Files
seaweedFS/weed/iam/sts/sts_service.go
Chris Lu 06391701ed Add AssumeRole and AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity STS actions (#8003)
* test: add integration tests for AssumeRole and AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity STS actions

- Add s3_sts_assume_role_test.go with comprehensive tests for AssumeRole:
  * Parameter validation (missing RoleArn, RoleSessionName, invalid duration)
  * AWS SigV4 authentication with valid/invalid credentials
  * Temporary credential generation and usage

- Add s3_sts_ldap_test.go with tests for AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity:
  * Parameter validation (missing LDAP credentials, RoleArn)
  * LDAP authentication scenarios (valid/invalid credentials)
  * Integration with LDAP server (when configured)

- Update Makefile with new test targets:
  * test-sts: run all STS tests
  * test-sts-assume-role: run AssumeRole tests only
  * test-sts-ldap: run LDAP STS tests only
  * test-sts-suite: run tests with full service lifecycle

- Enhance setup_all_tests.sh:
  * Add OpenLDAP container setup for LDAP testing
  * Create test LDAP users (testuser, ldapadmin)
  * Set LDAP environment variables for tests
  * Update cleanup to remove LDAP container

- Fix setup_keycloak.sh:
  * Enable verbose error logging for realm creation
  * Improve error diagnostics

Tests use fail-fast approach (t.Fatal) when server not configured,
ensuring clear feedback when infrastructure is missing.

* feat: implement AssumeRole and AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity STS actions

Implement two new STS actions to match MinIO's STS feature set:

**AssumeRole Implementation:**
- Add handleAssumeRole with full AWS SigV4 authentication
- Integrate with existing IAM infrastructure via verifyV4Signature
- Validate required parameters (RoleArn, RoleSessionName)
- Validate DurationSeconds (900-43200 seconds range)
- Generate temporary credentials with expiration
- Return AWS-compatible XML response

**AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity Implementation:**
- Add handleAssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity handler (stub)
- Validate LDAP-specific parameters (LDAPUsername, LDAPPassword)
- Validate common STS parameters (RoleArn, RoleSessionName, DurationSeconds)
- Return proper error messages for missing LDAP provider
- Ready for LDAP provider integration

**Routing Fixes:**
- Add explicit routes for AssumeRole and AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity
- Prevent IAM handler from intercepting authenticated STS requests
- Ensure proper request routing priority

**Handler Infrastructure:**
- Add IAM field to STSHandlers for SigV4 verification
- Update NewSTSHandlers to accept IAM reference
- Add STS-specific error codes and response types
- Implement writeSTSErrorResponse for AWS-compatible errors

The AssumeRole action is fully functional and tested.
AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity requires LDAP provider implementation.

* fix: update IAM matcher to exclude STS actions from interception

Update the IAM handler matcher to check for STS actions (AssumeRole,
AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity, AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity) and exclude them
from IAM handler processing. This allows STS requests to be handled by
the STS fallback handler even when they include AWS SigV4 authentication.

The matcher now parses the form data to check the Action parameter and
returns false for STS actions, ensuring they are routed to the correct
handler.

Note: This is a work-in-progress fix. Tests are still showing some
routing issues that need further investigation.

* fix: address PR review security issues for STS handlers

This commit addresses all critical security issues from PR review:

Security Fixes:
- Use crypto/rand for cryptographically secure credential generation
  instead of time.Now().UnixNano() (fixes predictable credentials)
- Add sts:AssumeRole permission check via VerifyActionPermission to
  prevent unauthorized role assumption
- Generate proper session tokens using crypto/rand instead of
  placeholder strings

Code Quality Improvements:
- Refactor DurationSeconds parsing into reusable parseDurationSeconds()
  helper function used by all three STS handlers
- Create generateSecureCredentials() helper for consistent and secure
  temporary credential generation
- Fix iamMatcher to check query string as fallback when Action not
  found in form data

LDAP Provider Implementation:
- Add go-ldap/ldap/v3 dependency
- Create LDAPProvider implementing IdentityProvider interface with
  full LDAP authentication support (connect, bind, search, groups)
- Update ProviderFactory to create real LDAP providers
- Wire LDAP provider into AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity handler

Test Infrastructure:
- Add LDAP user creation verification step in setup_all_tests.sh

* fix: address PR feedback (Round 2) - config validation & provider improvements

- Implement `validateLDAPConfig` in `ProviderFactory`
- Improve `LDAPProvider.Initialize`:
  - Support `connectionTimeout` parsing (string/int/float) from config map
  - Warn if `BindDN` is present but `BindPassword` is empty
- Improve `LDAPProvider.GetUserInfo`:
  - Add fallback to `searchUserGroups` if `memberOf` returns no groups (consistent with Authenticate)

* fix: address PR feedback (Round 3) - LDAP connection improvements & build fix

- Improve `LDAPProvider` connection handling:
  - Use `net.Dialer` with configured timeout for connection establishment
  - Enforce TLS 1.2+ (`MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12`) for both LDAPS and StartTLS
- Fix build error in `s3api_sts.go` (format verb for ErrorCode)

* fix: address PR feedback (Round 4) - LDAP hardening, Authz check & Routing fix

- LDAP Provider Hardening:
  - Prevent re-initialization
  - Enforce single user match in `GetUserInfo` (was explicit only in Authenticate)
  - Ensure connection closure if StartTLS fails
- STS Handlers:
  - Add robust provider detection using type assertion
  - **Security**: Implement authorization check (`VerifyActionPermission`) after LDAP authentication
- Routing:
  - Update tests to reflect that STS actions are handled by STS handler, not generic IAM

* fix: address PR feedback (Round 5) - JWT tokens, ARN formatting, PrincipalArn

CRITICAL FIXES:
- Replace standalone credential generation with STS service JWT tokens
  - handleAssumeRole now generates proper JWT session tokens
  - handleAssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity now generates proper JWT session tokens
  - Session tokens can be validated across distributed instances

- Fix ARN formatting in responses
  - Extract role name from ARN using utils.ExtractRoleNameFromArn()
  - Prevents malformed ARNs like "arn:aws:sts::assumed-role/arn:aws:iam::..."

- Add configurable AccountId for federated users
  - Add AccountId field to STSConfig (defaults to "111122223333")
  - PrincipalArn now uses configured account ID instead of hardcoded "aws"
  - Enables proper trust policy validation

IMPROVEMENTS:
- Sanitize LDAP authentication error messages (don't leak internal details)
- Remove duplicate comment in provider detection
- Add utils import for ARN parsing utilities

* feat: implement LDAP connection pooling to prevent resource exhaustion

PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT:
- Add connection pool to LDAPProvider (default size: 10 connections)
- Reuse LDAP connections across authentication requests
- Prevent file descriptor exhaustion under high load

IMPLEMENTATION:
- connectionPool struct with channel-based connection management
- getConnection(): retrieves from pool or creates new connection
- returnConnection(): returns healthy connections to pool
- createConnection(): establishes new LDAP connection with TLS support
- Close(): cleanup method to close all pooled connections
- Connection health checking (IsClosing()) before reuse

BENEFITS:
- Reduced connection overhead (no TCP handshake per request)
- Better resource utilization under load
- Prevents "too many open files" errors
- Non-blocking pool operations (creates new conn if pool empty)

* fix: correct TokenGenerator access in STS handlers

CRITICAL FIX:
- Make TokenGenerator public in STSService (was private tokenGenerator)
- Update all references from Config.TokenGenerator to TokenGenerator
- Remove TokenGenerator from STSConfig (it belongs in STSService)

This fixes the "NotImplemented" errors in distributed and Keycloak tests.
The issue was that Round 5 changes tried to access Config.TokenGenerator
which didn't exist - TokenGenerator is a field in STSService, not STSConfig.

The TokenGenerator is properly initialized in STSService.Initialize() and
is now accessible for JWT token generation in AssumeRole handlers.

* fix: update tests to use public TokenGenerator field

Following the change to make TokenGenerator public in STSService,
this commit updates the test files to reference the correct public field name.
This resolves compilation errors in the IAM STS test suite.

* fix: update distributed tests to use valid Keycloak users

Updated s3_iam_distributed_test.go to use 'admin-user' and 'read-user'
which exist in the standard Keycloak setup provided by setup_keycloak.sh.
This resolves 'unknown test user' errors in distributed integration tests.

* fix: ensure iam_config.json exists in setup target for CI

The GitHub Actions workflow calls 'make setup' which was not creating
iam_config.json, causing the server to start without IAM integration
enabled (iamIntegration = nil), resulting in NotImplemented errors.

Now 'make setup' copies iam_config.local.json to iam_config.json if
it doesn't exist, ensuring IAM is properly configured in CI.

* fix(iam/ldap): fix connection pool race and rebind corruption

- Add atomic 'closed' flag to connection pool to prevent racing on Close()
- Rebind authenticated user connections back to service account before returning to pool
- Close connections on error instead of returning potentially corrupted state to pool

* fix(iam/ldap): populate standard TokenClaims fields in ValidateToken

- Set Subject, Issuer, Audience, IssuedAt, and ExpiresAt to satisfy the interface
- Use time.Time for timestamps as required by TokenClaims struct
- Default to 1 hour TTL for LDAP tokens

* fix(s3api): include account ID in STS AssumedRoleUser ARN

- Consistent with AWS, include the account ID in the assumed-role ARN
- Use the configured account ID from STS service if available, otherwise default to '111122223333'
- Apply to both AssumeRole and AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity handlers
- Also update .gitignore to ignore IAM test environment files

* refactor(s3api): extract shared STS credential generation logic

- Move common logic for session claims and credential generation to prepareSTSCredentials
- Update handleAssumeRole and handleAssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity to use the helper
- Remove stale comments referencing outdated line numbers

* feat(iam/ldap): make pool size configurable and add audience support

- Add PoolSize to LDAPConfig (default 10)
- Add Audience to LDAPConfig to align with OIDC validation
- Update initialization and ValidateToken to use new fields

* update tests

* debug

* chore(iam): cleanup debug prints and fix test config port

* refactor(iam): use mapstructure for LDAP config parsing

* feat(sts): implement strict trust policy validation for AssumeRole

* test(iam): refactor STS tests to use AWS SDK signer

* test(s3api): implement ValidateTrustPolicyForPrincipal in MockIAMIntegration

* fix(s3api): ensure IAM matcher checks query string on ParseForm error

* fix(sts): use crypto/rand for secure credentials and extract constants

* fix(iam): fix ldap connection leaks and add insecure warning

* chore(iam): improved error wrapping and test parameterization

* feat(sts): add support for LDAPProviderName parameter

* Update weed/iam/ldap/ldap_provider.go

Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update weed/s3api/s3api_sts.go

Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sts): use STSErrSTSNotReady when LDAP provider is missing

* fix(sts): encapsulate TokenGenerator in STSService and add getter

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-01-12 10:45:24 -08:00

887 lines
32 KiB
Go

package sts
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strconv"
"time"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/providers"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/iam/utils"
)
// TrustPolicyValidator interface for validating trust policies during role assumption
type TrustPolicyValidator interface {
// ValidateTrustPolicyForWebIdentity validates if a web identity token can assume a role
// durationSeconds is optional and can be nil
ValidateTrustPolicyForWebIdentity(ctx context.Context, roleArn string, webIdentityToken string, durationSeconds *int64) error
// ValidateTrustPolicyForCredentials validates if credentials can assume a role
ValidateTrustPolicyForCredentials(ctx context.Context, roleArn string, identity *providers.ExternalIdentity) error
}
// FlexibleDuration wraps time.Duration to support both integer nanoseconds and duration strings in JSON
type FlexibleDuration struct {
time.Duration
}
// UnmarshalJSON implements JSON unmarshaling for FlexibleDuration
// Supports both: 3600000000000 (nanoseconds) and "1h" (duration string)
func (fd *FlexibleDuration) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
// Try to unmarshal as a duration string first (e.g., "1h", "30m")
var durationStr string
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &durationStr); err == nil {
duration, parseErr := time.ParseDuration(durationStr)
if parseErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid duration string %q: %w", durationStr, parseErr)
}
fd.Duration = duration
return nil
}
// If that fails, try to unmarshal as an integer (nanoseconds for backward compatibility)
var nanoseconds int64
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &nanoseconds); err == nil {
fd.Duration = time.Duration(nanoseconds)
return nil
}
// If both fail, try unmarshaling as a quoted number string (edge case)
var numberStr string
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &numberStr); err == nil {
if nanoseconds, parseErr := strconv.ParseInt(numberStr, 10, 64); parseErr == nil {
fd.Duration = time.Duration(nanoseconds)
return nil
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("unable to parse duration from %s (expected duration string like \"1h\" or integer nanoseconds)", data)
}
// MarshalJSON implements JSON marshaling for FlexibleDuration
// Always marshals as a human-readable duration string
func (fd FlexibleDuration) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
return json.Marshal(fd.Duration.String())
}
// STSService provides Security Token Service functionality
// This service is now completely stateless - all session information is embedded
// in JWT tokens, eliminating the need for session storage and enabling true
// distributed operation without shared state
type STSService struct {
Config *STSConfig // Public for access by other components
initialized bool
providers map[string]providers.IdentityProvider
issuerToProvider map[string]providers.IdentityProvider // Efficient issuer-based provider lookup
tokenGenerator *TokenGenerator
trustPolicyValidator TrustPolicyValidator // Interface for trust policy validation
}
// GetTokenGenerator returns the token generator used by the STS service.
// This keeps the underlying field unexported while still allowing read-only access.
func (s *STSService) GetTokenGenerator() *TokenGenerator {
return s.tokenGenerator
}
// STSConfig holds STS service configuration
type STSConfig struct {
// TokenDuration is the default duration for issued tokens
TokenDuration FlexibleDuration `json:"tokenDuration"`
// MaxSessionLength is the maximum duration for any session
MaxSessionLength FlexibleDuration `json:"maxSessionLength"`
// Issuer is the STS issuer identifier
Issuer string `json:"issuer"`
// SigningKey is used to sign session tokens
SigningKey []byte `json:"signingKey"`
// AccountId is the AWS account ID used for federated user ARNs
// Defaults to "111122223333" if not specified
AccountId string `json:"accountId,omitempty"`
// Providers configuration - enables automatic provider loading
Providers []*ProviderConfig `json:"providers,omitempty"`
}
// ProviderConfig holds identity provider configuration
type ProviderConfig struct {
// Name is the unique identifier for the provider
Name string `json:"name"`
// Type specifies the provider type (oidc, ldap, etc.)
Type string `json:"type"`
// Config contains provider-specific configuration
Config map[string]interface{} `json:"config"`
// Enabled indicates if this provider should be active
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
}
// AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest represents a request to assume role with web identity
type AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest struct {
// RoleArn is the ARN of the role to assume
RoleArn string `json:"RoleArn"`
// WebIdentityToken is the OIDC token from the identity provider
WebIdentityToken string `json:"WebIdentityToken"`
// RoleSessionName is a name for the assumed role session
RoleSessionName string `json:"RoleSessionName"`
// DurationSeconds is the duration of the role session (optional)
DurationSeconds *int64 `json:"DurationSeconds,omitempty"`
// Policy is an optional session policy (optional)
Policy *string `json:"Policy,omitempty"`
}
// AssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest represents a request to assume role with username/password
type AssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest struct {
// RoleArn is the ARN of the role to assume
RoleArn string `json:"RoleArn"`
// Username is the username for authentication
Username string `json:"Username"`
// Password is the password for authentication
Password string `json:"Password"`
// RoleSessionName is a name for the assumed role session
RoleSessionName string `json:"RoleSessionName"`
// ProviderName is the name of the identity provider to use
ProviderName string `json:"ProviderName"`
// DurationSeconds is the duration of the role session (optional)
DurationSeconds *int64 `json:"DurationSeconds,omitempty"`
}
// AssumeRoleResponse represents the response from assume role operations
type AssumeRoleResponse struct {
// Credentials contains the temporary security credentials
Credentials *Credentials `json:"Credentials"`
// AssumedRoleUser contains information about the assumed role user
AssumedRoleUser *AssumedRoleUser `json:"AssumedRoleUser"`
// PackedPolicySize is the percentage of max policy size used (AWS compatibility)
PackedPolicySize *int64 `json:"PackedPolicySize,omitempty"`
}
// Credentials represents temporary security credentials
type Credentials struct {
// AccessKeyId is the access key ID
AccessKeyId string `json:"AccessKeyId"`
// SecretAccessKey is the secret access key
SecretAccessKey string `json:"SecretAccessKey"`
// SessionToken is the session token
SessionToken string `json:"SessionToken"`
// Expiration is when the credentials expire
Expiration time.Time `json:"Expiration"`
}
// AssumedRoleUser contains information about the assumed role user
type AssumedRoleUser struct {
// AssumedRoleId is the unique identifier of the assumed role
AssumedRoleId string `json:"AssumedRoleId"`
// Arn is the ARN of the assumed role user
Arn string `json:"Arn"`
// Subject is the subject identifier from the identity provider
Subject string `json:"Subject,omitempty"`
}
// SessionInfo represents information about an active session
type SessionInfo struct {
// SessionId is the unique identifier for the session
SessionId string `json:"sessionId"`
// SessionName is the name of the role session
SessionName string `json:"sessionName"`
// RoleArn is the ARN of the assumed role
RoleArn string `json:"roleArn"`
// AssumedRoleUser contains information about the assumed role user
AssumedRoleUser string `json:"assumedRoleUser"`
// Principal is the principal ARN
Principal string `json:"principal"`
// Subject is the subject identifier from the identity provider
Subject string `json:"subject"`
// Provider is the identity provider used (legacy field)
Provider string `json:"provider"`
// IdentityProvider is the identity provider used
IdentityProvider string `json:"identityProvider"`
// ExternalUserId is the external user identifier from the provider
ExternalUserId string `json:"externalUserId"`
// ProviderIssuer is the issuer from the identity provider
ProviderIssuer string `json:"providerIssuer"`
// Policies are the policies associated with this session
Policies []string `json:"policies"`
// RequestContext contains additional request context for policy evaluation
RequestContext map[string]interface{} `json:"requestContext,omitempty"`
// CreatedAt is when the session was created
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
// ExpiresAt is when the session expires
ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"expiresAt"`
// Credentials are the temporary credentials for this session
Credentials *Credentials `json:"credentials"`
}
// NewSTSService creates a new STS service
func NewSTSService() *STSService {
return &STSService{
providers: make(map[string]providers.IdentityProvider),
issuerToProvider: make(map[string]providers.IdentityProvider),
}
}
// Initialize initializes the STS service with configuration
func (s *STSService) Initialize(config *STSConfig) error {
if config == nil {
return fmt.Errorf(ErrConfigCannotBeNil)
}
if err := s.validateConfig(config); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid STS configuration: %w", err)
}
s.Config = config
// Initialize token generator for stateless JWT operations
s.tokenGenerator = NewTokenGenerator(config.SigningKey, config.Issuer)
// Load identity providers from configuration
if err := s.loadProvidersFromConfig(config); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to load identity providers: %w", err)
}
s.initialized = true
return nil
}
// validateConfig validates the STS configuration
func (s *STSService) validateConfig(config *STSConfig) error {
if config.TokenDuration.Duration <= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf(ErrInvalidTokenDuration)
}
if config.MaxSessionLength.Duration <= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf(ErrInvalidMaxSessionLength)
}
if config.Issuer == "" {
return fmt.Errorf(ErrIssuerRequired)
}
if len(config.SigningKey) < MinSigningKeyLength {
return fmt.Errorf(ErrSigningKeyTooShort, MinSigningKeyLength)
}
return nil
}
// loadProvidersFromConfig loads identity providers from configuration
func (s *STSService) loadProvidersFromConfig(config *STSConfig) error {
if len(config.Providers) == 0 {
glog.V(2).Infof("No providers configured in STS config")
return nil
}
factory := NewProviderFactory()
// Load all providers from configuration
providersMap, err := factory.LoadProvidersFromConfig(config.Providers)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to load providers from config: %w", err)
}
// Replace current providers with new ones
s.providers = providersMap
// Also populate the issuerToProvider map for efficient and secure JWT validation
s.issuerToProvider = make(map[string]providers.IdentityProvider)
for name, provider := range s.providers {
issuer := s.extractIssuerFromProvider(provider)
if issuer != "" {
if _, exists := s.issuerToProvider[issuer]; exists {
glog.Warningf("Duplicate issuer %s found for provider %s. Overwriting.", issuer, name)
}
s.issuerToProvider[issuer] = provider
glog.V(2).Infof("Registered provider %s with issuer %s for efficient lookup", name, issuer)
}
}
glog.V(1).Infof("Successfully loaded %d identity providers: %v",
len(s.providers), s.getProviderNames())
return nil
}
// getProviderNames returns list of loaded provider names
func (s *STSService) getProviderNames() []string {
names := make([]string, 0, len(s.providers))
for name := range s.providers {
names = append(names, name)
}
return names
}
// IsInitialized returns whether the service is initialized
func (s *STSService) IsInitialized() bool {
return s.initialized
}
// RegisterProvider registers an identity provider
func (s *STSService) RegisterProvider(provider providers.IdentityProvider) error {
if provider == nil {
return fmt.Errorf(ErrProviderCannotBeNil)
}
name := provider.Name()
if name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf(ErrProviderNameEmpty)
}
s.providers[name] = provider
// Try to extract issuer information for efficient lookup
// This is a best-effort approach for different provider types
issuer := s.extractIssuerFromProvider(provider)
if issuer != "" {
s.issuerToProvider[issuer] = provider
glog.V(2).Infof("Registered provider %s with issuer %s for efficient lookup", name, issuer)
}
return nil
}
// extractIssuerFromProvider attempts to extract issuer information from different provider types
func (s *STSService) extractIssuerFromProvider(provider providers.IdentityProvider) string {
// Handle different provider types
switch p := provider.(type) {
case interface{ GetIssuer() string }:
// For providers that implement GetIssuer() method
return p.GetIssuer()
default:
// For other provider types, we'll rely on JWT parsing during validation
// This is still more efficient than the current brute-force approach
return ""
}
}
// GetProviders returns all registered identity providers
func (s *STSService) GetProviders() map[string]providers.IdentityProvider {
return s.providers
}
// SetTrustPolicyValidator sets the trust policy validator for role assumption validation
func (s *STSService) SetTrustPolicyValidator(validator TrustPolicyValidator) {
s.trustPolicyValidator = validator
}
// AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity assumes a role using a web identity token (OIDC)
// This method is now completely stateless - all session information is embedded in the JWT token
func (s *STSService) AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity(ctx context.Context, request *AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest) (*AssumeRoleResponse, error) {
if !s.initialized {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(ErrSTSServiceNotInitialized)
}
if request == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request cannot be nil")
}
// Validate request parameters
if err := s.validateAssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest(request); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid request: %w", err)
}
// Check for unsupported session policy
if request.Policy != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("session policies are not currently supported - Policy parameter must be omitted")
}
// 1. Validate the web identity token with appropriate provider
externalIdentity, provider, err := s.validateWebIdentityToken(ctx, request.WebIdentityToken)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to validate web identity token: %w", err)
}
// 2. Check if the role exists and can be assumed (includes trust policy validation)
if err := s.validateRoleAssumptionForWebIdentity(ctx, request.RoleArn, request.WebIdentityToken, request.DurationSeconds); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("role assumption denied: %w", err)
}
// 3. Calculate session duration, capping at the source token's expiration
// This ensures sessions from short-lived tokens (e.g., GitLab CI job tokens) don't outlive their source
sessionDuration := s.calculateSessionDuration(request.DurationSeconds, externalIdentity.TokenExpiration)
expiresAt := time.Now().Add(sessionDuration)
// 4. Generate session ID and credentials
sessionId, err := GenerateSessionId()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate session ID: %w", err)
}
credGenerator := NewCredentialGenerator()
credentials, err := credGenerator.GenerateTemporaryCredentials(sessionId, expiresAt)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate credentials: %w", err)
}
// 5. Create comprehensive JWT session token with all session information embedded
assumedRoleUser := &AssumedRoleUser{
AssumedRoleId: request.RoleArn,
Arn: GenerateAssumedRoleArn(request.RoleArn, request.RoleSessionName),
Subject: externalIdentity.UserID,
}
// Create rich JWT claims with all session information
sessionClaims := NewSTSSessionClaims(sessionId, s.Config.Issuer, expiresAt).
WithSessionName(request.RoleSessionName).
WithRoleInfo(request.RoleArn, assumedRoleUser.Arn, assumedRoleUser.Arn).
WithIdentityProvider(provider.Name(), externalIdentity.UserID, "").
WithMaxDuration(sessionDuration)
// Generate self-contained JWT token with all session information
jwtToken, err := s.tokenGenerator.GenerateJWTWithClaims(sessionClaims)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate JWT session token: %w", err)
}
credentials.SessionToken = jwtToken
// 6. Build and return response (no session storage needed!)
return &AssumeRoleResponse{
Credentials: credentials,
AssumedRoleUser: assumedRoleUser,
}, nil
}
// AssumeRoleWithCredentials assumes a role using username/password credentials
// This method is now completely stateless - all session information is embedded in the JWT token
func (s *STSService) AssumeRoleWithCredentials(ctx context.Context, request *AssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest) (*AssumeRoleResponse, error) {
if !s.initialized {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("STS service not initialized")
}
if request == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request cannot be nil")
}
// Validate request parameters
if err := s.validateAssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest(request); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid request: %w", err)
}
// 1. Get the specified provider
provider, exists := s.providers[request.ProviderName]
if !exists {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("identity provider not found: %s", request.ProviderName)
}
// 2. Validate credentials with the specified provider
credentials := request.Username + ":" + request.Password
externalIdentity, err := provider.Authenticate(ctx, credentials)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to authenticate credentials: %w", err)
}
// 3. Check if the role exists and can be assumed (includes trust policy validation)
if err := s.validateRoleAssumptionForCredentials(ctx, request.RoleArn, externalIdentity); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("role assumption denied: %w", err)
}
// 4. Calculate session duration
// For credential-based auth, there's no source token with expiration to cap against
sessionDuration := s.calculateSessionDuration(request.DurationSeconds, nil)
expiresAt := time.Now().Add(sessionDuration)
// 5. Generate session ID and temporary credentials
sessionId, err := GenerateSessionId()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate session ID: %w", err)
}
credGenerator := NewCredentialGenerator()
tempCredentials, err := credGenerator.GenerateTemporaryCredentials(sessionId, expiresAt)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate credentials: %w", err)
}
// 6. Create comprehensive JWT session token with all session information embedded
assumedRoleUser := &AssumedRoleUser{
AssumedRoleId: request.RoleArn,
Arn: GenerateAssumedRoleArn(request.RoleArn, request.RoleSessionName),
Subject: externalIdentity.UserID,
}
// Create rich JWT claims with all session information
sessionClaims := NewSTSSessionClaims(sessionId, s.Config.Issuer, expiresAt).
WithSessionName(request.RoleSessionName).
WithRoleInfo(request.RoleArn, assumedRoleUser.Arn, assumedRoleUser.Arn).
WithIdentityProvider(provider.Name(), externalIdentity.UserID, "").
WithMaxDuration(sessionDuration)
// Generate self-contained JWT token with all session information
jwtToken, err := s.tokenGenerator.GenerateJWTWithClaims(sessionClaims)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate JWT session token: %w", err)
}
tempCredentials.SessionToken = jwtToken
// 7. Build and return response (no session storage needed!)
return &AssumeRoleResponse{
Credentials: tempCredentials,
AssumedRoleUser: assumedRoleUser,
}, nil
}
// ValidateSessionToken validates a session token and returns session information
// This method is now completely stateless - all session information is extracted from the JWT token
func (s *STSService) ValidateSessionToken(ctx context.Context, sessionToken string) (*SessionInfo, error) {
if !s.initialized {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(ErrSTSServiceNotInitialized)
}
if sessionToken == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(ErrSessionTokenCannotBeEmpty)
}
// Validate JWT and extract comprehensive session claims
claims, err := s.tokenGenerator.ValidateJWTWithClaims(sessionToken)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(ErrSessionValidationFailed, err)
}
// Convert JWT claims back to SessionInfo
// All session information is embedded in the JWT token itself
return claims.ToSessionInfo(), nil
}
// NOTE: Session revocation is not supported in the stateless JWT design.
//
// In a stateless JWT system, tokens cannot be revoked without implementing a token blacklist,
// which would break the stateless architecture. Tokens remain valid until their natural
// expiration time.
//
// For applications requiring token revocation, consider:
// 1. Using shorter token lifespans (e.g., 15-30 minutes)
// 2. Implementing a distributed token blacklist (breaks stateless design)
// 3. Including a "jti" (JWT ID) claim for tracking specific tokens
//
// Use ValidateSessionToken() to verify if a token is valid and not expired.
// Helper methods for AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
// validateAssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest validates the request parameters
func (s *STSService) validateAssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest(request *AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityRequest) error {
if request.RoleArn == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("RoleArn is required")
}
if request.WebIdentityToken == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("WebIdentityToken is required")
}
if request.RoleSessionName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("RoleSessionName is required")
}
// Validate session duration if provided
if request.DurationSeconds != nil {
if *request.DurationSeconds < 900 || *request.DurationSeconds > 43200 { // 15min to 12 hours
return fmt.Errorf("DurationSeconds must be between 900 and 43200 seconds")
}
}
return nil
}
// validateWebIdentityToken validates the web identity token with strict issuer-to-provider mapping
// SECURITY: JWT tokens with a specific issuer claim MUST only be validated by the provider for that issuer
// SECURITY: This method only accepts JWT tokens. Non-JWT authentication must use AssumeRoleWithCredentials with explicit ProviderName.
func (s *STSService) validateWebIdentityToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (*providers.ExternalIdentity, providers.IdentityProvider, error) {
// Try to extract issuer from JWT token for strict validation
issuer, err := s.extractIssuerFromJWT(token)
if err != nil {
// Token is not a valid JWT or cannot be parsed
// SECURITY: Web identity tokens MUST be JWT tokens. Non-JWT authentication flows
// should use AssumeRoleWithCredentials with explicit ProviderName to prevent
// security vulnerabilities from non-deterministic provider selection.
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("web identity token must be a valid JWT token: %w", err)
}
// Look up the specific provider for this issuer
provider, exists := s.issuerToProvider[issuer]
if !exists {
// SECURITY: If no provider is registered for this issuer, fail immediately
// This prevents JWT tokens from being validated by unintended providers
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("no identity provider registered for issuer: %s", issuer)
}
// Authenticate with the correct provider for this issuer
identity, err := provider.Authenticate(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
// Map provider errors to STS errors using errors.Is() for robust error checking
// This eliminates fragile string matching and provides reliable error classification
if errors.Is(err, providers.ErrProviderTokenExpired) {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrTypedTokenExpired, err)
} else if errors.Is(err, providers.ErrProviderInvalidToken) {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrTypedInvalidToken, err)
} else if errors.Is(err, providers.ErrProviderInvalidIssuer) {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrTypedInvalidIssuer, err)
} else if errors.Is(err, providers.ErrProviderInvalidAudience) {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrTypedInvalidAudience, err)
} else if errors.Is(err, providers.ErrProviderMissingClaims) {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrTypedMissingClaims, err)
}
// For other errors, return with context
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("token validation failed with provider for issuer %s: %w", issuer, err)
}
if identity == nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("authentication succeeded but no identity returned for issuer %s", issuer)
}
return identity, provider, nil
}
// ValidateWebIdentityToken is a public method that exposes secure token validation for external use
// This method uses issuer-based lookup to select the correct provider, ensuring security and efficiency
func (s *STSService) ValidateWebIdentityToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (*providers.ExternalIdentity, providers.IdentityProvider, error) {
return s.validateWebIdentityToken(ctx, token)
}
// extractIssuerFromJWT extracts the issuer (iss) claim from a JWT token without verification
func (s *STSService) extractIssuerFromJWT(token string) (string, error) {
// Parse token without verification to get claims
parsedToken, _, err := new(jwt.Parser).ParseUnverified(token, jwt.MapClaims{})
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWT token: %v", err)
}
// Extract claims
claims, ok := parsedToken.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
if !ok {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid token claims")
}
// Get issuer claim
issuer, ok := claims["iss"].(string)
if !ok || issuer == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("missing or invalid issuer claim")
}
return issuer, nil
}
// validateRoleAssumptionForWebIdentity validates role assumption for web identity tokens
// This method performs complete trust policy validation to prevent unauthorized role assumptions
func (s *STSService) validateRoleAssumptionForWebIdentity(ctx context.Context, roleArn string, webIdentityToken string, durationSeconds *int64) error {
if roleArn == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("role ARN cannot be empty")
}
if webIdentityToken == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("web identity token cannot be empty")
}
// Validate role ARN and extract role information
// Accepts both arn:aws:iam::role/X and arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT:role/X
arnInfo := utils.ParseRoleARN(roleArn)
if arnInfo.RoleName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid role ARN format: %s, expected format: arn:aws:iam::[ACCOUNT_ID:]role/ROLE_NAME", roleArn)
}
// Log ARN details for debugging
if arnInfo.AccountID != "" {
glog.V(4).Infof("Role ARN validation: role=%s, account=%s (standard format)", arnInfo.RoleName, arnInfo.AccountID)
} else {
glog.V(4).Infof("Role ARN validation: role=%s (legacy format)", arnInfo.RoleName)
}
// CRITICAL SECURITY: Perform trust policy validation
if s.trustPolicyValidator != nil {
if err := s.trustPolicyValidator.ValidateTrustPolicyForWebIdentity(ctx, roleArn, webIdentityToken, durationSeconds); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("trust policy validation failed: %w", err)
}
} else {
// If no trust policy validator is configured, fail closed for security
glog.Errorf("SECURITY WARNING: No trust policy validator configured - denying role assumption for security")
return fmt.Errorf("trust policy validation not available - role assumption denied for security")
}
return nil
}
// validateRoleAssumptionForCredentials validates role assumption for credential-based authentication
// This method performs complete trust policy validation to prevent unauthorized role assumptions
func (s *STSService) validateRoleAssumptionForCredentials(ctx context.Context, roleArn string, identity *providers.ExternalIdentity) error {
if roleArn == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("role ARN cannot be empty")
}
if identity == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("identity cannot be nil")
}
// Validate role ARN and extract role information
// Accepts both arn:aws:iam::role/X and arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT:role/X
arnInfo := utils.ParseRoleARN(roleArn)
if arnInfo.RoleName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid role ARN format: %s, expected format: arn:aws:iam::[ACCOUNT_ID:]role/ROLE_NAME", roleArn)
}
// Log ARN details for debugging
if arnInfo.AccountID != "" {
glog.V(4).Infof("Role ARN validation: role=%s, account=%s (standard format)", arnInfo.RoleName, arnInfo.AccountID)
} else {
glog.V(4).Infof("Role ARN validation: role=%s (legacy format)", arnInfo.RoleName)
}
// CRITICAL SECURITY: Perform trust policy validation
if s.trustPolicyValidator != nil {
if err := s.trustPolicyValidator.ValidateTrustPolicyForCredentials(ctx, roleArn, identity); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("trust policy validation failed: %w", err)
}
} else {
// If no trust policy validator is configured, fail closed for security
glog.Errorf("SECURITY WARNING: No trust policy validator configured - denying role assumption for security")
return fmt.Errorf("trust policy validation not available - role assumption denied for security")
}
return nil
}
// calculateSessionDuration calculates the session duration, respecting the source token's expiration
// If the incoming web identity token has an exp claim, the session duration is capped to not exceed it
// This ensures that sessions from short-lived tokens (e.g., GitLab CI job tokens) don't outlive their source
func (s *STSService) calculateSessionDuration(durationSeconds *int64, tokenExpiration *time.Time) time.Duration {
var duration time.Duration
if durationSeconds != nil {
duration = time.Duration(*durationSeconds) * time.Second
} else {
// Use default from config
duration = s.Config.TokenDuration.Duration
}
// If the source token has an expiration, cap the session duration to not exceed it
// This follows the principle: "if calculated exp > incoming exp claim, then limit outgoing exp to incoming exp"
if tokenExpiration != nil && !tokenExpiration.IsZero() {
timeUntilTokenExpiry := time.Until(*tokenExpiration)
if timeUntilTokenExpiry <= 0 {
// Token already expired - use minimal duration as defense-in-depth
// The token should have been rejected during validation, but we handle this defensively
glog.V(2).Infof("Source token already expired, using minimal session duration")
duration = time.Minute
} else if timeUntilTokenExpiry < duration {
glog.V(2).Infof("Limiting session duration from %v to %v based on source token expiration",
duration, timeUntilTokenExpiry)
duration = timeUntilTokenExpiry
}
}
// Cap at MaxSessionLength if configured
if s.Config.MaxSessionLength.Duration > 0 && duration > s.Config.MaxSessionLength.Duration {
glog.V(2).Infof("Limiting session duration from %v to %v based on MaxSessionLength config",
duration, s.Config.MaxSessionLength.Duration)
duration = s.Config.MaxSessionLength.Duration
}
return duration
}
// extractSessionIdFromToken extracts session ID from JWT session token
func (s *STSService) extractSessionIdFromToken(sessionToken string) string {
// Validate JWT and extract session claims
claims, err := s.tokenGenerator.ValidateJWTWithClaims(sessionToken)
if err != nil {
// For test compatibility, also handle direct session IDs
if len(sessionToken) == 32 { // Typical session ID length
return sessionToken
}
return ""
}
return claims.SessionId
}
// validateAssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest validates the credentials request parameters
func (s *STSService) validateAssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest(request *AssumeRoleWithCredentialsRequest) error {
if request.RoleArn == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("RoleArn is required")
}
if request.Username == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Username is required")
}
if request.Password == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Password is required")
}
if request.RoleSessionName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("RoleSessionName is required")
}
if request.ProviderName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("ProviderName is required")
}
// Validate session duration if provided
if request.DurationSeconds != nil {
if *request.DurationSeconds < 900 || *request.DurationSeconds > 43200 { // 15min to 12 hours
return fmt.Errorf("DurationSeconds must be between 900 and 43200 seconds")
}
}
return nil
}
// ExpireSessionForTesting manually expires a session for testing purposes
func (s *STSService) ExpireSessionForTesting(ctx context.Context, sessionToken string) error {
if !s.initialized {
return fmt.Errorf("STS service not initialized")
}
if sessionToken == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("session token cannot be empty")
}
// Just validate the signature
_, err := s.tokenGenerator.ValidateJWTWithClaims(sessionToken)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid session token format: %w", err)
}
// In a stateless system, we cannot manually expire JWT tokens
// The token expiration is embedded in the token itself and handled by JWT validation
glog.V(1).Infof("Manual session expiration requested for stateless token - cannot expire JWT tokens manually")
return fmt.Errorf("manual session expiration not supported in stateless JWT system")
}