Files
seaweedFS/weed/iam/sts/sts_service.go
Chris Lu 54de32f207 Support AWS standard IAM role ARN formats (issue #7946) (#7948)
* fix(iam): support both AWS standard and legacy IAM role ARN formats

Fix issue #7946 where SeaweedFS only recognized legacy IAM role ARN format
(arn:aws:iam::role/RoleName) but not the standard AWS format with account ID
(arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT:role/RoleName). This was breaking EKS pod identity
integration which expects the standard format.

Changes:
- Update ExtractRoleNameFromArn() to handle both formats by searching for
  'role/' marker instead of matching a fixed prefix
- Update ExtractRoleNameFromPrincipal() to clearly document both STS and IAM
  formats it supports with or without account ID
- Simplify role ARN validation in validateRoleAssumptionForWebIdentity() and
  validateRoleAssumptionForCredentials() to use the extraction function
- Add comprehensive test coverage with 25 test cases covering both formats

The fix maintains backward compatibility with legacy format while adding
support for standard AWS format with account ID.

Fixes: https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/issues/7946

* docs: improve docstring coverage for ARN utility functions

- Add comprehensive package-level documentation
- Enhance ExtractRoleNameFromPrincipal docstring with parameter and return descriptions
- Enhance ExtractRoleNameFromArn docstring with detailed format documentation
- Add docstrings to test functions explaining test coverage
- Update all docstrings to 80%+ coverage for code review compliance

* refactor: improve ARN parsing code maintainability and error messages

- Define constants for ARN prefixes and markers (stsPrefix, stsAssumedRoleMarker, iamPrefix, iamRoleMarker)
- Replace hardcoded magic strings with named constants in ExtractRoleNameFromPrincipal and ExtractRoleNameFromArn
- Enhance error messages in sts_service.go to show expected ARN format when validation fails
- Error message now shows: 'arn:aws:iam::[ACCOUNT_ID:]role/ROLE_NAME' format
- Improves code readability and maintainability
- Facilitates future ARN format changes and debugging

* feat: add structured ARN type for better debugging and extensibility

Implements Option 2 (Structured ARN Type) from ARN handling comparison:

New Features:
- ARNInfo struct with Original, RoleName, AccountID, and Format fields
- ARNFormat enum (Legacy, Standard, Invalid) for type-safe format tracking
- ParseRoleARN() function for structured IAM role ARN parsing
- ParsePrincipalARN() function for structured STS/IAM principal parsing

Benefits:
- Better debugging: Can see original ARN, extracted components, and format type
- Extensible: Easy to add more fields (Region, Service, etc.) in future
- Type-safe: Format is an enum, not a string
- Backward compatible: Kept original string-based functions

STS Service Updates:
- Uses ParseRoleARN() for structured validation
- Logs ARN components at V(4) level for debugging (role, account, format)
- Better error context when validation fails

Test Coverage:
- 7 new tests for ParseRoleARN (legacy, standard, invalid formats)
- 7 new tests for ParsePrincipalARN (STS/IAM, legacy/standard)
- All 39 existing tests still pass
- Total: 53 ARN-related tests

Comparison with MinIO:
- More flexible: Supports both AWS formats (MinIO only supports MinIO format)
- Better tested: 53 tests vs MinIO's 8 tests
- Structured like MinIO but more practical for AWS use cases

* security: fix ARN parsing to prevent malicious ARN acceptance

Fix critical security vulnerability where malicious ARNs could bypass validation:
- ARNs like 'arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/role/malicious' were incorrectly accepted
- The previous implementation used strings.Index to find 'role/' anywhere in the ARN
- This allowed non-role resource types to be accepted if they contained 'role/' in their path

Changes:
1. Updated ExtractRoleNameFromArn() to validate resource type is exactly 'role/'
2. Updated ExtractRoleNameFromPrincipal() to validate resource type is exactly 'assumed-role/'
3. Updated ParseRoleARN() to validate structure before extracting fields
4. Updated ParsePrincipalARN() to validate structure before extracting fields
5. Added 6 security test cases to prevent regression

The fix validates ARN structure by:
- Splitting on ':' to separate account ID from resource type
- Verifying resource type starts with exact marker ('role/' or 'assumed-role/')
- Only then extracting role name, account ID, and format

All 59 tests pass, including new security tests that verify malicious ARNs are rejected.

Fixes: GitHub Copilot review #3624499048

* test: add test cases for empty role names and improve validation

Address review feedback to improve edge case coverage:

1. Added test case for standard format with empty role name
   - TestExtractRoleNameFromArn: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/
   - TestParseRoleARN: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/

2. Added empty role name validation for STS ARNs in ParsePrincipalARN
   - Now matches ParseRoleARN behavior
   - Prevents ARNs like arn:aws:sts::assumed-role/ from having valid Format

3. Added test cases for empty STS role names
   - TestParsePrincipalARN: arn:aws:sts::assumed-role/
   - TestParsePrincipalARN: arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/

All 65 tests pass (15 for ExtractRoleNameFromArn, 10 for ExtractRoleNameFromPrincipal,
8 for ParseRoleARN, 9 for ParsePrincipalARN, 4 security user ARNs, 2 security STS,
plus existing tests).

* refactor: simplify ARNInfo by removing Format enum

Remove ARNFormat enum (ARNFormatLegacy, ARNFormatStandard, ARNFormatInvalid)
as it's not needed for backward compatibility. Simplifications:

1. Removed ARNFormat type and all format constants
2. Removed Format field from ARNInfo struct
3. Validation now checks if RoleName is empty (simpler and clearer)
4. AccountID presence already distinguishes legacy (empty) from standard (non-empty) formats
5. Updated STS service to check RoleName emptiness instead of Format field
6. Improved debug logging to explicitly show "(legacy format)" or "(standard format)"

Benefits:
- Simpler code with fewer concepts
- AccountID field already provides format information
- Validation is clearer: empty RoleName = invalid ARN
- All 65 tests still pass

This change maintains the same functionality while reducing code complexity.
No backward compatibility concerns as the structured ARN parsing is new.

* test: add comprehensive edge case tests for ARN parsing

Add 4 new test functions covering:
- Multiple role markers in paths (e.g., role/role/name)
- Consecutive slashes in role paths (preserved as valid components)
- Special characters valid in AWS role names (+=,.@-_)
- Extremely long role names near AWS limits

These tests verify the parser's resilience to edge cases and ensure
proper handling of various valid role name formats and special characters.
2026-01-03 19:00:04 -08:00

876 lines
32 KiB
Go

package sts
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strconv"
"time"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/providers"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/utils"
)
// TrustPolicyValidator interface for validating trust policies during role assumption
type TrustPolicyValidator interface {
// ValidateTrustPolicyForWebIdentity validates if a web identity token can assume a role
ValidateTrustPolicyForWebIdentity(ctx context.Context, roleArn string, webIdentityToken string) error
// ValidateTrustPolicyForCredentials validates if credentials can assume a role
ValidateTrustPolicyForCredentials(ctx context.Context, roleArn string, identity *providers.ExternalIdentity) error
}
// FlexibleDuration wraps time.Duration to support both integer nanoseconds and duration strings in JSON
type FlexibleDuration struct {
time.Duration
}
// UnmarshalJSON implements JSON unmarshaling for FlexibleDuration
// Supports both: 3600000000000 (nanoseconds) and "1h" (duration string)
func (fd *FlexibleDuration) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
// Try to unmarshal as a duration string first (e.g., "1h", "30m")
var durationStr string
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &durationStr); err == nil {
duration, parseErr := time.ParseDuration(durationStr)
if parseErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid duration string %q: %w", durationStr, parseErr)
}
fd.Duration = duration
return nil
}
// If that fails, try to unmarshal as an integer (nanoseconds for backward compatibility)
var nanoseconds int64
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &nanoseconds); err == nil {
fd.Duration = time.Duration(nanoseconds)
return nil
}
// If both fail, try unmarshaling as a quoted number string (edge case)
var numberStr string
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &numberStr); err == nil {
if nanoseconds, parseErr := strconv.ParseInt(numberStr, 10, 64); parseErr == nil {
fd.Duration = time.Duration(nanoseconds)
return nil
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("unable to parse duration from %s (expected duration string like \"1h\" or integer nanoseconds)", data)
}
// MarshalJSON implements JSON marshaling for FlexibleDuration
// Always marshals as a human-readable duration string
func (fd FlexibleDuration) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
return json.Marshal(fd.Duration.String())
}
// STSService provides Security Token Service functionality
// This service is now completely stateless - all session information is embedded
// in JWT tokens, eliminating the need for session storage and enabling true
// distributed operation without shared state
type STSService struct {
Config *STSConfig // Public for access by other components
initialized bool
providers map[string]providers.IdentityProvider
issuerToProvider map[string]providers.IdentityProvider // Efficient issuer-based provider lookup
tokenGenerator *TokenGenerator
trustPolicyValidator TrustPolicyValidator // Interface for trust policy validation
}
// STSConfig holds STS service configuration
type STSConfig struct {
// TokenDuration is the default duration for issued tokens
TokenDuration FlexibleDuration `json:"tokenDuration"`
// MaxSessionLength is the maximum duration for any session
MaxSessionLength FlexibleDuration `json:"maxSessionLength"`
// Issuer is the STS issuer identifier
Issuer string `json:"issuer"`
// SigningKey is used to sign session tokens
SigningKey []byte `json:"signingKey"`
// Providers configuration - enables automatic provider loading
Providers []*ProviderConfig `json:"providers,omitempty"`
}
// ProviderConfig holds identity provider configuration
type ProviderConfig struct {
// Name is the unique identifier for the provider
Name string `json:"name"`
// Type specifies the provider type (oidc, ldap, etc.)
Type string `json:"type"`
// Config contains provider-specific configuration
Config map[string]interface{} `json:"config"`
// Enabled indicates if this provider should be active
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
}
// AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest represents a request to assume role with web identity
type AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest struct {
// RoleArn is the ARN of the role to assume
RoleArn string `json:"RoleArn"`
// WebIdentityToken is the OIDC token from the identity provider
WebIdentityToken string `json:"WebIdentityToken"`
// RoleSessionName is a name for the assumed role session
RoleSessionName string `json:"RoleSessionName"`
// DurationSeconds is the duration of the role session (optional)
DurationSeconds *int64 `json:"DurationSeconds,omitempty"`
// Policy is an optional session policy (optional)
Policy *string `json:"Policy,omitempty"`
}
// AssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest represents a request to assume role with username/password
type AssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest struct {
// RoleArn is the ARN of the role to assume
RoleArn string `json:"RoleArn"`
// Username is the username for authentication
Username string `json:"Username"`
// Password is the password for authentication
Password string `json:"Password"`
// RoleSessionName is a name for the assumed role session
RoleSessionName string `json:"RoleSessionName"`
// ProviderName is the name of the identity provider to use
ProviderName string `json:"ProviderName"`
// DurationSeconds is the duration of the role session (optional)
DurationSeconds *int64 `json:"DurationSeconds,omitempty"`
}
// AssumeRoleResponse represents the response from assume role operations
type AssumeRoleResponse struct {
// Credentials contains the temporary security credentials
Credentials *Credentials `json:"Credentials"`
// AssumedRoleUser contains information about the assumed role user
AssumedRoleUser *AssumedRoleUser `json:"AssumedRoleUser"`
// PackedPolicySize is the percentage of max policy size used (AWS compatibility)
PackedPolicySize *int64 `json:"PackedPolicySize,omitempty"`
}
// Credentials represents temporary security credentials
type Credentials struct {
// AccessKeyId is the access key ID
AccessKeyId string `json:"AccessKeyId"`
// SecretAccessKey is the secret access key
SecretAccessKey string `json:"SecretAccessKey"`
// SessionToken is the session token
SessionToken string `json:"SessionToken"`
// Expiration is when the credentials expire
Expiration time.Time `json:"Expiration"`
}
// AssumedRoleUser contains information about the assumed role user
type AssumedRoleUser struct {
// AssumedRoleId is the unique identifier of the assumed role
AssumedRoleId string `json:"AssumedRoleId"`
// Arn is the ARN of the assumed role user
Arn string `json:"Arn"`
// Subject is the subject identifier from the identity provider
Subject string `json:"Subject,omitempty"`
}
// SessionInfo represents information about an active session
type SessionInfo struct {
// SessionId is the unique identifier for the session
SessionId string `json:"sessionId"`
// SessionName is the name of the role session
SessionName string `json:"sessionName"`
// RoleArn is the ARN of the assumed role
RoleArn string `json:"roleArn"`
// AssumedRoleUser contains information about the assumed role user
AssumedRoleUser string `json:"assumedRoleUser"`
// Principal is the principal ARN
Principal string `json:"principal"`
// Subject is the subject identifier from the identity provider
Subject string `json:"subject"`
// Provider is the identity provider used (legacy field)
Provider string `json:"provider"`
// IdentityProvider is the identity provider used
IdentityProvider string `json:"identityProvider"`
// ExternalUserId is the external user identifier from the provider
ExternalUserId string `json:"externalUserId"`
// ProviderIssuer is the issuer from the identity provider
ProviderIssuer string `json:"providerIssuer"`
// Policies are the policies associated with this session
Policies []string `json:"policies"`
// RequestContext contains additional request context for policy evaluation
RequestContext map[string]interface{} `json:"requestContext,omitempty"`
// CreatedAt is when the session was created
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
// ExpiresAt is when the session expires
ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"expiresAt"`
// Credentials are the temporary credentials for this session
Credentials *Credentials `json:"credentials"`
}
// NewSTSService creates a new STS service
func NewSTSService() *STSService {
return &STSService{
providers: make(map[string]providers.IdentityProvider),
issuerToProvider: make(map[string]providers.IdentityProvider),
}
}
// Initialize initializes the STS service with configuration
func (s *STSService) Initialize(config *STSConfig) error {
if config == nil {
return fmt.Errorf(ErrConfigCannotBeNil)
}
if err := s.validateConfig(config); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid STS configuration: %w", err)
}
s.Config = config
// Initialize token generator for stateless JWT operations
s.tokenGenerator = NewTokenGenerator(config.SigningKey, config.Issuer)
// Load identity providers from configuration
if err := s.loadProvidersFromConfig(config); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to load identity providers: %w", err)
}
s.initialized = true
return nil
}
// validateConfig validates the STS configuration
func (s *STSService) validateConfig(config *STSConfig) error {
if config.TokenDuration.Duration <= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf(ErrInvalidTokenDuration)
}
if config.MaxSessionLength.Duration <= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf(ErrInvalidMaxSessionLength)
}
if config.Issuer == "" {
return fmt.Errorf(ErrIssuerRequired)
}
if len(config.SigningKey) < MinSigningKeyLength {
return fmt.Errorf(ErrSigningKeyTooShort, MinSigningKeyLength)
}
return nil
}
// loadProvidersFromConfig loads identity providers from configuration
func (s *STSService) loadProvidersFromConfig(config *STSConfig) error {
if len(config.Providers) == 0 {
glog.V(2).Infof("No providers configured in STS config")
return nil
}
factory := NewProviderFactory()
// Load all providers from configuration
providersMap, err := factory.LoadProvidersFromConfig(config.Providers)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to load providers from config: %w", err)
}
// Replace current providers with new ones
s.providers = providersMap
// Also populate the issuerToProvider map for efficient and secure JWT validation
s.issuerToProvider = make(map[string]providers.IdentityProvider)
for name, provider := range s.providers {
issuer := s.extractIssuerFromProvider(provider)
if issuer != "" {
if _, exists := s.issuerToProvider[issuer]; exists {
glog.Warningf("Duplicate issuer %s found for provider %s. Overwriting.", issuer, name)
}
s.issuerToProvider[issuer] = provider
glog.V(2).Infof("Registered provider %s with issuer %s for efficient lookup", name, issuer)
}
}
glog.V(1).Infof("Successfully loaded %d identity providers: %v",
len(s.providers), s.getProviderNames())
return nil
}
// getProviderNames returns list of loaded provider names
func (s *STSService) getProviderNames() []string {
names := make([]string, 0, len(s.providers))
for name := range s.providers {
names = append(names, name)
}
return names
}
// IsInitialized returns whether the service is initialized
func (s *STSService) IsInitialized() bool {
return s.initialized
}
// RegisterProvider registers an identity provider
func (s *STSService) RegisterProvider(provider providers.IdentityProvider) error {
if provider == nil {
return fmt.Errorf(ErrProviderCannotBeNil)
}
name := provider.Name()
if name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf(ErrProviderNameEmpty)
}
s.providers[name] = provider
// Try to extract issuer information for efficient lookup
// This is a best-effort approach for different provider types
issuer := s.extractIssuerFromProvider(provider)
if issuer != "" {
s.issuerToProvider[issuer] = provider
glog.V(2).Infof("Registered provider %s with issuer %s for efficient lookup", name, issuer)
}
return nil
}
// extractIssuerFromProvider attempts to extract issuer information from different provider types
func (s *STSService) extractIssuerFromProvider(provider providers.IdentityProvider) string {
// Handle different provider types
switch p := provider.(type) {
case interface{ GetIssuer() string }:
// For providers that implement GetIssuer() method
return p.GetIssuer()
default:
// For other provider types, we'll rely on JWT parsing during validation
// This is still more efficient than the current brute-force approach
return ""
}
}
// GetProviders returns all registered identity providers
func (s *STSService) GetProviders() map[string]providers.IdentityProvider {
return s.providers
}
// SetTrustPolicyValidator sets the trust policy validator for role assumption validation
func (s *STSService) SetTrustPolicyValidator(validator TrustPolicyValidator) {
s.trustPolicyValidator = validator
}
// AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity assumes a role using a web identity token (OIDC)
// This method is now completely stateless - all session information is embedded in the JWT token
func (s *STSService) AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity(ctx context.Context, request *AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest) (*AssumeRoleResponse, error) {
if !s.initialized {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(ErrSTSServiceNotInitialized)
}
if request == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request cannot be nil")
}
// Validate request parameters
if err := s.validateAssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest(request); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid request: %w", err)
}
// Check for unsupported session policy
if request.Policy != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("session policies are not currently supported - Policy parameter must be omitted")
}
// 1. Validate the web identity token with appropriate provider
externalIdentity, provider, err := s.validateWebIdentityToken(ctx, request.WebIdentityToken)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to validate web identity token: %w", err)
}
// 2. Check if the role exists and can be assumed (includes trust policy validation)
if err := s.validateRoleAssumptionForWebIdentity(ctx, request.RoleArn, request.WebIdentityToken); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("role assumption denied: %w", err)
}
// 3. Calculate session duration, capping at the source token's expiration
// This ensures sessions from short-lived tokens (e.g., GitLab CI job tokens) don't outlive their source
sessionDuration := s.calculateSessionDuration(request.DurationSeconds, externalIdentity.TokenExpiration)
expiresAt := time.Now().Add(sessionDuration)
// 4. Generate session ID and credentials
sessionId, err := GenerateSessionId()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate session ID: %w", err)
}
credGenerator := NewCredentialGenerator()
credentials, err := credGenerator.GenerateTemporaryCredentials(sessionId, expiresAt)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate credentials: %w", err)
}
// 5. Create comprehensive JWT session token with all session information embedded
assumedRoleUser := &AssumedRoleUser{
AssumedRoleId: request.RoleArn,
Arn: GenerateAssumedRoleArn(request.RoleArn, request.RoleSessionName),
Subject: externalIdentity.UserID,
}
// Create rich JWT claims with all session information
sessionClaims := NewSTSSessionClaims(sessionId, s.Config.Issuer, expiresAt).
WithSessionName(request.RoleSessionName).
WithRoleInfo(request.RoleArn, assumedRoleUser.Arn, assumedRoleUser.Arn).
WithIdentityProvider(provider.Name(), externalIdentity.UserID, "").
WithMaxDuration(sessionDuration)
// Generate self-contained JWT token with all session information
jwtToken, err := s.tokenGenerator.GenerateJWTWithClaims(sessionClaims)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate JWT session token: %w", err)
}
credentials.SessionToken = jwtToken
// 6. Build and return response (no session storage needed!)
return &AssumeRoleResponse{
Credentials: credentials,
AssumedRoleUser: assumedRoleUser,
}, nil
}
// AssumeRoleWithCredentials assumes a role using username/password credentials
// This method is now completely stateless - all session information is embedded in the JWT token
func (s *STSService) AssumeRoleWithCredentials(ctx context.Context, request *AssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest) (*AssumeRoleResponse, error) {
if !s.initialized {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("STS service not initialized")
}
if request == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request cannot be nil")
}
// Validate request parameters
if err := s.validateAssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest(request); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid request: %w", err)
}
// 1. Get the specified provider
provider, exists := s.providers[request.ProviderName]
if !exists {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("identity provider not found: %s", request.ProviderName)
}
// 2. Validate credentials with the specified provider
credentials := request.Username + ":" + request.Password
externalIdentity, err := provider.Authenticate(ctx, credentials)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to authenticate credentials: %w", err)
}
// 3. Check if the role exists and can be assumed (includes trust policy validation)
if err := s.validateRoleAssumptionForCredentials(ctx, request.RoleArn, externalIdentity); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("role assumption denied: %w", err)
}
// 4. Calculate session duration
// For credential-based auth, there's no source token with expiration to cap against
sessionDuration := s.calculateSessionDuration(request.DurationSeconds, nil)
expiresAt := time.Now().Add(sessionDuration)
// 5. Generate session ID and temporary credentials
sessionId, err := GenerateSessionId()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate session ID: %w", err)
}
credGenerator := NewCredentialGenerator()
tempCredentials, err := credGenerator.GenerateTemporaryCredentials(sessionId, expiresAt)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate credentials: %w", err)
}
// 6. Create comprehensive JWT session token with all session information embedded
assumedRoleUser := &AssumedRoleUser{
AssumedRoleId: request.RoleArn,
Arn: GenerateAssumedRoleArn(request.RoleArn, request.RoleSessionName),
Subject: externalIdentity.UserID,
}
// Create rich JWT claims with all session information
sessionClaims := NewSTSSessionClaims(sessionId, s.Config.Issuer, expiresAt).
WithSessionName(request.RoleSessionName).
WithRoleInfo(request.RoleArn, assumedRoleUser.Arn, assumedRoleUser.Arn).
WithIdentityProvider(provider.Name(), externalIdentity.UserID, "").
WithMaxDuration(sessionDuration)
// Generate self-contained JWT token with all session information
jwtToken, err := s.tokenGenerator.GenerateJWTWithClaims(sessionClaims)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate JWT session token: %w", err)
}
tempCredentials.SessionToken = jwtToken
// 7. Build and return response (no session storage needed!)
return &AssumeRoleResponse{
Credentials: tempCredentials,
AssumedRoleUser: assumedRoleUser,
}, nil
}
// ValidateSessionToken validates a session token and returns session information
// This method is now completely stateless - all session information is extracted from the JWT token
func (s *STSService) ValidateSessionToken(ctx context.Context, sessionToken string) (*SessionInfo, error) {
if !s.initialized {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(ErrSTSServiceNotInitialized)
}
if sessionToken == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(ErrSessionTokenCannotBeEmpty)
}
// Validate JWT and extract comprehensive session claims
claims, err := s.tokenGenerator.ValidateJWTWithClaims(sessionToken)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(ErrSessionValidationFailed, err)
}
// Convert JWT claims back to SessionInfo
// All session information is embedded in the JWT token itself
return claims.ToSessionInfo(), nil
}
// NOTE: Session revocation is not supported in the stateless JWT design.
//
// In a stateless JWT system, tokens cannot be revoked without implementing a token blacklist,
// which would break the stateless architecture. Tokens remain valid until their natural
// expiration time.
//
// For applications requiring token revocation, consider:
// 1. Using shorter token lifespans (e.g., 15-30 minutes)
// 2. Implementing a distributed token blacklist (breaks stateless design)
// 3. Including a "jti" (JWT ID) claim for tracking specific tokens
//
// Use ValidateSessionToken() to verify if a token is valid and not expired.
// Helper methods for AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
// validateAssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest validates the request parameters
func (s *STSService) validateAssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest(request *AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest) error {
if request.RoleArn == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("RoleArn is required")
}
if request.WebIdentityToken == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("WebIdentityToken is required")
}
if request.RoleSessionName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("RoleSessionName is required")
}
// Validate session duration if provided
if request.DurationSeconds != nil {
if *request.DurationSeconds < 900 || *request.DurationSeconds > 43200 { // 15min to 12 hours
return fmt.Errorf("DurationSeconds must be between 900 and 43200 seconds")
}
}
return nil
}
// validateWebIdentityToken validates the web identity token with strict issuer-to-provider mapping
// SECURITY: JWT tokens with a specific issuer claim MUST only be validated by the provider for that issuer
// SECURITY: This method only accepts JWT tokens. Non-JWT authentication must use AssumeRoleWithCredentials with explicit ProviderName.
func (s *STSService) validateWebIdentityToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (*providers.ExternalIdentity, providers.IdentityProvider, error) {
// Try to extract issuer from JWT token for strict validation
issuer, err := s.extractIssuerFromJWT(token)
if err != nil {
// Token is not a valid JWT or cannot be parsed
// SECURITY: Web identity tokens MUST be JWT tokens. Non-JWT authentication flows
// should use AssumeRoleWithCredentials with explicit ProviderName to prevent
// security vulnerabilities from non-deterministic provider selection.
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("web identity token must be a valid JWT token: %w", err)
}
// Look up the specific provider for this issuer
provider, exists := s.issuerToProvider[issuer]
if !exists {
// SECURITY: If no provider is registered for this issuer, fail immediately
// This prevents JWT tokens from being validated by unintended providers
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("no identity provider registered for issuer: %s", issuer)
}
// Authenticate with the correct provider for this issuer
identity, err := provider.Authenticate(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
// Map provider errors to STS errors using errors.Is() for robust error checking
// This eliminates fragile string matching and provides reliable error classification
if errors.Is(err, providers.ErrProviderTokenExpired) {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrTypedTokenExpired, err)
} else if errors.Is(err, providers.ErrProviderInvalidToken) {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrTypedInvalidToken, err)
} else if errors.Is(err, providers.ErrProviderInvalidIssuer) {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrTypedInvalidIssuer, err)
} else if errors.Is(err, providers.ErrProviderInvalidAudience) {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrTypedInvalidAudience, err)
} else if errors.Is(err, providers.ErrProviderMissingClaims) {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrTypedMissingClaims, err)
}
// For other errors, return with context
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("token validation failed with provider for issuer %s: %w", issuer, err)
}
if identity == nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("authentication succeeded but no identity returned for issuer %s", issuer)
}
return identity, provider, nil
}
// ValidateWebIdentityToken is a public method that exposes secure token validation for external use
// This method uses issuer-based lookup to select the correct provider, ensuring security and efficiency
func (s *STSService) ValidateWebIdentityToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (*providers.ExternalIdentity, providers.IdentityProvider, error) {
return s.validateWebIdentityToken(ctx, token)
}
// extractIssuerFromJWT extracts the issuer (iss) claim from a JWT token without verification
func (s *STSService) extractIssuerFromJWT(token string) (string, error) {
// Parse token without verification to get claims
parsedToken, _, err := new(jwt.Parser).ParseUnverified(token, jwt.MapClaims{})
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWT token: %v", err)
}
// Extract claims
claims, ok := parsedToken.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
if !ok {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid token claims")
}
// Get issuer claim
issuer, ok := claims["iss"].(string)
if !ok || issuer == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("missing or invalid issuer claim")
}
return issuer, nil
}
// validateRoleAssumptionForWebIdentity validates role assumption for web identity tokens
// This method performs complete trust policy validation to prevent unauthorized role assumptions
func (s *STSService) validateRoleAssumptionForWebIdentity(ctx context.Context, roleArn string, webIdentityToken string) error {
if roleArn == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("role ARN cannot be empty")
}
if webIdentityToken == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("web identity token cannot be empty")
}
// Validate role ARN and extract role information
// Accepts both arn:aws:iam::role/X and arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT:role/X
arnInfo := utils.ParseRoleARN(roleArn)
if arnInfo.RoleName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid role ARN format: %s, expected format: arn:aws:iam::[ACCOUNT_ID:]role/ROLE_NAME", roleArn)
}
// Log ARN details for debugging
if arnInfo.AccountID != "" {
glog.V(4).Infof("Role ARN validation: role=%s, account=%s (standard format)", arnInfo.RoleName, arnInfo.AccountID)
} else {
glog.V(4).Infof("Role ARN validation: role=%s (legacy format)", arnInfo.RoleName)
}
// CRITICAL SECURITY: Perform trust policy validation
if s.trustPolicyValidator != nil {
if err := s.trustPolicyValidator.ValidateTrustPolicyForWebIdentity(ctx, roleArn, webIdentityToken); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("trust policy validation failed: %w", err)
}
} else {
// If no trust policy validator is configured, fail closed for security
glog.Errorf("SECURITY WARNING: No trust policy validator configured - denying role assumption for security")
return fmt.Errorf("trust policy validation not available - role assumption denied for security")
}
return nil
}
// validateRoleAssumptionForCredentials validates role assumption for credential-based authentication
// This method performs complete trust policy validation to prevent unauthorized role assumptions
func (s *STSService) validateRoleAssumptionForCredentials(ctx context.Context, roleArn string, identity *providers.ExternalIdentity) error {
if roleArn == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("role ARN cannot be empty")
}
if identity == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("identity cannot be nil")
}
// Validate role ARN and extract role information
// Accepts both arn:aws:iam::role/X and arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT:role/X
arnInfo := utils.ParseRoleARN(roleArn)
if arnInfo.RoleName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid role ARN format: %s, expected format: arn:aws:iam::[ACCOUNT_ID:]role/ROLE_NAME", roleArn)
}
// Log ARN details for debugging
if arnInfo.AccountID != "" {
glog.V(4).Infof("Role ARN validation: role=%s, account=%s (standard format)", arnInfo.RoleName, arnInfo.AccountID)
} else {
glog.V(4).Infof("Role ARN validation: role=%s (legacy format)", arnInfo.RoleName)
}
// CRITICAL SECURITY: Perform trust policy validation
if s.trustPolicyValidator != nil {
if err := s.trustPolicyValidator.ValidateTrustPolicyForCredentials(ctx, roleArn, identity); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("trust policy validation failed: %w", err)
}
} else {
// If no trust policy validator is configured, fail closed for security
glog.Errorf("SECURITY WARNING: No trust policy validator configured - denying role assumption for security")
return fmt.Errorf("trust policy validation not available - role assumption denied for security")
}
return nil
}
// calculateSessionDuration calculates the session duration, respecting the source token's expiration
// If the incoming web identity token has an exp claim, the session duration is capped to not exceed it
// This ensures that sessions from short-lived tokens (e.g., GitLab CI job tokens) don't outlive their source
func (s *STSService) calculateSessionDuration(durationSeconds *int64, tokenExpiration *time.Time) time.Duration {
var duration time.Duration
if durationSeconds != nil {
duration = time.Duration(*durationSeconds) * time.Second
} else {
// Use default from config
duration = s.Config.TokenDuration.Duration
}
// If the source token has an expiration, cap the session duration to not exceed it
// This follows the principle: "if calculated exp > incoming exp claim, then limit outgoing exp to incoming exp"
if tokenExpiration != nil && !tokenExpiration.IsZero() {
timeUntilTokenExpiry := time.Until(*tokenExpiration)
if timeUntilTokenExpiry <= 0 {
// Token already expired - use minimal duration as defense-in-depth
// The token should have been rejected during validation, but we handle this defensively
glog.V(2).Infof("Source token already expired, using minimal session duration")
duration = time.Minute
} else if timeUntilTokenExpiry < duration {
glog.V(2).Infof("Limiting session duration from %v to %v based on source token expiration",
duration, timeUntilTokenExpiry)
duration = timeUntilTokenExpiry
}
}
// Cap at MaxSessionLength if configured
if s.Config.MaxSessionLength.Duration > 0 && duration > s.Config.MaxSessionLength.Duration {
glog.V(2).Infof("Limiting session duration from %v to %v based on MaxSessionLength config",
duration, s.Config.MaxSessionLength.Duration)
duration = s.Config.MaxSessionLength.Duration
}
return duration
}
// extractSessionIdFromToken extracts session ID from JWT session token
func (s *STSService) extractSessionIdFromToken(sessionToken string) string {
// Parse JWT and extract session ID from claims
claims, err := s.tokenGenerator.ValidateJWTWithClaims(sessionToken)
if err != nil {
// For test compatibility, also handle direct session IDs
if len(sessionToken) == 32 { // Typical session ID length
return sessionToken
}
return ""
}
return claims.SessionId
}
// validateAssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest validates the credentials request parameters
func (s *STSService) validateAssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest(request *AssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest) error {
if request.RoleArn == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("RoleArn is required")
}
if request.Username == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Username is required")
}
if request.Password == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Password is required")
}
if request.RoleSessionName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("RoleSessionName is required")
}
if request.ProviderName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("ProviderName is required")
}
// Validate session duration if provided
if request.DurationSeconds != nil {
if *request.DurationSeconds < 900 || *request.DurationSeconds > 43200 { // 15min to 12 hours
return fmt.Errorf("DurationSeconds must be between 900 and 43200 seconds")
}
}
return nil
}
// ExpireSessionForTesting manually expires a session for testing purposes
func (s *STSService) ExpireSessionForTesting(ctx context.Context, sessionToken string) error {
if !s.initialized {
return fmt.Errorf("STS service not initialized")
}
if sessionToken == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("session token cannot be empty")
}
// Validate JWT token format
_, err := s.tokenGenerator.ValidateJWTWithClaims(sessionToken)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid session token format: %w", err)
}
// In a stateless system, we cannot manually expire JWT tokens
// The token expiration is embedded in the token itself and handled by JWT validation
glog.V(1).Infof("Manual session expiration requested for stateless token - cannot expire JWT tokens manually")
return fmt.Errorf("manual session expiration not supported in stateless JWT system")
}