* Add documentation for issue #7941 fix * ensure auth * rm FIX_ISSUE_7941.md * Integrate STS session token validation into V4 signature verification - Check for X-Amz-Security-Token header in verifyV4Signature - Call validateSTSSessionToken for STS requests - Skip regular access key lookup and expiration check for STS sessions * Fix variable scoping in verifyV4Signature for STS session token validation * Add ErrExpiredToken error for better AWS S3 compatibility with STS session tokens * Support STS session token in query parameters for presigned URLs * Fix nil pointer dereference in validateSTSSessionToken * Enhance STS token validation with detailed error diagnostics and logging * Fix missing credentials in STSSessionClaims.ToSessionInfo() * test: Add comprehensive STS session claims validation tests - TestSTSSessionClaimsToSessionInfo: Validates basic claims conversion - TestSTSSessionClaimsToSessionInfoCredentialGeneration: Verifies credential generation - TestSTSSessionClaimsToSessionInfoPreservesAllFields: Ensures all fields are preserved - TestSTSSessionClaimsToSessionInfoEmptyFields: Tests handling of empty/nil fields - TestSTSSessionClaimsToSessionInfoCredentialExpiration: Validates expiration handling All tests pass with proper timing tolerance for credential generation. * perf: Reuse CredentialGenerator instance for STS session claims Optimize ToSessionInfo() to reuse a package-level defaultCredentialGenerator instead of allocating a new CredentialGenerator on every call. This reduces allocation overhead since this method is called frequently during signature verification (potentially once per request). The CredentialGenerator is stateless and deterministic, making it safe to reuse across concurrent calls without synchronization. * refactor: Surface credential generation errors and remove sensitive logging Two improvements to error handling and security: 1. weed/iam/sts/session_claims.go: - Add logging for credential generation failures in ToSessionInfo() - Wrap errors with context (session ID) to aid debugging - Use glog.Warningf() to surface errors instead of silently swallowing them - Add fmt import for error wrapping 2. weed/s3api/auth_signature_v4.go: - Remove debug logging of actual access key IDs (glog.V(2) call) - Security improvement: avoid exposing sensitive access keys even at debug level - Keep warning-level logging that shows only count of available keys This ensures credential generation failures are observable while protecting sensitive authentication material from logs. * test: Verify deterministic credential generation in session claims tests Update TestSTSSessionClaimsToSessionInfoCredentialGeneration to properly verify deterministic credential generation: - Remove misleading comment about 'randomness' - parts of credentials ARE deterministic - Add assertions that AccessKeyId is identical for same SessionId (hash-based, deterministic) - Add assertions that SessionToken is identical for same SessionId (hash-based, deterministic) - Verify Expiration matches when SessionId is identical - Document that SecretAccessKey is NOT deterministic (uses random.Read) - Truncate expiresAt to second precision to avoid timing issues This test now properly verifies that the deterministic components of credential generation work correctly while acknowledging the cryptographic randomness of the secret access key. * test(sts): Assert credentials expiration relative to now in credential expiration tests Replace wallclock assertions comparing tc.expiresAt to time.Now() (which only verified test setup) with assertions that check sessionInfo.Credentials.Expiration relative to time.Now(), thus exercising the code under test. Include clarifying comment for intent. * feat(sts): Add IsExpired helpers and use them in expiration tests - Add Credentials.IsExpired() and SessionInfo.IsExpired() in new file session_helpers.go. - Update TestSTSSessionClaimsToSessionInfoCredentialExpiration to use helpers for clearer intent. * test: revert test-only IsExpired helpers; restore direct expiration assertions Remove session_helpers.go and update TestSTSSessionClaimsToSessionInfoCredentialExpiration to assert against sessionInfo.Credentials.Expiration directly as requested by reviewer., * fix(s3api): restore error return when access key not found Critical fix: The previous cleanup of sensitive logging inadvertently removed the error return statement when access key lookup fails. This caused the code to continue and call isCredentialExpired() on nil pointer, crashing the server. This explains EOF errors in CORS tests - server was panicking on requests with invalid keys. * fix(sts): make secret access key deterministic based on sessionId CRITICAL FIX: The secret access key was being randomly generated, causing signature verification failures when the same session token was used twice: 1. AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity generates random secret key X 2. Client signs request using secret key X 3. Server validates token, regenerates credentials via ToSessionInfo() 4. ToSessionInfo() calls generateSecretAccessKey(), which generates random key Y 5. Server tries to verify signature using key Y, but signature was made with X 6. Signature verification fails (SignatureDoesNotMatch) Solution: Make generateSecretAccessKey() deterministic by using SHA256 hash of 'secret-key:' + sessionId, just like generateAccessKeyId() already does. This ensures: - AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity generates deterministic secret key from sessionId - ToSessionInfo() regenerates the same secret key from the same sessionId - Client signature verification succeeds because keys match Fixes: AWS SDK v2 CORS tests failing with 'ExpiredToken' errors Affected files: - weed/iam/sts/token_utils.go: Updated generateSecretAccessKey() signature and implementation to be deterministic - Updated GenerateTemporaryCredentials() to pass sessionId parameter Tests: All 54 STS tests pass with this fix * test(sts): add comprehensive secret key determinism test coverage Updated tests to verify that secret access keys are now deterministic: 1. Updated TestSTSSessionClaimsToSessionInfoCredentialGeneration: - Changed comment from 'NOT deterministic' to 'NOW deterministic' - Added assertion that same sessionId produces identical secret key - Explains why this is critical for signature verification 2. Added TestSecretAccessKeyDeterminism (new dedicated test): - Verifies secret key is identical across multiple calls with same sessionId - Verifies access key ID and session token are also identical - Verifies different sessionIds produce different credentials - Includes detailed comments explaining why determinism is critical These tests ensure that the STS implementation correctly regenerates deterministic credentials during signature verification. Without determinism, signature verification would always fail because the server would use different secret keys than the client used to sign. * refactor(sts): add explicit zero-time expiration handling Improved defensive programming in IsExpired() methods: 1. Credentials.IsExpired(): - Added explicit check for zero-time expiration (time.Time{}) - Treats uninitialized credentials as expired - Prevents accidentally treating uninitialized creds as valid 2. SessionInfo.IsExpired(): - Added same explicit zero-time check - Treats uninitialized sessions as expired - Protects against bugs where sessions might not be properly initialized This is important because time.Now().After(time.Time{}) returns true, but explicitly checking for zero time makes the intent clear and helps catch initialization bugs during code review and debugging. * refactor(sts): remove unused IsExpired() helper functions The session_helpers.go file contained two unused IsExpired() methods: - Credentials.IsExpired() - SessionInfo.IsExpired() These were never called anywhere in the codebase. The actual expiration checks use: - isCredentialExpired() in weed/s3api/auth_credentials.go (S3 auth) - Direct time.Now().After() checks Removing unused code improves code clarity and reduces maintenance burden. * fix(auth): pass STS session token to IAM authorization for V4 signature auth CRITICAL FIX: Session tokens were not being passed to the authorization check when using AWS Signature V4 authentication with STS credentials. The bug: 1. AWS SDK sends request with X-Amz-Security-Token header (V4 signature) 2. validateSTSSessionToken validates the token, creates Identity with PrincipalArn 3. authorizeWithIAM only checked X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token (JWT auth header) 4. Since it was empty, fell into 'static V4' branch which set SessionToken = '' 5. AuthorizeAction returned ErrAccessDenied because SessionToken was empty The fix (in authorizeWithIAM): - Check X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token first (JWT auth) - If empty, fallback to X-Amz-Security-Token header (V4 STS auth) - If still empty, check X-Amz-Security-Token query param (presigned URLs) - When session token is found with PrincipalArn, use 'STS V4 signature' path - Only use 'static V4' path when there's no session token This ensures: - JWT Bearer auth with session tokens works (existing path) - STS V4 signature auth with session tokens works (new path) - Static V4 signature auth without session tokens works (existing path) Logging updated to distinguish: - 'JWT-based IAM authorization' - 'STS V4 signature IAM authorization' (new) - 'static V4 signature IAM authorization' (clarified) * test(s3api): add comprehensive STS session token authorization test coverage Added new test file auth_sts_v4_test.go with comprehensive tests for the STS session token authorization fix: 1. TestAuthorizeWithIAMSessionTokenExtraction: - Verifies X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token is extracted from JWT auth headers - Verifies X-Amz-Security-Token is extracted from V4 STS auth headers - Verifies X-Amz-Security-Token is extracted from query parameters (presigned URLs) - Verifies JWT tokens take precedence when both are present - Regression test for the bug where V4 STS tokens were not being passed to authorization 2. TestSTSSessionTokenIntoCredentials: - Verifies STS credentials have all required fields (AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, SessionToken) - Verifies deterministic generation from sessionId (same sessionId = same credentials) - Verifies different sessionIds produce different credentials - Critical for signature verification: same session must regenerate same secret key 3. TestActionConstantsForV4Auth: - Verifies S3 action constants are available for authorization checks - Ensures ACTION_READ, ACTION_WRITE, etc. are properly defined These tests ensure that: - V4 Signature auth with STS tokens properly extracts and uses session tokens - Session tokens are prioritized correctly (JWT > X-Amz-Security-Token header > query param) - STS credentials are deterministically generated for signature verification - The fix for passing STS session tokens to authorization is properly covered All 3 test functions pass (6 test cases total). * refactor(s3api): improve code quality and performance - Rename authorization path constants to avoid conflict with existing authType enum - Replace nested if/else with clean switch statement in authorizeWithIAM() - Add determineIAMAuthPath() helper for clearer intent and testability - Optimize key counting in auth_signature_v4.go: remove unnecessary slice allocation - Fix timing assertion in session_claims_test.go: use WithinDuration for symmetric tolerance These changes improve code readability, maintainability, and performance while maintaining full backward compatibility and test coverage. * refactor(s3api): use typed iamAuthPath for authorization path constants - Define iamAuthPath as a named string type (similar to existing authType enum) - Update constants to use explicit type: iamAuthPathJWT, iamAuthPathSTS_V4, etc. - Update determineIAMAuthPath() to return typed iamAuthPath - Improves type safety and prevents accidental string value misuse
1030 lines
35 KiB
Go
1030 lines
35 KiB
Go
package s3api
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"slices"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/credential"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/filer"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/filer_pb"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/iam_pb"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
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// Import KMS providers to register them
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_ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/aws"
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// _ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/azure" // TODO: Fix Azure SDK compatibility issues
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_ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/gcp"
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_ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/local"
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_ "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/kms/openbao"
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"google.golang.org/grpc"
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)
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type Action string
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type Iam interface {
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Check(f http.HandlerFunc, actions ...Action) http.HandlerFunc
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}
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type IdentityAccessManagement struct {
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m sync.RWMutex
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identities []*Identity
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accessKeyIdent map[string]*Identity
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nameToIdentity map[string]*Identity // O(1) lookup by identity name
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accounts map[string]*Account
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emailAccount map[string]*Account
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hashes map[string]*sync.Pool
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hashCounters map[string]*int32
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identityAnonymous *Identity
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hashMu sync.RWMutex
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domain string
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isAuthEnabled bool
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credentialManager *credential.CredentialManager
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filerClient filer_pb.SeaweedFilerClient
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grpcDialOption grpc.DialOption
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// IAM Integration for advanced features
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iamIntegration *S3IAMIntegration
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// Bucket policy engine for evaluating bucket policies
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policyEngine *BucketPolicyEngine
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}
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type Identity struct {
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Name string
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Account *Account
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Credentials []*Credential
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Actions []Action
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PrincipalArn string // ARN for IAM authorization (e.g., "arn:aws:iam::account-id:user/username")
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Disabled bool // User status: false = enabled (default), true = disabled
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}
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// Account represents a system user, a system user can
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// configure multiple IAM-Users, IAM-Users can configure
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// permissions respectively, and each IAM-User can
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// configure multiple security credentials
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type Account struct {
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//Name is also used to display the "DisplayName" as the owner of the bucket or object
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DisplayName string
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EmailAddress string
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//Id is used to identify an Account when granting cross-account access(ACLs) to buckets and objects
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Id string
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}
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// Predefined Accounts
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var (
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// AccountAdmin is used as the default account for IAM-Credentials access without Account configured
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AccountAdmin = Account{
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DisplayName: "admin",
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EmailAddress: "admin@example.com",
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Id: s3_constants.AccountAdminId,
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}
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// AccountAnonymous is used to represent the account for anonymous access
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AccountAnonymous = Account{
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DisplayName: "anonymous",
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EmailAddress: "anonymous@example.com",
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Id: s3_constants.AccountAnonymousId,
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}
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)
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type Credential struct {
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AccessKey string
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SecretKey string
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Status string // Access key status: "Active" or "Inactive" (empty treated as "Active")
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Expiration int64 // Unix timestamp when credential expires (0 = no expiration)
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}
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// isCredentialExpired checks if a credential has expired
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func (c *Credential) isCredentialExpired() bool {
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return c.Expiration > 0 && c.Expiration < time.Now().Unix()
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}
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func NewIdentityAccessManagement(option *S3ApiServerOption) *IdentityAccessManagement {
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return NewIdentityAccessManagementWithStore(option, "")
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}
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func NewIdentityAccessManagementWithStore(option *S3ApiServerOption, explicitStore string) *IdentityAccessManagement {
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iam := &IdentityAccessManagement{
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domain: option.DomainName,
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hashes: make(map[string]*sync.Pool),
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hashCounters: make(map[string]*int32),
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}
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// Always initialize credential manager with fallback to defaults
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credentialManager, err := credential.NewCredentialManagerWithDefaults(credential.CredentialStoreTypeName(explicitStore))
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if err != nil {
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glog.Fatalf("failed to initialize credential manager: %v", err)
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}
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// For stores that need filer client details, set them temporarily
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// This will be updated to use FilerClient's GetCurrentFiler after FilerClient is created
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if store := credentialManager.GetStore(); store != nil {
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if filerFuncSetter, ok := store.(interface {
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SetFilerAddressFunc(func() pb.ServerAddress, grpc.DialOption)
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}); ok {
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// Temporary setup: use first filer until FilerClient is available
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// See s3api_server.go where this is updated to FilerClient.GetCurrentFiler
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if len(option.Filers) > 0 {
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getFiler := func() pb.ServerAddress {
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if len(option.Filers) > 0 {
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return option.Filers[0]
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}
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return ""
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}
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filerFuncSetter.SetFilerAddressFunc(getFiler, option.GrpcDialOption)
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glog.V(1).Infof("Credential store configured with temporary filer function (will be updated after FilerClient creation)")
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}
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}
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}
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iam.credentialManager = credentialManager
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// Track whether any configuration was successfully loaded
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configLoaded := false
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// First, try to load configurations from file or filer
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if option.Config != "" {
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glog.V(3).Infof("loading static config file %s", option.Config)
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if err := iam.loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFile(option.Config); err != nil {
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glog.Fatalf("fail to load config file %s: %v", option.Config, err)
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}
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// Check if any identities were actually loaded from the config file
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iam.m.RLock()
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configLoaded = len(iam.identities) > 0
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iam.m.RUnlock()
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} else {
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glog.V(3).Infof("no static config file specified... loading config from credential manager")
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if err := iam.loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFiler(option); err != nil {
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glog.Warningf("fail to load config: %v", err)
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} else {
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// Check if any identities were actually loaded from filer
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iam.m.RLock()
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configLoaded = len(iam.identities) > 0
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iam.m.RUnlock()
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}
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}
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// Only use environment variables as fallback if no configuration was loaded
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if !configLoaded {
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accessKeyId := os.Getenv("AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID")
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secretAccessKey := os.Getenv("AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY")
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if accessKeyId != "" && secretAccessKey != "" {
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glog.V(1).Infof("No S3 configuration found, using AWS environment variables as fallback")
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// Create environment variable identity name
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identityNameSuffix := accessKeyId
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if len(accessKeyId) > 8 {
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identityNameSuffix = accessKeyId[:8]
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}
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// Create admin identity with environment variable credentials
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envIdentity := &Identity{
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Name: "admin-" + identityNameSuffix,
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Account: &AccountAdmin,
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Credentials: []*Credential{
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{
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AccessKey: accessKeyId,
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SecretKey: secretAccessKey,
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},
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},
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Actions: []Action{
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s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN,
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},
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}
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// Set as the only configuration
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iam.m.Lock()
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if len(iam.identities) == 0 {
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iam.identities = []*Identity{envIdentity}
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iam.accessKeyIdent = map[string]*Identity{accessKeyId: envIdentity}
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iam.nameToIdentity = map[string]*Identity{envIdentity.Name: envIdentity}
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iam.isAuthEnabled = true
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}
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iam.m.Unlock()
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glog.V(1).Infof("Added admin identity from AWS environment variables: %s", envIdentity.Name)
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}
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}
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return iam
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}
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func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFiler(option *S3ApiServerOption) error {
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return iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager()
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}
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func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) loadS3ApiConfigurationFromFile(fileName string) error {
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content, readErr := os.ReadFile(fileName)
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if readErr != nil {
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glog.Warningf("fail to read %s : %v", fileName, readErr)
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return fmt.Errorf("fail to read %s : %v", fileName, readErr)
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}
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// Initialize KMS if configuration contains KMS settings
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if err := iam.initializeKMSFromConfig(content); err != nil {
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glog.Warningf("KMS initialization failed: %v", err)
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}
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return iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromBytes(content)
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}
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func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromBytes(content []byte) error {
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s3ApiConfiguration := &iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration{}
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if err := filer.ParseS3ConfigurationFromBytes(content, s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
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glog.Warningf("unmarshal error: %v", err)
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return fmt.Errorf("unmarshal error: %w", err)
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}
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if err := filer.CheckDuplicateAccessKey(s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := iam.loadS3ApiConfiguration(s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) loadS3ApiConfiguration(config *iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration) error {
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var identities []*Identity
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var identityAnonymous *Identity
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accessKeyIdent := make(map[string]*Identity)
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nameToIdentity := make(map[string]*Identity)
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accounts := make(map[string]*Account)
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emailAccount := make(map[string]*Account)
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foundAccountAdmin := false
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foundAccountAnonymous := false
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for _, account := range config.Accounts {
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glog.V(3).Infof("loading account name=%s, id=%s", account.DisplayName, account.Id)
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switch account.Id {
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case AccountAdmin.Id:
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AccountAdmin = Account{
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Id: account.Id,
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DisplayName: account.DisplayName,
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EmailAddress: account.EmailAddress,
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}
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accounts[account.Id] = &AccountAdmin
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foundAccountAdmin = true
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case AccountAnonymous.Id:
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AccountAnonymous = Account{
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Id: account.Id,
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DisplayName: account.DisplayName,
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EmailAddress: account.EmailAddress,
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}
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accounts[account.Id] = &AccountAnonymous
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foundAccountAnonymous = true
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default:
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t := Account{
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Id: account.Id,
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DisplayName: account.DisplayName,
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EmailAddress: account.EmailAddress,
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}
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accounts[account.Id] = &t
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}
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if account.EmailAddress != "" {
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emailAccount[account.EmailAddress] = accounts[account.Id]
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}
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}
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if !foundAccountAdmin {
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accounts[AccountAdmin.Id] = &AccountAdmin
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emailAccount[AccountAdmin.EmailAddress] = &AccountAdmin
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}
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if !foundAccountAnonymous {
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accounts[AccountAnonymous.Id] = &AccountAnonymous
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emailAccount[AccountAnonymous.EmailAddress] = &AccountAnonymous
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}
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for _, ident := range config.Identities {
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glog.V(3).Infof("loading identity %s (disabled=%v)", ident.Name, ident.Disabled)
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t := &Identity{
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Name: ident.Name,
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Credentials: nil,
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Actions: nil,
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PrincipalArn: generatePrincipalArn(ident.Name),
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Disabled: ident.Disabled, // false (default) = enabled, true = disabled
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}
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switch {
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case ident.Name == AccountAnonymous.Id:
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t.Account = &AccountAnonymous
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identityAnonymous = t
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case ident.Account == nil:
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t.Account = &AccountAdmin
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default:
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if account, ok := accounts[ident.Account.Id]; ok {
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t.Account = account
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} else {
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t.Account = &AccountAdmin
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glog.Warningf("identity %s is associated with a non exist account ID, the association is invalid", ident.Name)
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}
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}
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for _, action := range ident.Actions {
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t.Actions = append(t.Actions, Action(action))
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}
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for _, cred := range ident.Credentials {
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t.Credentials = append(t.Credentials, &Credential{
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AccessKey: cred.AccessKey,
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SecretKey: cred.SecretKey,
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Status: cred.Status, // Load access key status
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})
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accessKeyIdent[cred.AccessKey] = t
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}
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identities = append(identities, t)
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nameToIdentity[t.Name] = t
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}
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// Load service accounts and add their credentials to the parent identity
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for _, sa := range config.ServiceAccounts {
|
|
if sa.Credential == nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Skip disabled service accounts - they should not be able to authenticate
|
|
if sa.Disabled {
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("Skipping disabled service account %s", sa.Id)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Find the parent identity
|
|
parentIdent, ok := nameToIdentity[sa.ParentUser]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
glog.Warningf("Service account %s has non-existent parent user %s, skipping", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add service account credential to parent identity with expiration
|
|
cred := &Credential{
|
|
AccessKey: sa.Credential.AccessKey,
|
|
SecretKey: sa.Credential.SecretKey,
|
|
Status: sa.Credential.Status,
|
|
Expiration: sa.Expiration, // Populate expiration from service account
|
|
}
|
|
parentIdent.Credentials = append(parentIdent.Credentials, cred)
|
|
accessKeyIdent[sa.Credential.AccessKey] = parentIdent
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("Loaded service account %s for parent %s (expiration: %d)", sa.Id, sa.ParentUser, sa.Expiration)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
iam.m.Lock()
|
|
// atomically switch
|
|
iam.identities = identities
|
|
iam.identityAnonymous = identityAnonymous
|
|
iam.accounts = accounts
|
|
iam.emailAccount = emailAccount
|
|
iam.accessKeyIdent = accessKeyIdent
|
|
iam.nameToIdentity = nameToIdentity
|
|
if !iam.isAuthEnabled { // one-directional, no toggling
|
|
iam.isAuthEnabled = len(identities) > 0
|
|
}
|
|
iam.m.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
// Log configuration summary
|
|
glog.V(1).Infof("Loaded %d identities, %d accounts, %d access keys. Auth enabled: %v",
|
|
len(identities), len(accounts), len(accessKeyIdent), iam.isAuthEnabled)
|
|
|
|
if glog.V(2) {
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("Access key to identity mapping:")
|
|
for accessKey, identity := range accessKeyIdent {
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof(" %s -> %s (actions: %d)", accessKey, identity.Name, len(identity.Actions))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) isEnabled() bool {
|
|
return iam.isAuthEnabled
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) lookupByAccessKey(accessKey string) (identity *Identity, cred *Credential, found bool) {
|
|
iam.m.RLock()
|
|
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
// Helper function to truncate access key for logging to avoid credential exposure
|
|
truncate := func(key string) string {
|
|
const mask = "***"
|
|
if len(key) > 4 {
|
|
return key[:4] + mask
|
|
}
|
|
// For very short keys, never log the full key
|
|
return mask
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
truncatedKey := truncate(accessKey)
|
|
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("Looking up access key: %s (len=%d, total keys registered: %d)",
|
|
truncatedKey, len(accessKey), len(iam.accessKeyIdent))
|
|
|
|
if ident, ok := iam.accessKeyIdent[accessKey]; ok {
|
|
// Check if user is disabled
|
|
if ident.Disabled {
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("User %s is disabled, rejecting access key %s", ident.Name, truncatedKey)
|
|
return nil, nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, credential := range ident.Credentials {
|
|
if credential.AccessKey == accessKey {
|
|
// Check if access key is inactive (empty Status treated as Active for backward compatibility)
|
|
if credential.Status == iamAccessKeyStatusInactive {
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("Access key %s for identity %s is inactive", truncatedKey, ident.Name)
|
|
return nil, nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("Found access key %s for identity %s", truncatedKey, ident.Name)
|
|
return ident, credential, true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("Could not find access key %s (len=%d). Available keys: %d, Auth enabled: %v",
|
|
truncatedKey, len(accessKey), len(iam.accessKeyIdent), iam.isAuthEnabled)
|
|
|
|
// Log all registered access keys at higher verbosity for debugging
|
|
if glog.V(3) {
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("Registered access keys:")
|
|
for key := range iam.accessKeyIdent {
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof(" - %s (len=%d)", truncate(key), len(key))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil, nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// LookupByAccessKey is an exported wrapper for lookupByAccessKey.
|
|
// It returns the identity and credential associated with the given access key.
|
|
//
|
|
// WARNING: The returned pointers reference internal data structures.
|
|
// Callers MUST NOT modify the returned Identity or Credential objects.
|
|
// If mutation is needed, make a copy first.
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) LookupByAccessKey(accessKey string) (identity *Identity, cred *Credential, found bool) {
|
|
return iam.lookupByAccessKey(accessKey)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) lookupAnonymous() (identity *Identity, found bool) {
|
|
iam.m.RLock()
|
|
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
|
|
if iam.identityAnonymous != nil {
|
|
return iam.identityAnonymous, true
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) lookupByIdentityName(name string) *Identity {
|
|
iam.m.RLock()
|
|
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
return iam.nameToIdentity[name]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// generatePrincipalArn generates an ARN for a user identity
|
|
func generatePrincipalArn(identityName string) string {
|
|
// Handle special cases
|
|
switch identityName {
|
|
case AccountAnonymous.Id:
|
|
return "arn:aws:iam::user/anonymous"
|
|
case AccountAdmin.Id:
|
|
return "arn:aws:iam::user/admin"
|
|
default:
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:iam::user/%s", identityName)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) GetAccountNameById(canonicalId string) string {
|
|
iam.m.RLock()
|
|
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
|
|
if account, ok := iam.accounts[canonicalId]; ok {
|
|
return account.DisplayName
|
|
}
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) GetAccountIdByEmail(email string) string {
|
|
iam.m.RLock()
|
|
defer iam.m.RUnlock()
|
|
if account, ok := iam.emailAccount[email]; ok {
|
|
return account.Id
|
|
}
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) Auth(f http.HandlerFunc, action Action) http.HandlerFunc {
|
|
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if !iam.isEnabled() {
|
|
f(w, r)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
identity, errCode := iam.authRequest(r, action)
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("auth error: %v", errCode)
|
|
|
|
iam.handleAuthResult(w, r, identity, errCode, f)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AuthPostPolicy is a specialized authentication wrapper for PostPolicy requests.
|
|
// It allows requests with multipart/form-data to proceed even if classified as Anonymous,
|
|
// because the actual authentication (signature verification) for ALL PostPolicy requests is
|
|
// performed unconditionally in PostPolicyBucketHandler.doesPolicySignatureMatch().
|
|
// This delegation only defers the initial authentication classification; it does NOT bypass
|
|
// signature verification, which is mandatory for all PostPolicy uploads.
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) AuthPostPolicy(f http.HandlerFunc, action Action) http.HandlerFunc {
|
|
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if !iam.isEnabled() {
|
|
f(w, r)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Optimization: Use authRequestWithAuthType to avoid re-parsing headers for classification
|
|
identity, errCode, authType := iam.authRequestWithAuthType(r, action)
|
|
|
|
// Special handling for PostPolicy: if AccessDenied (likely because Anonymous to private bucket)
|
|
// AND it looks like a PostPolicy request, allow it to proceed to handler for verification.
|
|
if errCode == s3err.ErrAccessDenied {
|
|
if authType == authTypeAnonymous &&
|
|
r.Method == http.MethodPost &&
|
|
strings.Contains(r.Header.Get("Content-Type"), "multipart/form-data") {
|
|
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("Delegating PostPolicy auth to handler")
|
|
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "PostPolicy")
|
|
f(w, r)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("auth error: %v", errCode)
|
|
|
|
iam.handleAuthResult(w, r, identity, errCode, f)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) handleAuthResult(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, identity *Identity, errCode s3err.ErrorCode, f http.HandlerFunc) {
|
|
if errCode == s3err.ErrNone {
|
|
// Store the authenticated identity in request context (secure, cannot be spoofed)
|
|
if identity != nil && identity.Name != "" {
|
|
ctx := s3_constants.SetIdentityNameInContext(r.Context(), identity.Name)
|
|
// Also store the full identity object for handlers that need it (e.g., ListBuckets)
|
|
// This is especially important for JWT users whose identity is not in the identities list
|
|
ctx = s3_constants.SetIdentityInContext(ctx, identity)
|
|
r = r.WithContext(ctx)
|
|
}
|
|
f(w, r)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, errCode)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Wrapper to maintain backward compatibility
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authRequest(r *http.Request, action Action) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
|
|
identity, err, _ := iam.authRequestWithAuthType(r, action)
|
|
return identity, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// check whether the request has valid access keys
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authRequestWithAuthType(r *http.Request, action Action) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode, authType) {
|
|
var identity *Identity
|
|
var s3Err s3err.ErrorCode
|
|
var found bool
|
|
var amzAuthType string
|
|
|
|
reqAuthType := getRequestAuthType(r)
|
|
|
|
switch reqAuthType {
|
|
case authTypeUnknown:
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("unknown auth type")
|
|
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "Unknown")
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
|
|
case authTypePresignedV2, authTypeSignedV2:
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("v2 auth type")
|
|
identity, s3Err = iam.isReqAuthenticatedV2(r)
|
|
amzAuthType = "SigV2"
|
|
case authTypeStreamingSigned, authTypeSigned, authTypePresigned:
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("v4 auth type")
|
|
identity, s3Err = iam.reqSignatureV4Verify(r)
|
|
amzAuthType = "SigV4"
|
|
case authTypeStreamingUnsigned:
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("unsigned streaming upload")
|
|
// no amzAuthType set for this case in original code?
|
|
// Actually original explicitly returned ErrNone without setting identity
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrNone, reqAuthType
|
|
case authTypeJWT:
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("jwt auth type detected, iamIntegration != nil? %t", iam.iamIntegration != nil)
|
|
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "Jwt")
|
|
if iam.iamIntegration != nil {
|
|
identity, s3Err = iam.authenticateJWTWithIAM(r)
|
|
amzAuthType = "Jwt"
|
|
} else {
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("IAM integration is nil, returning ErrNotImplemented")
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrNotImplemented, reqAuthType
|
|
}
|
|
case authTypeAnonymous:
|
|
amzAuthType = "Anonymous"
|
|
if identity, found = iam.lookupAnonymous(); !found {
|
|
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, amzAuthType)
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrNotImplemented, reqAuthType
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(amzAuthType) > 0 {
|
|
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, amzAuthType)
|
|
}
|
|
if s3Err != s3err.ErrNone {
|
|
return identity, s3Err, reqAuthType
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("user name: %v actions: %v, action: %v", identity.Name, identity.Actions, action)
|
|
bucket, object := s3_constants.GetBucketAndObject(r)
|
|
prefix := s3_constants.GetPrefix(r)
|
|
|
|
// For List operations, use prefix for permission checking if available
|
|
if action == s3_constants.ACTION_LIST && object == "" && prefix != "" {
|
|
// List operation with prefix - check permission for the prefix path
|
|
object = prefix
|
|
} else if (object == "/" || object == "") && prefix != "" {
|
|
// Using the aws cli with s3, and s3api, and with boto3, the object is often set to "/" or empty
|
|
// but the prefix is set to the actual object key for permission checking
|
|
object = prefix
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// For ListBuckets, authorization is performed in the handler by iterating
|
|
// through buckets and checking permissions for each. Skip the global check here.
|
|
policyAllows := false
|
|
|
|
if action == s3_constants.ACTION_LIST && bucket == "" {
|
|
// ListBuckets operation - authorization handled per-bucket in the handler
|
|
} else {
|
|
// First check bucket policy if one exists
|
|
// Bucket policies can grant or deny access to specific users/principals
|
|
// Following AWS semantics:
|
|
// - Explicit DENY in bucket policy → immediate rejection
|
|
// - Explicit ALLOW in bucket policy → grant access (bypass IAM checks)
|
|
// - No policy or indeterminate → fall through to IAM checks
|
|
if iam.policyEngine != nil && bucket != "" {
|
|
principal := buildPrincipalARN(identity)
|
|
// Phase 1: Evaluate bucket policy without object entry.
|
|
// Tag-based conditions (s3:ExistingObjectTag) are re-checked by handlers
|
|
// after fetching the entry, which is the Phase 2 check.
|
|
allowed, evaluated, err := iam.policyEngine.EvaluatePolicy(bucket, object, string(action), principal, r, nil)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// SECURITY: Fail-close on policy evaluation errors
|
|
// If we can't evaluate the policy, deny access rather than falling through to IAM
|
|
glog.Errorf("Error evaluating bucket policy for %s/%s: %v - denying access", bucket, object, err)
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
|
|
} else if evaluated {
|
|
// A bucket policy exists and was evaluated with a matching statement
|
|
if allowed {
|
|
// Policy explicitly allows this action - grant access immediately
|
|
// This bypasses IAM checks to support cross-account access and policy-only principals
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("Bucket policy allows %s to %s on %s/%s (bypassing IAM)", identity.Name, action, bucket, object)
|
|
policyAllows = true
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Policy explicitly denies this action - deny access immediately
|
|
// Note: Explicit Deny in bucket policy overrides all other permissions
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("Bucket policy explicitly denies %s to %s on %s/%s", identity.Name, action, bucket, object)
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// If not evaluated (no policy or no matching statements), fall through to IAM/identity checks
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Only check IAM if bucket policy didn't explicitly allow
|
|
if !policyAllows {
|
|
// Traditional identities (with Actions from -s3.config) use legacy auth,
|
|
// JWT/STS identities (no Actions) use IAM authorization
|
|
if len(identity.Actions) > 0 {
|
|
if !identity.canDo(action, bucket, object) {
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
|
|
}
|
|
} else if iam.iamIntegration != nil {
|
|
if errCode := iam.authorizeWithIAM(r, identity, action, bucket, object); errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
|
|
return identity, errCode, reqAuthType
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAccountId, identity.Account.Id)
|
|
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrNone, reqAuthType
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AuthSignatureOnly performs only signature verification without any authorization checks.
|
|
// This is used for IAM API operations where authorization is handled separately based on
|
|
// the specific IAM action (e.g., self-service vs admin operations).
|
|
// Returns the authenticated identity and any signature verification error.
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) AuthSignatureOnly(r *http.Request) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
|
|
var identity *Identity
|
|
var s3Err s3err.ErrorCode
|
|
var authType string
|
|
switch getRequestAuthType(r) {
|
|
case authTypeUnknown:
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("unknown auth type")
|
|
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "Unknown")
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
|
|
case authTypePresignedV2, authTypeSignedV2:
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("v2 auth type")
|
|
identity, s3Err = iam.isReqAuthenticatedV2(r)
|
|
authType = "SigV2"
|
|
case authTypeStreamingSigned, authTypeSigned, authTypePresigned:
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("v4 auth type")
|
|
identity, s3Err = iam.reqSignatureV4Verify(r)
|
|
authType = "SigV4"
|
|
|
|
case authTypeStreamingUnsigned:
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("unsigned streaming upload")
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrNone
|
|
case authTypeJWT:
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("jwt auth type detected, iamIntegration != nil? %t", iam.iamIntegration != nil)
|
|
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, "Jwt")
|
|
if iam.iamIntegration != nil {
|
|
identity, s3Err = iam.authenticateJWTWithIAM(r)
|
|
authType = "Jwt"
|
|
} else {
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("IAM integration is nil, returning ErrNotImplemented")
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrNotImplemented
|
|
}
|
|
case authTypeAnonymous:
|
|
// Anonymous users cannot use IAM API
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied
|
|
default:
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrNotImplemented
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(authType) > 0 {
|
|
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAuthType, authType)
|
|
}
|
|
if s3Err != s3err.ErrNone {
|
|
return identity, s3Err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Set account ID header for downstream handlers
|
|
if identity != nil && identity.Account != nil {
|
|
r.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzAccountId, identity.Account.Id)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrNone
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (identity *Identity) canDo(action Action, bucket string, objectKey string) bool {
|
|
if identity.isAdmin() {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
for _, a := range identity.Actions {
|
|
// Case where the Resource provided is
|
|
// "Resource": [
|
|
// "arn:aws:s3:::*"
|
|
// ]
|
|
if a == action {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if bucket == "" {
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("identity %s is not allowed to perform action %s on %s -- bucket is empty", identity.Name, action, bucket+objectKey)
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("checking if %s can perform %s on bucket '%s'", identity.Name, action, bucket+objectKey)
|
|
target := string(action) + ":" + bucket + objectKey
|
|
adminTarget := s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN + ":" + bucket + objectKey
|
|
limitedByBucket := string(action) + ":" + bucket
|
|
adminLimitedByBucket := s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN + ":" + bucket
|
|
|
|
for _, a := range identity.Actions {
|
|
act := string(a)
|
|
if strings.HasSuffix(act, "*") {
|
|
if strings.HasPrefix(target, act[:len(act)-1]) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if strings.HasPrefix(adminTarget, act[:len(act)-1]) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if act == limitedByBucket {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if act == adminLimitedByBucket {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
//log error
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("identity %s is not allowed to perform action %s on %s", identity.Name, action, bucket+objectKey)
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (identity *Identity) isAdmin() bool {
|
|
return slices.Contains(identity.Actions, s3_constants.ACTION_ADMIN)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// buildPrincipalARN builds an ARN for an identity to use in bucket policy evaluation
|
|
func buildPrincipalARN(identity *Identity) string {
|
|
if identity == nil {
|
|
return "*" // Anonymous
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if this is the anonymous user identity (authenticated as anonymous)
|
|
// S3 policies expect Principal: "*" for anonymous access
|
|
if identity.Name == s3_constants.AccountAnonymousId ||
|
|
(identity.Account != nil && identity.Account.Id == s3_constants.AccountAnonymousId) {
|
|
return "*" // Anonymous user
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Build an AWS-compatible principal ARN
|
|
// Format: arn:aws:iam::account-id:user/user-name
|
|
accountId := identity.Account.Id
|
|
if accountId == "" {
|
|
accountId = "000000000000" // Default account ID
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
userName := identity.Name
|
|
if userName == "" {
|
|
userName = "unknown"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:iam::%s:user/%s", accountId, userName)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetCredentialManager returns the credential manager instance
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) GetCredentialManager() *credential.CredentialManager {
|
|
return iam.credentialManager
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager loads configuration using the credential manager
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager() error {
|
|
glog.V(1).Infof("Loading S3 API configuration from credential manager")
|
|
|
|
s3ApiConfiguration, err := iam.credentialManager.LoadConfiguration(context.Background())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
glog.Errorf("Failed to load configuration from credential manager: %v", err)
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to load configuration from credential manager: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("Credential manager returned %d identities and %d accounts",
|
|
len(s3ApiConfiguration.Identities), len(s3ApiConfiguration.Accounts))
|
|
|
|
if err := iam.loadS3ApiConfiguration(s3ApiConfiguration); err != nil {
|
|
glog.Errorf("Failed to load S3 API configuration: %v", err)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
glog.V(1).Infof("Successfully loaded S3 API configuration from credential manager")
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// initializeKMSFromConfig loads KMS configuration from TOML format
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) initializeKMSFromConfig(configContent []byte) error {
|
|
// JSON-only KMS configuration
|
|
if err := iam.initializeKMSFromJSON(configContent); err == nil {
|
|
glog.V(1).Infof("Successfully loaded KMS configuration from JSON format")
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
glog.V(2).Infof("No KMS configuration found in S3 config - SSE-KMS will not be available")
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// initializeKMSFromJSON loads KMS configuration from JSON format when provided in the same file
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) initializeKMSFromJSON(configContent []byte) error {
|
|
// Parse as generic JSON and extract optional "kms" block
|
|
var m map[string]any
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(string(configContent))), &m); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
kmsVal, ok := m["kms"]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("no KMS section found")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Load KMS configuration directly from the parsed JSON data
|
|
return kms.LoadKMSFromConfig(kmsVal)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetIAMIntegration sets the IAM integration for advanced authentication and authorization
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) SetIAMIntegration(integration *S3IAMIntegration) {
|
|
iam.m.Lock()
|
|
defer iam.m.Unlock()
|
|
iam.iamIntegration = integration
|
|
// When IAM integration is configured, authentication must be enabled
|
|
// to ensure requests go through proper auth checks
|
|
if integration != nil {
|
|
iam.isAuthEnabled = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// authenticateJWTWithIAM authenticates JWT tokens using the IAM integration
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authenticateJWTWithIAM(r *http.Request) (*Identity, s3err.ErrorCode) {
|
|
ctx := r.Context()
|
|
|
|
// Use IAM integration to authenticate JWT
|
|
iamIdentity, errCode := iam.iamIntegration.AuthenticateJWT(ctx, r)
|
|
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
|
|
return nil, errCode
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Convert IAMIdentity to existing Identity structure
|
|
identity := &Identity{
|
|
Name: iamIdentity.Name,
|
|
Account: iamIdentity.Account,
|
|
Actions: []Action{}, // Empty - authorization handled by policy engine
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Store session info in request headers for later authorization
|
|
r.Header.Set("X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token", iamIdentity.SessionToken)
|
|
r.Header.Set("X-SeaweedFS-Principal", iamIdentity.Principal)
|
|
|
|
return identity, s3err.ErrNone
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// IAM authorization path type constants
|
|
// iamAuthPath represents the type of IAM authorization path
|
|
type iamAuthPath string
|
|
|
|
// IAM authorization path constants
|
|
const (
|
|
iamAuthPathJWT iamAuthPath = "jwt"
|
|
iamAuthPathSTS_V4 iamAuthPath = "sts_v4"
|
|
iamAuthPathStatic_V4 iamAuthPath = "static_v4"
|
|
iamAuthPathNone iamAuthPath = "none"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// determineIAMAuthPath determines the IAM authorization path based on available tokens and principals
|
|
func determineIAMAuthPath(sessionToken, principal, principalArn string) iamAuthPath {
|
|
if sessionToken != "" && principal != "" {
|
|
return iamAuthPathJWT
|
|
} else if sessionToken != "" && principalArn != "" {
|
|
return iamAuthPathSTS_V4
|
|
} else if principalArn != "" {
|
|
return iamAuthPathStatic_V4
|
|
}
|
|
return iamAuthPathNone
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// authorizeWithIAM authorizes requests using the IAM integration policy engine
|
|
func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authorizeWithIAM(r *http.Request, identity *Identity, action Action, bucket string, object string) s3err.ErrorCode {
|
|
ctx := r.Context()
|
|
|
|
// Get session info from request headers
|
|
// First check for JWT-based authentication headers (X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token)
|
|
sessionToken := r.Header.Get("X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token")
|
|
principal := r.Header.Get("X-SeaweedFS-Principal")
|
|
|
|
// Fallback to AWS Signature V4 STS token if JWT token not present
|
|
// This handles the case where STS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity generates temporary credentials
|
|
// that include an X-Amz-Security-Token header (in addition to the access key and secret)
|
|
if sessionToken == "" {
|
|
sessionToken = r.Header.Get("X-Amz-Security-Token")
|
|
if sessionToken == "" {
|
|
// Also check query parameters for presigned URLs with STS tokens
|
|
sessionToken = r.URL.Query().Get("X-Amz-Security-Token")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create IAMIdentity for authorization
|
|
iamIdentity := &IAMIdentity{
|
|
Name: identity.Name,
|
|
Account: identity.Account,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Determine authorization path and configure identity
|
|
authPath := determineIAMAuthPath(sessionToken, principal, identity.PrincipalArn)
|
|
switch authPath {
|
|
case iamAuthPathJWT:
|
|
// JWT-based authentication - use session token and principal from headers
|
|
iamIdentity.Principal = principal
|
|
iamIdentity.SessionToken = sessionToken
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("Using JWT-based IAM authorization for principal: %s", principal)
|
|
case iamAuthPathSTS_V4:
|
|
// STS V4 signature authentication - use session token (from X-Amz-Security-Token) with principal ARN
|
|
iamIdentity.Principal = identity.PrincipalArn
|
|
iamIdentity.SessionToken = sessionToken
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("Using STS V4 signature IAM authorization for principal: %s with session token", identity.PrincipalArn)
|
|
case iamAuthPathStatic_V4:
|
|
// Static V4 signature authentication - use principal ARN without session token
|
|
iamIdentity.Principal = identity.PrincipalArn
|
|
iamIdentity.SessionToken = ""
|
|
glog.V(3).Infof("Using static V4 signature IAM authorization for principal: %s", identity.PrincipalArn)
|
|
default:
|
|
glog.V(3).Info("No valid principal information for IAM authorization")
|
|
return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Use IAM integration for authorization
|
|
return iam.iamIntegration.AuthorizeAction(ctx, iamIdentity, action, bucket, object, r)
|
|
}
|