Fix STS authorization in streaming/chunked uploads (#7988)
* Fix STS authorization in streaming/chunked uploads During streaming/chunked uploads (SigV4 streaming), authorization happens twice: 1. Initial authorization in authRequestWithAuthType() - works correctly 2. Second authorization in verifyV4Signature() - was failing for STS The issue was that verifyV4Signature() only used identity.canDo() for permission checks, which always denies STS identities (they have empty Actions). This bypassed IAM authorization completely. This commit makes verifyV4Signature() IAM-aware by adding the same fallback logic used in authRequestWithAuthType(): - Traditional identities (with Actions) use legacy canDo() check - STS/JWT identities (empty Actions) fall back to IAM authorization Fixes: https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/pull/7986#issuecomment-3723196038 * Add comprehensive unit tests for STS authorization in streaming uploads Created test suite to verify that verifyV4Signature properly handles STS identities by falling back to IAM authorization when shouldCheckPermissions is true. Tests cover: - STS identities with IAM integration (allow and deny cases) - STS identities without IAM integration (should deny) - Traditional identities with Actions (canDo check) - Permission check bypass when shouldCheckPermissions=false - Specific streaming upload scenario from bug report - Action determination based on HTTP method All tests pass successfully. * Refactor authorization logic to avoid duplication Centralized the authorization logic into IdentityAccessManagement.VerifyActionPermission. Updated auth_signature_v4.go and auth_credentials.go to use this new helper. Updated tests to clarify that they mirror the centralized logic. * Refactor tests to use VerifyActionPermission directly Introduced IAMIntegration interface to facilitate mocking of internal IAM integration logic. Updated IdentityAccessManagement to use the interface. Updated tests to directy call VerifyActionPermission using a mocked IAM integration, eliminating duplicated logic in tests. * fix(s3api): ensure static config file takes precedence and refactor tests - Track if configuration was loaded from a static file using `useStaticConfig`. - Ignore filer-based IAM updates when a static configuration is in use to respect "Highest Priority" rule. - Refactor `TestVerifyV4SignatureWithSTSIdentity` to use `VerifyActionPermission` directly. - Fix typed nil interface panic in authorization test.
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@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ type IdentityAccessManagement struct {
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grpcDialOption grpc.DialOption
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// IAM Integration for advanced features
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iamIntegration *S3IAMIntegration
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iamIntegration IAMIntegration
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// Bucket policy engine for evaluating bucket policies
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policyEngine *BucketPolicyEngine
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@@ -702,18 +702,9 @@ func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authRequestWithAuthType(r *http.Request, ac
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// Only check IAM if bucket policy didn't explicitly allow
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if !policyAllows {
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// Traditional identities (with Actions from -s3.config) use legacy auth,
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// JWT/STS identities (no Actions) use IAM authorization
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if len(identity.Actions) > 0 {
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if !identity.canDo(action, bucket, object) {
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return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
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}
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} else if iam.iamIntegration != nil {
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if errCode := iam.authorizeWithIAM(r, identity, action, bucket, object); errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
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return identity, errCode, reqAuthType
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}
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} else {
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return identity, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, reqAuthType
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// Use centralized permission check
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if errCode := iam.VerifyActionPermission(r, identity, action, bucket, object); errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
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return identity, errCode, reqAuthType
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}
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}
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}
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@@ -990,6 +981,23 @@ func determineIAMAuthPath(sessionToken, principal, principalArn string) iamAuthP
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return iamAuthPathNone
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}
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// VerifyActionPermission checks if the identity is allowed to perform the action on the resource.
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// It handles both traditional identities (via Actions) and IAM/STS identities (via Policy).
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func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) VerifyActionPermission(r *http.Request, identity *Identity, action Action, bucket, object string) s3err.ErrorCode {
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// Traditional identities (with Actions from -s3.config) use legacy auth,
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// JWT/STS identities (no Actions) use IAM authorization
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if len(identity.Actions) > 0 {
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if !identity.canDo(action, bucket, object) {
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return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
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}
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return s3err.ErrNone
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} else if iam.iamIntegration != nil {
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return iam.authorizeWithIAM(r, identity, action, bucket, object)
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}
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return s3err.ErrAccessDenied
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}
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// authorizeWithIAM authorizes requests using the IAM integration policy engine
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func (iam *IdentityAccessManagement) authorizeWithIAM(r *http.Request, identity *Identity, action Action, bucket string, object string) s3err.ErrorCode {
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ctx := r.Context()
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