S3 API: Add SSE-KMS (#7144)

* implement sse-c

* fix Content-Range

* adding tests

* Update s3_sse_c_test.go

* copy sse-c objects

* adding tests

* refactor

* multi reader

* remove extra write header call

* refactor

* SSE-C encrypted objects do not support HTTP Range requests

* robust

* fix server starts

* Update Makefile

* Update Makefile

* ci: remove SSE-C integration tests and workflows; delete test/s3/encryption/

* s3: SSE-C MD5 must be base64 (case-sensitive); fix validation, comparisons, metadata storage; update tests

* minor

* base64

* Update SSE-C_IMPLEMENTATION.md

Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update weed/s3api/s3api_object_handlers.go

Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update SSE-C_IMPLEMENTATION.md

Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* address comments

* fix test

* fix compilation

* Bucket Default Encryption

To complete the SSE-KMS implementation for production use:
Add AWS KMS Provider - Implement weed/kms/aws/aws_kms.go using AWS SDK
Integrate with S3 Handlers - Update PUT/GET object handlers to use SSE-KMS
Add Multipart Upload Support - Extend SSE-KMS to multipart uploads
Configuration Integration - Add KMS configuration to filer.toml
Documentation - Update SeaweedFS wiki with SSE-KMS usage examples

* store bucket sse config in proto

* add more tests

* Update SSE-C_IMPLEMENTATION.md

Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* Fix rebase errors and restore structured BucketMetadata API

Merge Conflict Fixes:
- Fixed merge conflicts in header.go (SSE-C and SSE-KMS headers)
- Fixed merge conflicts in s3api_errors.go (SSE-C and SSE-KMS error codes)
- Fixed merge conflicts in s3_sse_c.go (copy strategy constants)
- Fixed merge conflicts in s3api_object_handlers_copy.go (copy strategy usage)

API Restoration:
- Restored BucketMetadata struct with Tags, CORS, and Encryption fields
- Restored structured API functions: GetBucketMetadata, SetBucketMetadata, UpdateBucketMetadata
- Restored helper functions: UpdateBucketTags, UpdateBucketCORS, UpdateBucketEncryption
- Restored clear functions: ClearBucketTags, ClearBucketCORS, ClearBucketEncryption

Handler Updates:
- Updated GetBucketTaggingHandler to use GetBucketMetadata() directly
- Updated PutBucketTaggingHandler to use UpdateBucketTags()
- Updated DeleteBucketTaggingHandler to use ClearBucketTags()
- Updated CORS handlers to use UpdateBucketCORS() and ClearBucketCORS()
- Updated loadCORSFromBucketContent to use GetBucketMetadata()

Internal Function Updates:
- Updated getBucketMetadata() to return *BucketMetadata struct
- Updated setBucketMetadata() to accept *BucketMetadata struct
- Updated getBucketEncryptionMetadata() to use GetBucketMetadata()
- Updated setBucketEncryptionMetadata() to use SetBucketMetadata()

Benefits:
- Resolved all rebase conflicts while preserving both SSE-C and SSE-KMS functionality
- Maintained consistent structured API throughout the codebase
- Eliminated intermediate wrapper functions for cleaner code
- Proper error handling with better granularity
- All tests passing and build successful

The bucket metadata system now uses a unified, type-safe, structured API
that supports tags, CORS, and encryption configuration consistently.

* Fix updateEncryptionConfiguration for first-time bucket encryption setup

- Change getBucketEncryptionMetadata to getBucketMetadata to avoid failures when no encryption config exists
- Change setBucketEncryptionMetadata to setBucketMetadataWithEncryption for consistency
- This fixes the critical issue where bucket encryption configuration failed for buckets without existing encryption

Fixes: https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/pull/7144#discussion_r2285669572

* Fix rebase conflicts and maintain structured BucketMetadata API

Resolved Conflicts:
- Fixed merge conflicts in s3api_bucket_config.go between structured API (HEAD) and old intermediate functions
- Kept modern structured API approach: UpdateBucketCORS, ClearBucketCORS, UpdateBucketEncryption
- Removed old intermediate functions: setBucketTags, deleteBucketTags, setBucketMetadataWithEncryption

API Consistency Maintained:
- updateCORSConfiguration: Uses UpdateBucketCORS() directly
- removeCORSConfiguration: Uses ClearBucketCORS() directly
- updateEncryptionConfiguration: Uses UpdateBucketEncryption() directly
- All structured API functions preserved: GetBucketMetadata, SetBucketMetadata, UpdateBucketMetadata

Benefits:
- Maintains clean separation between API layers
- Preserves atomic metadata updates with proper error handling
- Eliminates function indirection for better performance
- Consistent API usage pattern throughout codebase
- All tests passing and build successful

The bucket metadata system continues to use the unified, type-safe, structured API
that properly handles tags, CORS, and encryption configuration without any
intermediate wrapper functions.

* Fix complex rebase conflicts and maintain clean structured BucketMetadata API

Resolved Complex Conflicts:
- Fixed merge conflicts between modern structured API (HEAD) and mixed approach
- Removed duplicate function declarations that caused compilation errors
- Consistently chose structured API approach over intermediate functions

Fixed Functions:
- BucketMetadata struct: Maintained clean field alignment
- loadCORSFromBucketContent: Uses GetBucketMetadata() directly
- updateCORSConfiguration: Uses UpdateBucketCORS() directly
- removeCORSConfiguration: Uses ClearBucketCORS() directly
- getBucketMetadata: Returns *BucketMetadata struct consistently
- setBucketMetadata: Accepts *BucketMetadata struct consistently

Removed Duplicates:
- Eliminated duplicate GetBucketMetadata implementations
- Eliminated duplicate SetBucketMetadata implementations
- Eliminated duplicate UpdateBucketMetadata implementations
- Eliminated duplicate helper functions (UpdateBucketTags, etc.)

API Consistency Achieved:
- Single, unified BucketMetadata struct for all operations
- Atomic updates through UpdateBucketMetadata with function callbacks
- Type-safe operations with proper error handling
- No intermediate wrapper functions cluttering the API

Benefits:
- Clean, maintainable codebase with no function duplication
- Consistent structured API usage throughout all bucket operations
- Proper error handling and type safety
- Build successful and all tests passing

The bucket metadata system now has a completely clean, structured API
without any conflicts, duplicates, or inconsistencies.

* Update remaining functions to use new structured BucketMetadata APIs directly

Updated functions to follow the pattern established in bucket config:
- getEncryptionConfiguration() -> Uses GetBucketMetadata() directly
- removeEncryptionConfiguration() -> Uses ClearBucketEncryption() directly

Benefits:
- Consistent API usage pattern across all bucket metadata operations
- Simpler, more readable code that leverages the structured API
- Eliminates calls to intermediate legacy functions
- Better error handling and logging consistency
- All tests pass with improved functionality

This completes the transition to using the new structured BucketMetadata API
throughout the entire bucket configuration and encryption subsystem.

* Fix GitHub PR #7144 code review comments

Address all code review comments from Gemini Code Assist bot:

1. **High Priority - SSE-KMS Key Validation**: Fixed ValidateSSEKMSKey to allow empty KMS key ID
   - Empty key ID now indicates use of default KMS key (consistent with AWS behavior)
   - Updated ParseSSEKMSHeaders to call validation after parsing
   - Enhanced isValidKMSKeyID to reject keys with spaces and invalid characters

2. **Medium Priority - KMS Registry Error Handling**: Improved error collection in CloseAll
   - Now collects all provider close errors instead of only returning the last one
   - Uses proper error formatting with %w verb for error wrapping
   - Returns single error for one failure, combined message for multiple failures

3. **Medium Priority - Local KMS Aliases Consistency**: Fixed alias handling in CreateKey
   - Now updates the aliases slice in-place to maintain consistency
   - Ensures both p.keys map and key.Aliases slice use the same prefixed format

All changes maintain backward compatibility and improve error handling robustness.
Tests updated and passing for all scenarios including edge cases.

* Use errors.Join for KMS registry error handling

Replace manual string building with the more idiomatic errors.Join function:

- Removed manual error message concatenation with strings.Builder
- Simplified error handling logic by using errors.Join(allErrors...)
- Removed unnecessary string import
- Added errors import for errors.Join

This approach is cleaner, more idiomatic, and automatically handles:
- Returning nil for empty error slice
- Returning single error for one-element slice
- Properly formatting multiple errors with newlines

The errors.Join function was introduced in Go 1.20 and is the
recommended way to combine multiple errors.

* Update registry.go

* Fix GitHub PR #7144 latest review comments

Address all new code review comments from Gemini Code Assist bot:

1. **High Priority - SSE-KMS Detection Logic**: Tightened IsSSEKMSEncrypted function
   - Now relies only on the canonical x-amz-server-side-encryption header
   - Removed redundant check for x-amz-encrypted-data-key metadata
   - Prevents misinterpretation of objects with inconsistent metadata state
   - Updated test case to reflect correct behavior (encrypted data key only = false)

2. **Medium Priority - UUID Validation**: Enhanced KMS key ID validation
   - Replaced simplistic length/hyphen count check with proper regex validation
   - Added regexp import for robust UUID format checking
   - Regex pattern: ^[a-fA-F0-9]{8}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{4}-[a-fA-F0-9]{12}$
   - Prevents invalid formats like '------------------------------------' from passing

3. **Medium Priority - Alias Mutation Fix**: Avoided input slice modification
   - Changed CreateKey to not mutate the input aliases slice in-place
   - Uses local variable for modified alias to prevent side effects
   - Maintains backward compatibility while being safer for callers

All changes improve code robustness and follow AWS S3 standards more closely.
Tests updated and passing for all scenarios including edge cases.

* Fix failing SSE tests

Address two failing test cases:

1. **TestSSEHeaderConflicts**: Fixed SSE-C and SSE-KMS mutual exclusion
   - Modified IsSSECRequest to return false if SSE-KMS headers are present
   - Modified IsSSEKMSRequest to return false if SSE-C headers are present
   - This prevents both detection functions from returning true simultaneously
   - Aligns with AWS S3 behavior where SSE-C and SSE-KMS are mutually exclusive

2. **TestBucketEncryptionEdgeCases**: Fixed XML namespace validation
   - Added namespace validation in encryptionConfigFromXMLBytes function
   - Now rejects XML with invalid namespaces (only allows empty or AWS standard namespace)
   - Validates XMLName.Space to ensure proper XML structure
   - Prevents acceptance of malformed XML with incorrect namespaces

Both fixes improve compliance with AWS S3 standards and prevent invalid
configurations from being accepted. All SSE and bucket encryption tests
now pass successfully.

* Fix GitHub PR #7144 latest review comments

Address two new code review comments from Gemini Code Assist bot:

1. **High Priority - Race Condition in UpdateBucketMetadata**: Fixed thread safety issue
   - Added per-bucket locking mechanism to prevent race conditions
   - Introduced bucketMetadataLocks map with RWMutex for each bucket
   - Added getBucketMetadataLock helper with double-checked locking pattern
   - UpdateBucketMetadata now uses bucket-specific locks to serialize metadata updates
   - Prevents last-writer-wins scenarios when concurrent requests update different metadata parts

2. **Medium Priority - KMS Key ARN Validation**: Improved robustness of ARN validation
   - Enhanced isValidKMSKeyID function to strictly validate ARN structure
   - Changed from 'len(parts) >= 6' to 'len(parts) != 6' for exact part count
   - Added proper resource validation for key/ and alias/ prefixes
   - Prevents malformed ARNs with incorrect structure from being accepted
   - Now validates: arn:aws:kms:region:account:key/keyid or arn:aws:kms:region:account:alias/aliasname

Both fixes improve system reliability and prevent edge cases that could cause
data corruption or security issues. All existing tests continue to pass.

* format

* address comments

* Configuration Adapter

* Regex Optimization

* Caching Integration

* add negative cache for non-existent buckets

* remove bucketMetadataLocks

* address comments

* address comments

* copying objects with sse-kms

* copying strategy

* store IV in entry metadata

* implement compression reader

* extract json map as sse kms context

* bucket key

* comments

* rotate sse chunks

* KMS Data Keys use AES-GCM + nonce

* add comments

* Update weed/s3api/s3_sse_kms.go

Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update s3api_object_handlers_put.go

* get IV from response header

* set sse headers

* Update s3api_object_handlers.go

* deterministic JSON marshaling

* store iv in entry metadata

* address comments

* not used

* store iv in destination metadata

ensures that SSE-C copy operations with re-encryption (decrypt/re-encrypt scenario) now properly store the destination encryption metadata

* add todo

* address comments

* SSE-S3 Deserialization

* add BucketKMSCache to BucketConfig

* fix test compilation

* already not empty

* use constants

* fix: critical metadata (encrypted data keys, encryption context, etc.) was never stored during PUT/copy operations

* address comments

* fix tests

* Fix SSE-KMS Copy Re-encryption

* Cache now persists across requests

* fix test

* iv in metadata only

* SSE-KMS copy operations should follow the same pattern as SSE-C

* fix size overhead calculation

* Filer-Side SSE Metadata Processing

* SSE Integration Tests

* fix tests

* clean up

* Update s3_sse_multipart_test.go

* add s3 sse tests

* unused

* add logs

* Update Makefile

* Update Makefile

* s3 health check

* The tests were failing because they tried to run both SSE-C and SSE-KMS tests

* Update weed/s3api/s3_sse_c.go

Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update Makefile

* add back

* Update Makefile

* address comments

* fix tests

* Update s3-sse-tests.yml

* Update s3-sse-tests.yml

* fix sse-kms for PUT operation

* IV

* Update auth_credentials.go

* fix multipart with kms

* constants

* multipart sse kms

Modified handleSSEKMSResponse to detect multipart SSE-KMS objects
Added createMultipartSSEKMSDecryptedReader to handle each chunk independently
Each chunk now gets its own decrypted reader before combining into the final stream

* validate key id

* add SSEType

* permissive kms key format

* Update s3_sse_kms_test.go

* format

* assert equal

* uploading SSE-KMS metadata per chunk

* persist sse type and metadata

* avoid re-chunk multipart uploads

* decryption process to use stored PartOffset values

* constants

* sse-c multipart upload

* Unified Multipart SSE Copy

* purge

* fix fatalf

* avoid io.MultiReader which does not close underlying readers

* unified cross-encryption

* fix Single-object SSE-C

* adjust constants

* range read sse files

* remove debug logs

---------

Co-authored-by: gemini-code-assist[bot] <176961590+gemini-code-assist[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Chris Lu
2025-08-21 08:28:07 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 111fc5c054
commit b7b73016dd
59 changed files with 14036 additions and 436 deletions

View File

@@ -2,11 +2,13 @@ package s3api
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -328,9 +330,41 @@ func (s3a *S3ApiServer) GetObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
destUrl = s3a.toFilerUrl(bucket, object)
}
// Check if this is a range request to an SSE object and modify the approach
originalRangeHeader := r.Header.Get("Range")
var sseObject = false
// Pre-check if this object is SSE encrypted to avoid filer range conflicts
if originalRangeHeader != "" {
bucket, object := s3_constants.GetBucketAndObject(r)
objectPath := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s%s", s3a.option.BucketsPath, bucket, object)
if objectEntry, err := s3a.getEntry("", objectPath); err == nil {
primarySSEType := s3a.detectPrimarySSEType(objectEntry)
if primarySSEType == "SSE-C" || primarySSEType == "SSE-KMS" {
sseObject = true
// Temporarily remove Range header to get full encrypted data from filer
r.Header.Del("Range")
}
}
}
s3a.proxyToFiler(w, r, destUrl, false, func(proxyResponse *http.Response, w http.ResponseWriter) (statusCode int, bytesTransferred int64) {
// Handle SSE-C decryption if needed
return s3a.handleSSECResponse(r, proxyResponse, w)
// Restore the original Range header for SSE processing
if sseObject && originalRangeHeader != "" {
r.Header.Set("Range", originalRangeHeader)
}
// Add SSE metadata headers based on object metadata before SSE processing
bucket, object := s3_constants.GetBucketAndObject(r)
objectPath := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s%s", s3a.option.BucketsPath, bucket, object)
if objectEntry, err := s3a.getEntry("", objectPath); err == nil {
s3a.addSSEHeadersToResponse(proxyResponse, objectEntry)
}
// Handle SSE decryption (both SSE-C and SSE-KMS) if needed
return s3a.handleSSEResponse(r, proxyResponse, w)
})
}
@@ -427,8 +461,8 @@ func (s3a *S3ApiServer) HeadObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request
}
s3a.proxyToFiler(w, r, destUrl, false, func(proxyResponse *http.Response, w http.ResponseWriter) (statusCode int, bytesTransferred int64) {
// Handle SSE-C validation for HEAD requests
return s3a.handleSSECResponse(r, proxyResponse, w)
// Handle SSE validation (both SSE-C and SSE-KMS) for HEAD requests
return s3a.handleSSEResponse(r, proxyResponse, w)
})
}
@@ -625,15 +659,95 @@ func (s3a *S3ApiServer) handleSSECResponse(r *http.Request, proxyResponse *http.
return http.StatusForbidden, 0
}
// SSE-C encrypted objects do not support HTTP Range requests because the 16-byte IV
// is required at the beginning of the stream for proper decryption
if r.Header.Get("Range") != "" {
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInvalidRange)
return http.StatusRequestedRangeNotSatisfiable, 0
// SSE-C encrypted objects support HTTP Range requests
// The IV is stored in metadata and CTR mode allows seeking to any offset
// Range requests will be handled by the filer layer with proper offset-based decryption
// Check if this is a chunked or small content SSE-C object
bucket, object := s3_constants.GetBucketAndObject(r)
objectPath := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s%s", s3a.option.BucketsPath, bucket, object)
if entry, err := s3a.getEntry("", objectPath); err == nil {
// Check for SSE-C chunks
sseCChunks := 0
for _, chunk := range entry.GetChunks() {
if chunk.GetSseType() == filer_pb.SSEType_SSE_C {
sseCChunks++
}
}
if sseCChunks >= 1 {
// Handle chunked SSE-C objects - each chunk needs independent decryption
multipartReader, decErr := s3a.createMultipartSSECDecryptedReader(r, proxyResponse)
if decErr != nil {
glog.Errorf("Failed to create multipart SSE-C decrypted reader: %v", decErr)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return http.StatusInternalServerError, 0
}
// Capture existing CORS headers
capturedCORSHeaders := captureCORSHeaders(w, corsHeaders)
// Copy headers from proxy response
for k, v := range proxyResponse.Header {
w.Header()[k] = v
}
// Set proper headers for range requests
rangeHeader := r.Header.Get("Range")
if rangeHeader != "" {
// Parse range header (e.g., "bytes=0-99")
if len(rangeHeader) > 6 && rangeHeader[:6] == "bytes=" {
rangeSpec := rangeHeader[6:]
parts := strings.Split(rangeSpec, "-")
if len(parts) == 2 {
startOffset, endOffset := int64(0), int64(-1)
if parts[0] != "" {
startOffset, _ = strconv.ParseInt(parts[0], 10, 64)
}
if parts[1] != "" {
endOffset, _ = strconv.ParseInt(parts[1], 10, 64)
}
if endOffset >= startOffset {
// Specific range - set proper Content-Length and Content-Range headers
rangeLength := endOffset - startOffset + 1
totalSize := proxyResponse.Header.Get("Content-Length")
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.FormatInt(rangeLength, 10))
w.Header().Set("Content-Range", fmt.Sprintf("bytes %d-%d/%s", startOffset, endOffset, totalSize))
// writeFinalResponse will set status to 206 if Content-Range is present
}
}
}
}
return writeFinalResponse(w, proxyResponse, multipartReader, capturedCORSHeaders)
} else if len(entry.GetChunks()) == 0 && len(entry.Content) > 0 {
// Small content SSE-C object stored directly in entry.Content
// Fall through to traditional single-object SSE-C handling below
}
}
// Create decrypted reader
decryptedReader, decErr := CreateSSECDecryptedReader(proxyResponse.Body, customerKey)
// Single-part SSE-C object: Get IV from proxy response headers (stored during upload)
ivBase64 := proxyResponse.Header.Get(s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSEIVHeader)
if ivBase64 == "" {
glog.Errorf("SSE-C encrypted single-part object missing IV in metadata")
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return http.StatusInternalServerError, 0
}
iv, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(ivBase64)
if err != nil {
glog.Errorf("Failed to decode IV from metadata: %v", err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return http.StatusInternalServerError, 0
}
// Create decrypted reader with IV from metadata
decryptedReader, decErr := CreateSSECDecryptedReader(proxyResponse.Body, customerKey, iv)
if decErr != nil {
glog.Errorf("Failed to create SSE-C decrypted reader: %v", decErr)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
@@ -651,23 +765,12 @@ func (s3a *S3ApiServer) handleSSECResponse(r *http.Request, proxyResponse *http.
}
// Set correct Content-Length for SSE-C (only for full object requests)
// Range requests are complex with SSE-C because the entire object needs decryption
// With IV stored in metadata, the encrypted length equals the original length
if proxyResponse.Header.Get("Content-Range") == "" {
// Full object request: subtract 16-byte IV from encrypted length
// Full object request: encrypted length equals original length (IV not in stream)
if contentLengthStr := proxyResponse.Header.Get("Content-Length"); contentLengthStr != "" {
encryptedLength, err := strconv.ParseInt(contentLengthStr, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
glog.Errorf("Invalid Content-Length header for SSE-C object: %v", err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return http.StatusInternalServerError, 0
}
originalLength := encryptedLength - 16
if originalLength < 0 {
glog.Errorf("Encrypted object length (%d) is less than IV size (16 bytes)", encryptedLength)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return http.StatusInternalServerError, 0
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.FormatInt(originalLength, 10))
// Content-Length is already correct since IV is stored in metadata, not in data stream
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", contentLengthStr)
}
}
// For range requests, let the actual bytes transferred determine the response length
@@ -689,6 +792,160 @@ func (s3a *S3ApiServer) handleSSECResponse(r *http.Request, proxyResponse *http.
}
}
// handleSSEResponse handles both SSE-C and SSE-KMS decryption/validation and response processing
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) handleSSEResponse(r *http.Request, proxyResponse *http.Response, w http.ResponseWriter) (statusCode int, bytesTransferred int64) {
// Check what the client is expecting based on request headers
clientExpectsSSEC := IsSSECRequest(r)
// Check what the stored object has in headers (may be conflicting after copy)
kmsMetadataHeader := proxyResponse.Header.Get(s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSEKMSKeyHeader)
sseAlgorithm := proxyResponse.Header.Get(s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerAlgorithm)
// Get actual object state by examining chunks (most reliable for cross-encryption)
bucket, object := s3_constants.GetBucketAndObject(r)
objectPath := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s%s", s3a.option.BucketsPath, bucket, object)
actualObjectType := "Unknown"
if objectEntry, err := s3a.getEntry("", objectPath); err == nil {
actualObjectType = s3a.detectPrimarySSEType(objectEntry)
}
// Route based on ACTUAL object type (from chunks) rather than conflicting headers
if actualObjectType == "SSE-C" && clientExpectsSSEC {
// Object is SSE-C and client expects SSE-C → SSE-C handler
return s3a.handleSSECResponse(r, proxyResponse, w)
} else if actualObjectType == "SSE-KMS" && !clientExpectsSSEC {
// Object is SSE-KMS and client doesn't expect SSE-C → SSE-KMS handler
return s3a.handleSSEKMSResponse(r, proxyResponse, w, kmsMetadataHeader)
} else if actualObjectType == "None" && !clientExpectsSSEC {
// Object is unencrypted and client doesn't expect SSE-C → pass through
return passThroughResponse(proxyResponse, w)
} else if actualObjectType == "SSE-C" && !clientExpectsSSEC {
// Object is SSE-C but client doesn't provide SSE-C headers → Error
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrSSECustomerKeyMissing)
return http.StatusBadRequest, 0
} else if actualObjectType == "SSE-KMS" && clientExpectsSSEC {
// Object is SSE-KMS but client provides SSE-C headers → Error
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrSSECustomerKeyMissing)
return http.StatusBadRequest, 0
} else if actualObjectType == "None" && clientExpectsSSEC {
// Object is unencrypted but client provides SSE-C headers → Error
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrSSECustomerKeyMissing)
return http.StatusBadRequest, 0
}
// Fallback for edge cases - use original logic with header-based detection
if clientExpectsSSEC && sseAlgorithm != "" {
return s3a.handleSSECResponse(r, proxyResponse, w)
} else if !clientExpectsSSEC && kmsMetadataHeader != "" {
return s3a.handleSSEKMSResponse(r, proxyResponse, w, kmsMetadataHeader)
} else {
return passThroughResponse(proxyResponse, w)
}
}
// handleSSEKMSResponse handles SSE-KMS decryption and response processing
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) handleSSEKMSResponse(r *http.Request, proxyResponse *http.Response, w http.ResponseWriter, kmsMetadataHeader string) (statusCode int, bytesTransferred int64) {
// Deserialize SSE-KMS metadata
kmsMetadataBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(kmsMetadataHeader)
if err != nil {
glog.Errorf("Failed to decode SSE-KMS metadata: %v", err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return http.StatusInternalServerError, 0
}
sseKMSKey, err := DeserializeSSEKMSMetadata(kmsMetadataBytes)
if err != nil {
glog.Errorf("Failed to deserialize SSE-KMS metadata: %v", err)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return http.StatusInternalServerError, 0
}
// For HEAD requests, we don't need to decrypt the body, just add response headers
if r.Method == "HEAD" {
// Capture existing CORS headers that may have been set by middleware
capturedCORSHeaders := captureCORSHeaders(w, corsHeaders)
// Copy headers from proxy response
for k, v := range proxyResponse.Header {
w.Header()[k] = v
}
// Add SSE-KMS response headers
AddSSEKMSResponseHeaders(w, sseKMSKey)
return writeFinalResponse(w, proxyResponse, proxyResponse.Body, capturedCORSHeaders)
}
// For GET requests, check if this is a multipart SSE-KMS object
// We need to check the object structure to determine if it's multipart encrypted
isMultipartSSEKMS := false
if sseKMSKey != nil {
// Get the object entry to check chunk structure
bucket, object := s3_constants.GetBucketAndObject(r)
objectPath := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s%s", s3a.option.BucketsPath, bucket, object)
if entry, err := s3a.getEntry("", objectPath); err == nil {
// Check for multipart SSE-KMS
sseKMSChunks := 0
for _, chunk := range entry.GetChunks() {
if chunk.GetSseType() == filer_pb.SSEType_SSE_KMS && len(chunk.GetSseKmsMetadata()) > 0 {
sseKMSChunks++
}
}
isMultipartSSEKMS = sseKMSChunks > 1
glog.Infof("SSE-KMS object detection: chunks=%d, sseKMSChunks=%d, isMultipartSSEKMS=%t",
len(entry.GetChunks()), sseKMSChunks, isMultipartSSEKMS)
}
}
var decryptedReader io.Reader
if isMultipartSSEKMS {
// Handle multipart SSE-KMS objects - each chunk needs independent decryption
multipartReader, decErr := s3a.createMultipartSSEKMSDecryptedReader(r, proxyResponse)
if decErr != nil {
glog.Errorf("Failed to create multipart SSE-KMS decrypted reader: %v", decErr)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return http.StatusInternalServerError, 0
}
decryptedReader = multipartReader
glog.V(3).Infof("Using multipart SSE-KMS decryption for object")
} else {
// Handle single-part SSE-KMS objects
singlePartReader, decErr := CreateSSEKMSDecryptedReader(proxyResponse.Body, sseKMSKey)
if decErr != nil {
glog.Errorf("Failed to create SSE-KMS decrypted reader: %v", decErr)
s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, s3err.ErrInternalError)
return http.StatusInternalServerError, 0
}
decryptedReader = singlePartReader
glog.V(3).Infof("Using single-part SSE-KMS decryption for object")
}
// Capture existing CORS headers that may have been set by middleware
capturedCORSHeaders := captureCORSHeaders(w, corsHeaders)
// Copy headers from proxy response (excluding body-related headers that might change)
for k, v := range proxyResponse.Header {
if k != "Content-Length" && k != "Content-Encoding" {
w.Header()[k] = v
}
}
// Set correct Content-Length for SSE-KMS
if proxyResponse.Header.Get("Content-Range") == "" {
// For full object requests, encrypted length equals original length
if contentLengthStr := proxyResponse.Header.Get("Content-Length"); contentLengthStr != "" {
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", contentLengthStr)
}
}
// Add SSE-KMS response headers
AddSSEKMSResponseHeaders(w, sseKMSKey)
return writeFinalResponse(w, proxyResponse, decryptedReader, capturedCORSHeaders)
}
// addObjectLockHeadersToResponse extracts object lock metadata from entry Extended attributes
// and adds the appropriate S3 headers to the response
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) addObjectLockHeadersToResponse(w http.ResponseWriter, entry *filer_pb.Entry) {
@@ -729,3 +986,433 @@ func (s3a *S3ApiServer) addObjectLockHeadersToResponse(w http.ResponseWriter, en
w.Header().Set(s3_constants.AmzObjectLockLegalHold, s3_constants.LegalHoldOff)
}
}
// addSSEHeadersToResponse converts stored SSE metadata from entry.Extended to HTTP response headers
// Uses intelligent prioritization: only set headers for the PRIMARY encryption type to avoid conflicts
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) addSSEHeadersToResponse(proxyResponse *http.Response, entry *filer_pb.Entry) {
if entry == nil || entry.Extended == nil {
return
}
// Determine the primary encryption type by examining chunks (most reliable)
primarySSEType := s3a.detectPrimarySSEType(entry)
// Only set headers for the PRIMARY encryption type
switch primarySSEType {
case "SSE-C":
// Add only SSE-C headers
if algorithmBytes, exists := entry.Extended[s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerAlgorithm]; exists && len(algorithmBytes) > 0 {
proxyResponse.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerAlgorithm, string(algorithmBytes))
}
if keyMD5Bytes, exists := entry.Extended[s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerKeyMD5]; exists && len(keyMD5Bytes) > 0 {
proxyResponse.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerKeyMD5, string(keyMD5Bytes))
}
if ivBytes, exists := entry.Extended[s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSEIV]; exists && len(ivBytes) > 0 {
ivBase64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ivBytes)
proxyResponse.Header.Set(s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSEIVHeader, ivBase64)
}
case "SSE-KMS":
// Add only SSE-KMS headers
if sseAlgorithm, exists := entry.Extended[s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryption]; exists && len(sseAlgorithm) > 0 {
proxyResponse.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryption, string(sseAlgorithm))
}
if kmsKeyID, exists := entry.Extended[s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryptionAwsKmsKeyId]; exists && len(kmsKeyID) > 0 {
proxyResponse.Header.Set(s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryptionAwsKmsKeyId, string(kmsKeyID))
}
default:
// Unencrypted or unknown - don't set any SSE headers
}
glog.V(3).Infof("addSSEHeadersToResponse: processed %d extended metadata entries", len(entry.Extended))
}
// detectPrimarySSEType determines the primary SSE type by examining chunk metadata
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) detectPrimarySSEType(entry *filer_pb.Entry) string {
if len(entry.GetChunks()) == 0 {
// No chunks - check object-level metadata only (single objects or smallContent)
hasSSEC := entry.Extended[s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerAlgorithm] != nil
hasSSEKMS := entry.Extended[s3_constants.AmzServerSideEncryption] != nil
if hasSSEC && !hasSSEKMS {
return "SSE-C"
} else if hasSSEKMS && !hasSSEC {
return "SSE-KMS"
} else if hasSSEC && hasSSEKMS {
// Both present - this should only happen during cross-encryption copies
// Use content to determine actual encryption state
if len(entry.Content) > 0 {
// smallContent - check if it's encrypted (heuristic: random-looking data)
return "SSE-C" // Default to SSE-C for mixed case
} else {
// No content, both headers - default to SSE-C
return "SSE-C"
}
}
return "None"
}
// Count chunk types to determine primary (multipart objects)
ssecChunks := 0
ssekmsChunks := 0
for _, chunk := range entry.GetChunks() {
switch chunk.GetSseType() {
case filer_pb.SSEType_SSE_C:
ssecChunks++
case filer_pb.SSEType_SSE_KMS:
ssekmsChunks++
}
}
// Primary type is the one with more chunks
if ssecChunks > ssekmsChunks {
return "SSE-C"
} else if ssekmsChunks > ssecChunks {
return "SSE-KMS"
} else if ssecChunks > 0 {
// Equal number, prefer SSE-C (shouldn't happen in practice)
return "SSE-C"
}
return "None"
}
// createMultipartSSEKMSDecryptedReader creates a reader that decrypts each chunk independently for multipart SSE-KMS objects
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) createMultipartSSEKMSDecryptedReader(r *http.Request, proxyResponse *http.Response) (io.Reader, error) {
// Get the object path from the request
bucket, object := s3_constants.GetBucketAndObject(r)
objectPath := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s%s", s3a.option.BucketsPath, bucket, object)
// Get the object entry from filer to access chunk information
entry, err := s3a.getEntry("", objectPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get object entry for multipart SSE-KMS decryption: %v", err)
}
// Sort chunks by offset to ensure correct order
chunks := entry.GetChunks()
sort.Slice(chunks, func(i, j int) bool {
return chunks[i].GetOffset() < chunks[j].GetOffset()
})
// Create readers for each chunk, decrypting them independently
var readers []io.Reader
for i, chunk := range chunks {
glog.Infof("Processing chunk %d/%d: fileId=%s, offset=%d, size=%d, sse_type=%d",
i+1, len(entry.GetChunks()), chunk.GetFileIdString(), chunk.GetOffset(), chunk.GetSize(), chunk.GetSseType())
// Get this chunk's encrypted data
chunkReader, err := s3a.createEncryptedChunkReader(chunk)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create chunk reader: %v", err)
}
// Get SSE-KMS metadata for this chunk
var chunkSSEKMSKey *SSEKMSKey
// Check if this chunk has per-chunk SSE-KMS metadata (new architecture)
if chunk.GetSseType() == filer_pb.SSEType_SSE_KMS && len(chunk.GetSseKmsMetadata()) > 0 {
// Use the per-chunk SSE-KMS metadata
kmsKey, err := DeserializeSSEKMSMetadata(chunk.GetSseKmsMetadata())
if err != nil {
glog.Errorf("Failed to deserialize per-chunk SSE-KMS metadata for chunk %s: %v", chunk.GetFileIdString(), err)
} else {
// ChunkOffset is already set from the stored metadata (PartOffset)
chunkSSEKMSKey = kmsKey
glog.Infof("Using per-chunk SSE-KMS metadata for chunk %s: keyID=%s, IV=%x, partOffset=%d",
chunk.GetFileIdString(), kmsKey.KeyID, kmsKey.IV[:8], kmsKey.ChunkOffset)
}
}
// Fallback to object-level metadata (legacy support)
if chunkSSEKMSKey == nil {
objectMetadataHeader := proxyResponse.Header.Get(s3_constants.SeaweedFSSSEKMSKeyHeader)
if objectMetadataHeader != "" {
kmsMetadataBytes, decodeErr := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(objectMetadataHeader)
if decodeErr == nil {
kmsKey, _ := DeserializeSSEKMSMetadata(kmsMetadataBytes)
if kmsKey != nil {
// For object-level metadata (legacy), use absolute file offset as fallback
kmsKey.ChunkOffset = chunk.GetOffset()
chunkSSEKMSKey = kmsKey
}
glog.Infof("Using fallback object-level SSE-KMS metadata for chunk %s with offset %d", chunk.GetFileIdString(), chunk.GetOffset())
}
}
}
if chunkSSEKMSKey == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no SSE-KMS metadata found for chunk %s in multipart object", chunk.GetFileIdString())
}
// Create decrypted reader for this chunk
decryptedChunkReader, decErr := CreateSSEKMSDecryptedReader(chunkReader, chunkSSEKMSKey)
if decErr != nil {
chunkReader.Close() // Close the chunk reader if decryption fails
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt chunk: %v", decErr)
}
// Use the streaming decrypted reader directly instead of reading into memory
readers = append(readers, decryptedChunkReader)
glog.V(4).Infof("Added streaming decrypted reader for chunk %s in multipart SSE-KMS object", chunk.GetFileIdString())
}
// Combine all decrypted chunk readers into a single stream with proper resource management
multiReader := NewMultipartSSEReader(readers)
glog.V(3).Infof("Created multipart SSE-KMS decrypted reader with %d chunks", len(readers))
return multiReader, nil
}
// createEncryptedChunkReader creates a reader for a single encrypted chunk
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) createEncryptedChunkReader(chunk *filer_pb.FileChunk) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
// Get chunk URL
srcUrl, err := s3a.lookupVolumeUrl(chunk.GetFileIdString())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("lookup volume URL for chunk %s: %v", chunk.GetFileIdString(), err)
}
// Create HTTP request for chunk data
req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", srcUrl, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create HTTP request for chunk: %v", err)
}
// Execute request
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("execute HTTP request for chunk: %v", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
resp.Body.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("HTTP request for chunk failed: %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
return resp.Body, nil
}
// MultipartSSEReader wraps multiple readers and ensures all underlying readers are properly closed
type MultipartSSEReader struct {
multiReader io.Reader
readers []io.Reader
}
// SSERangeReader applies range logic to an underlying reader
type SSERangeReader struct {
reader io.Reader
offset int64 // bytes to skip from the beginning
remaining int64 // bytes remaining to read (-1 for unlimited)
skipped int64 // bytes already skipped
}
// NewMultipartSSEReader creates a new multipart reader that can properly close all underlying readers
func NewMultipartSSEReader(readers []io.Reader) *MultipartSSEReader {
return &MultipartSSEReader{
multiReader: io.MultiReader(readers...),
readers: readers,
}
}
// Read implements the io.Reader interface
func (m *MultipartSSEReader) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
return m.multiReader.Read(p)
}
// Close implements the io.Closer interface and closes all underlying readers that support closing
func (m *MultipartSSEReader) Close() error {
var lastErr error
for i, reader := range m.readers {
if closer, ok := reader.(io.Closer); ok {
if err := closer.Close(); err != nil {
glog.V(2).Infof("Error closing reader %d: %v", i, err)
lastErr = err // Keep track of the last error, but continue closing others
}
}
}
return lastErr
}
// Read implements the io.Reader interface for SSERangeReader
func (r *SSERangeReader) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
// If we need to skip bytes and haven't skipped enough yet
if r.skipped < r.offset {
skipNeeded := r.offset - r.skipped
skipBuf := make([]byte, min(int64(len(p)), skipNeeded))
skipRead, skipErr := r.reader.Read(skipBuf)
r.skipped += int64(skipRead)
if skipErr != nil {
return 0, skipErr
}
// If we still need to skip more, recurse
if r.skipped < r.offset {
return r.Read(p)
}
}
// If we have a remaining limit and it's reached
if r.remaining == 0 {
return 0, io.EOF
}
// Calculate how much to read
readSize := len(p)
if r.remaining > 0 && int64(readSize) > r.remaining {
readSize = int(r.remaining)
}
// Read the data
n, err = r.reader.Read(p[:readSize])
if r.remaining > 0 {
r.remaining -= int64(n)
}
return n, err
}
// createMultipartSSECDecryptedReader creates a decrypted reader for multipart SSE-C objects
// Each chunk has its own IV and encryption key from the original multipart parts
func (s3a *S3ApiServer) createMultipartSSECDecryptedReader(r *http.Request, proxyResponse *http.Response) (io.Reader, error) {
// Parse SSE-C headers from the request for decryption key
customerKey, err := ParseSSECHeaders(r)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid SSE-C headers for multipart decryption: %v", err)
}
// Get the object path from the request
bucket, object := s3_constants.GetBucketAndObject(r)
objectPath := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s%s", s3a.option.BucketsPath, bucket, object)
// Get the object entry from filer to access chunk information
entry, err := s3a.getEntry("", objectPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get object entry for multipart SSE-C decryption: %v", err)
}
// Sort chunks by offset to ensure correct order
chunks := entry.GetChunks()
sort.Slice(chunks, func(i, j int) bool {
return chunks[i].GetOffset() < chunks[j].GetOffset()
})
// Check for Range header to optimize chunk processing
var startOffset, endOffset int64 = 0, -1
rangeHeader := r.Header.Get("Range")
if rangeHeader != "" {
// Parse range header (e.g., "bytes=0-99")
if len(rangeHeader) > 6 && rangeHeader[:6] == "bytes=" {
rangeSpec := rangeHeader[6:]
parts := strings.Split(rangeSpec, "-")
if len(parts) == 2 {
if parts[0] != "" {
startOffset, _ = strconv.ParseInt(parts[0], 10, 64)
}
if parts[1] != "" {
endOffset, _ = strconv.ParseInt(parts[1], 10, 64)
}
}
}
}
// Filter chunks to only those needed for the range request
var neededChunks []*filer_pb.FileChunk
for _, chunk := range chunks {
chunkStart := chunk.GetOffset()
chunkEnd := chunkStart + int64(chunk.GetSize()) - 1
// Check if this chunk overlaps with the requested range
if endOffset == -1 {
// No end specified, take all chunks from startOffset
if chunkEnd >= startOffset {
neededChunks = append(neededChunks, chunk)
}
} else {
// Specific range: check for overlap
if chunkStart <= endOffset && chunkEnd >= startOffset {
neededChunks = append(neededChunks, chunk)
}
}
}
// Create readers for only the needed chunks
var readers []io.Reader
for _, chunk := range neededChunks {
// Get this chunk's encrypted data
chunkReader, err := s3a.createEncryptedChunkReader(chunk)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create chunk reader: %v", err)
}
if chunk.GetSseType() == filer_pb.SSEType_SSE_C {
// For SSE-C chunks, extract the IV from the stored per-chunk metadata (unified approach)
if len(chunk.GetSseKmsMetadata()) > 0 {
// Deserialize the SSE-C metadata stored in the unified metadata field
ssecMetadata, decErr := DeserializeSSECMetadata(chunk.GetSseKmsMetadata())
if decErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to deserialize SSE-C metadata for chunk %s: %v", chunk.GetFileIdString(), decErr)
}
// Decode the IV from the metadata
iv, ivErr := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(ssecMetadata.IV)
if ivErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode IV for SSE-C chunk %s: %v", chunk.GetFileIdString(), ivErr)
}
// Calculate the correct IV for this chunk using within-part offset
var chunkIV []byte
if ssecMetadata.PartOffset > 0 {
chunkIV = calculateIVWithOffset(iv, ssecMetadata.PartOffset)
} else {
chunkIV = iv
}
decryptedReader, decErr := CreateSSECDecryptedReader(chunkReader, customerKey, chunkIV)
if decErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create SSE-C decrypted reader for chunk %s: %v", chunk.GetFileIdString(), decErr)
}
readers = append(readers, decryptedReader)
glog.Infof("Created SSE-C decrypted reader for chunk %s using stored metadata", chunk.GetFileIdString())
} else {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SSE-C chunk %s missing required metadata", chunk.GetFileIdString())
}
} else {
// Non-SSE-C chunk, use as-is
readers = append(readers, chunkReader)
}
}
multiReader := NewMultipartSSEReader(readers)
// Apply range logic if a range was requested
if rangeHeader != "" && startOffset >= 0 {
if endOffset == -1 {
// Open-ended range (e.g., "bytes=100-")
return &SSERangeReader{
reader: multiReader,
offset: startOffset,
remaining: -1, // Read until EOF
}, nil
} else {
// Specific range (e.g., "bytes=0-99")
rangeLength := endOffset - startOffset + 1
return &SSERangeReader{
reader: multiReader,
offset: startOffset,
remaining: rangeLength,
}, nil
}
}
return multiReader, nil
}