their source
|
|
sessionDuration := s.calculateSessionDuration(request.DurationSeconds, externalIdentity.TokenExpiration)
|
|
expiresAt := time.Now().Add(sessionDuration)
|
|
|
|
// 4. Generate session ID and credentials
|
|
sessionId, err := GenerateSessionId()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate session ID: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
credGenerator := NewCredentialGenerator()
|
|
credentials, err := credGenerator.GenerateTemporaryCredentials(sessionId, expiresAt)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate credentials: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 5. Create comprehensive JWT session token with all session information embedded
|
|
assumedRoleUser := &AssumedRoleUser{
|
|
AssumedRoleId: request.RoleArn,
|
|
Arn: GenerateAssumedRoleArn(request.RoleArn, request.RoleSessionName),
|
|
Subject: externalIdentity.UserID,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create rich JWT claims with all session information
|
|
sessionClaims := NewSTSSessionClaims(sessionId, s.Config.Issuer, expiresAt).
|
|
WithSessionName(request.RoleSessionName).
|
|
WithRoleInfo(request.RoleArn, assumedRoleUser.Arn, assumedRoleUser.Arn).
|
|
WithIdentityProvider(provider.Name(), externalIdentity.UserID, "").
|
|
WithMaxDuration(sessionDuration)
|
|
|
|
// Generate self-contained JWT token with all session information
|
|
jwtToken, err := s.tokenGenerator.GenerateJWTWithClaims(sessionClaims)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate JWT session token: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
credentials.SessionToken = jwtToken
|
|
|
|
// 6. Build and return response (no session storage needed!)
|
|
|
|
return &AssumeRoleResponse{
|
|
Credentials: credentials,
|
|
AssumedRoleUser: assumedRoleUser,
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AssumeRoleWithCredentials assumes a role using username/password credentials
|
|
// This method is now completely stateless - all session information is embedded in the JWT token
|
|
func (s *STSService) AssumeRoleWithCredentials(ctx context.Context, request *AssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest) (*AssumeRoleResponse, error) {
|
|
if !s.initialized {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("STS service not initialized")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if request == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request cannot be nil")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate request parameters
|
|
if err := s.validateAssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest(request); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid request: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 1. Get the specified provider
|
|
provider, exists := s.providers[request.ProviderName]
|
|
if !exists {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("identity provider not found: %s", request.ProviderName)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 2. Validate credentials with the specified provider
|
|
credentials := request.Username + ":" + request.Password
|
|
externalIdentity, err := provider.Authenticate(ctx, credentials)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to authenticate credentials: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 3. Check if the role exists and can be assumed (includes trust policy validation)
|
|
if err := s.validateRoleAssumptionForCredentials(ctx, request.RoleArn, externalIdentity); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("role assumption denied: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 4. Calculate session duration
|
|
// For credential-based auth, there's no source token with expiration to cap against
|
|
sessionDuration := s.calculateSessionDuration(request.DurationSeconds, nil)
|
|
expiresAt := time.Now().Add(sessionDuration)
|
|
|
|
// 5. Generate session ID and temporary credentials
|
|
sessionId, err := GenerateSessionId()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate session ID: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
credGenerator := NewCredentialGenerator()
|
|
tempCredentials, err := credGenerator.GenerateTemporaryCredentials(sessionId, expiresAt)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate credentials: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 6. Create comprehensive JWT session token with all session information embedded
|
|
assumedRoleUser := &AssumedRoleUser{
|
|
AssumedRoleId: request.RoleArn,
|
|
Arn: GenerateAssumedRoleArn(request.RoleArn, request.RoleSessionName),
|
|
Subject: externalIdentity.UserID,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create rich JWT claims with all session information
|
|
sessionClaims := NewSTSSessionClaims(sessionId, s.Config.Issuer, expiresAt).
|
|
WithSessionName(request.RoleSessionName).
|
|
WithRoleInfo(request.RoleArn, assumedRoleUser.Arn, assumedRoleUser.Arn).
|
|
WithIdentityProvider(provider.Name(), externalIdentity.UserID, "").
|
|
WithMaxDuration(sessionDuration)
|
|
|
|
// Generate self-contained JWT token with all session information
|
|
jwtToken, err := s.tokenGenerator.GenerateJWTWithClaims(sessionClaims)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate JWT session token: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
tempCredentials.SessionToken = jwtToken
|
|
|
|
// 7. Build and return response (no session storage needed!)
|
|
|
|
return &AssumeRoleResponse{
|
|
Credentials: tempCredentials,
|
|
AssumedRoleUser: assumedRoleUser,
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ValidateSessionToken validates a session token and returns session information
|
|
// This method is now completely stateless - all session information is extracted from the JWT token
|
|
func (s *STSService) ValidateSessionToken(ctx context.Context, sessionToken string) (*SessionInfo, error) {
|
|
if !s.initialized {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf(ErrSTSServiceNotInitialized)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if sessionToken == "" {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf(ErrSessionTokenCannotBeEmpty)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate JWT and extract comprehensive session claims
|
|
claims, err := s.tokenGenerator.ValidateJWTWithClaims(sessionToken)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf(ErrSessionValidationFailed, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Convert JWT claims back to SessionInfo
|
|
// All session information is embedded in the JWT token itself
|
|
return claims.ToSessionInfo(), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NOTE: Session revocation is not supported in the stateless JWT design.
|
|
//
|
|
// In a stateless JWT system, tokens cannot be revoked without implementing a token blacklist,
|
|
// which would break the stateless architecture. Tokens remain valid until their natural
|
|
// expiration time.
|
|
//
|
|
// For applications requiring token revocation, consider:
|
|
// 1. Using shorter token lifespans (e.g., 15-30 minutes)
|
|
// 2. Implementing a distributed token blacklist (breaks stateless design)
|
|
// 3. Including a "jti" (JWT ID) claim for tracking specific tokens
|
|
//
|
|
// Use ValidateSessionToken() to verify if a token is valid and not expired.
|
|
|
|
// Helper methods for AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
|
|
|
|
// validateAssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest validates the request parameters
|
|
func (s *STSService) validateAssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest(request *AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest) error {
|
|
if request.RoleArn == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("RoleArn is required")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if request.WebIdentityToken == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("WebIdentityToken is required")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if request.RoleSessionName == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("RoleSessionName is required")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate session duration if provided
|
|
if request.DurationSeconds != nil {
|
|
if *request.DurationSeconds < 900 || *request.DurationSeconds > 43200 { // 15min to 12 hours
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("DurationSeconds must be between 900 and 43200 seconds")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validateWebIdentityToken validates the web identity token with strict issuer-to-provider mapping
|
|
// SECURITY: JWT tokens with a specific issuer claim MUST only be validated by the provider for that issuer
|
|
// SECURITY: This method only accepts JWT tokens. Non-JWT authentication must use AssumeRoleWithCredentials with explicit ProviderName.
|
|
func (s *STSService) validateWebIdentityToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (*providers.ExternalIdentity, providers.IdentityProvider, error) {
|
|
// Try to extract issuer from JWT token for strict validation
|
|
issuer, err := s.extractIssuerFromJWT(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Token is not a valid JWT or cannot be parsed
|
|
// SECURITY: Web identity tokens MUST be JWT tokens. Non-JWT authentication flows
|
|
// should use AssumeRoleWithCredentials with explicit ProviderName to prevent
|
|
// security vulnerabilities from non-deterministic provider selection.
|
|
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("web identity token must be a valid JWT token: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Look up the specific provider for this issuer
|
|
provider, exists := s.issuerToProvider[issuer]
|
|
if !exists {
|
|
// SECURITY: If no provider is registered for this issuer, fail immediately
|
|
// This prevents JWT tokens from being validated by unintended providers
|
|
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("no identity provider registered for issuer: %s", issuer)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Authenticate with the correct provider for this issuer
|
|
identity, err := provider.Authenticate(ctx, token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Map provider errors to STS errors using errors.Is() for robust error checking
|
|
// This eliminates fragile string matching and provides reliable error classification
|
|
if errors.Is(err, providers.ErrProviderTokenExpired) {
|
|
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrTypedTokenExpired, err)
|
|
} else if errors.Is(err, providers.ErrProviderInvalidToken) {
|
|
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrTypedInvalidToken, err)
|
|
} else if errors.Is(err, providers.ErrProviderInvalidIssuer) {
|
|
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrTypedInvalidIssuer, err)
|
|
} else if errors.Is(err, providers.ErrProviderInvalidAudience) {
|
|
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrTypedInvalidAudience, err)
|
|
} else if errors.Is(err, providers.ErrProviderMissingClaims) {
|
|
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrTypedMissingClaims, err)
|
|
}
|
|
// For other errors, return with context
|
|
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("token validation failed with provider for issuer %s: %w", issuer, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if identity == nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("authentication succeeded but no identity returned for issuer %s", issuer)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return identity, provider, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ValidateWebIdentityToken is a public method that exposes secure token validation for external use
|
|
// This method uses issuer-based lookup to select the correct provider, ensuring security and efficiency
|
|
func (s *STSService) ValidateWebIdentityToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (*providers.ExternalIdentity, providers.IdentityProvider, error) {
|
|
return s.validateWebIdentityToken(ctx, token)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// extractIssuerFromJWT extracts the issuer (iss) claim from a JWT token without verification
|
|
func (s *STSService) extractIssuerFromJWT(token string) (string, error) {
|
|
// Parse token without verification to get claims
|
|
parsedToken, _, err := new(jwt.Parser).ParseUnverified(token, jwt.MapClaims{})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWT token: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Extract claims
|
|
claims, ok := parsedToken.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid token claims")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get issuer claim
|
|
issuer, ok := claims["iss"].(string)
|
|
if !ok || issuer == "" {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("missing or invalid issuer claim")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return issuer, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validateRoleAssumptionForWebIdentity validates role assumption for web identity tokens
|
|
// This method performs complete trust policy validation to prevent unauthorized role assumptions
|
|
func (s *STSService) validateRoleAssumptionForWebIdentity(ctx context.Context, roleArn string, webIdentityToken string) error {
|
|
if roleArn == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("role ARN cannot be empty")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if webIdentityToken == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("web identity token cannot be empty")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Basic role ARN format validation
|
|
expectedPrefix := "arn:aws:iam::role/"
|
|
if len(roleArn) < len(expectedPrefix) || roleArn[:len(expectedPrefix)] != expectedPrefix {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid role ARN format: got %s, expected format: %s*", roleArn, expectedPrefix)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Extract role name and validate ARN format
|
|
roleName := utils.ExtractRoleNameFromArn(roleArn)
|
|
if roleName == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid role ARN format: %s", roleArn)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CRITICAL SECURITY: Perform trust policy validation
|
|
if s.trustPolicyValidator != nil {
|
|
if err := s.trustPolicyValidator.ValidateTrustPolicyForWebIdentity(ctx, roleArn, webIdentityToken); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("trust policy validation failed: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// If no trust policy validator is configured, fail closed for security
|
|
glog.Errorf("SECURITY WARNING: No trust policy validator configured - denying role assumption for security")
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("trust policy validation not available - role assumption denied for security")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validateRoleAssumptionForCredentials validates role assumption for credential-based authentication
|
|
// This method performs complete trust policy validation to prevent unauthorized role assumptions
|
|
func (s *STSService) validateRoleAssumptionForCredentials(ctx context.Context, roleArn string, identity *providers.ExternalIdentity) error {
|
|
if roleArn == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("role ARN cannot be empty")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if identity == nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("identity cannot be nil")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Basic role ARN format validation
|
|
expectedPrefix := "arn:aws:iam::role/"
|
|
if len(roleArn) < len(expectedPrefix) || roleArn[:len(expectedPrefix)] != expectedPrefix {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid role ARN format: got %s, expected format: %s*", roleArn, expectedPrefix)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Extract role name and validate ARN format
|
|
roleName := utils.ExtractRoleNameFromArn(roleArn)
|
|
if roleName == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid role ARN format: %s", roleArn)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CRITICAL SECURITY: Perform trust policy validation
|
|
if s.trustPolicyValidator != nil {
|
|
if err := s.trustPolicyValidator.ValidateTrustPolicyForCredentials(ctx, roleArn, identity); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("trust policy validation failed: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// If no trust policy validator is configured, fail closed for security
|
|
glog.Errorf("SECURITY WARNING: No trust policy validator configured - denying role assumption for security")
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("trust policy validation not available - role assumption denied for security")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// calculateSessionDuration calculates the session duration, respecting the source token's expiration
|
|
// If the incoming web identity token has an exp claim, the session duration is capped to not exceed it
|
|
// This ensures that sessions from short-lived tokens (e.g., GitLab CI job tokens) don't outlive their source
|
|
func (s *STSService) calculateSessionDuration(durationSeconds *int64, tokenExpiration *time.Time) time.Duration {
|
|
var duration time.Duration
|
|
if durationSeconds != nil {
|
|
duration = time.Duration(*durationSeconds) * time.Second
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Use default from config
|
|
duration = s.Config.TokenDuration.Duration
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the source token has an expiration, cap the session duration to not exceed it
|
|
// This follows the principle: "if calculated exp > incoming exp claim, then limit outgoing exp to incoming exp"
|
|
if tokenExpiration != nil && !tokenExpiration.IsZero() {
|
|
timeUntilTokenExpiry := time.Until(*tokenExpiration)
|
|
if timeUntilTokenExpiry <= 0 {
|
|
// Token already expired - use minimal duration as defense-in-depth
|
|
// The token should have been rejected during validation, but we handle this defensively
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("Source token already expired, using minimal session duration")
|
|
duration = time.Minute
|
|
} else if timeUntilTokenExpiry < duration {
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("Limiting session duration from %v to %v based on source token expiration",
|
|
duration, timeUntilTokenExpiry)
|
|
duration = timeUntilTokenExpiry
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Cap at MaxSessionLength if configured
|
|
if s.Config.MaxSessionLength.Duration > 0 && duration > s.Config.MaxSessionLength.Duration {
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("Limiting session duration from %v to %v based on MaxSessionLength config",
|
|
duration, s.Config.MaxSessionLength.Duration)
|
|
duration = s.Config.MaxSessionLength.Duration
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return duration
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// extractSessionIdFromToken extracts session ID from JWT session token
|
|
func (s *STSService) extractSessionIdFromToken(sessionToken string) string {
|
|
// Parse JWT and extract session ID from claims
|
|
claims, err := s.tokenGenerator.ValidateJWTWithClaims(sessionToken)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// For test compatibility, also handle direct session IDs
|
|
if len(sessionToken) == 32 { // Typical session ID length
|
|
return sessionToken
|
|
}
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return claims.SessionId
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validateAssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest validates the credentials request parameters
|
|
func (s *STSService) validateAssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest(request *AssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest) error {
|
|
if request.RoleArn == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("RoleArn is required")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if request.Username == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Username is required")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if request.Password == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Password is required")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if request.RoleSessionName == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("RoleSessionName is required")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if request.ProviderName == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("ProviderName is required")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate session duration if provided
|
|
if request.DurationSeconds != nil {
|
|
if *request.DurationSeconds < 900 || *request.DurationSeconds > 43200 { // 15min to 12 hours
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("DurationSeconds must be between 900 and 43200 seconds")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ExpireSessionForTesting manually expires a session for testing purposes
|
|
func (s *STSService) ExpireSessionForTesting(ctx context.Context, sessionToken string) error {
|
|
if !s.initialized {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("STS service not initialized")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if sessionToken == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("session token cannot be empty")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate JWT token format
|
|
_, err := s.tokenGenerator.ValidateJWTWithClaims(sessionToken)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid session token format: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// In a stateless system, we cannot manually expire JWT tokens
|
|
// The token expiration is embedded in the token itself and handled by JWT validation
|
|
glog.V(1).Infof("Manual session expiration requested for stateless token - cannot expire JWT tokens manually")
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("manual session expiration not supported in stateless JWT system")
|
|
}
|