s3api/policy_engine: use forwarded client IP for aws:SourceIp (#8304)

* s3api: honor forwarded source IP for policy conditions

Prefer X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-Ip before RemoteAddr when populating aws:SourceIp in policy condition evaluation. Also avoid noisy parsing behavior for unix socket markers and add coverage for precedence/fallback paths.\n\nFixes #8301.

* s3api: simplify remote addr parsing

* s3api: guard aws:SourceIp against DNS hosts

* s3api: simplify remote addr fallback

* s3api: simplify remote addr parsing

* Update weed/s3api/policy_engine/engine.go

Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Fix TestExtractConditionValuesFromRequestSourceIPPrecedence using trusted private IP

* Refactor extractSourceIP to use R-to-L XFF parsing and net.IP.IsPrivate

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Chris Lu
2026-02-11 12:47:03 -08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 7151181d54
commit 8b5d31e5eb
2 changed files with 179 additions and 9 deletions

View File

@@ -458,6 +458,89 @@ func TestExtractConditionValuesFromRequest(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestExtractConditionValuesFromRequestSourceIPPrecedence(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
header map[string][]string
remoteAddr string
expectedIP string
}{
{
name: "uses right-most public X-Forwarded-For entry",
header: map[string][]string{
"X-Forwarded-For": {"bad-ip, 203.0.113.10, 198.51.100.5"},
},
remoteAddr: "192.168.1.100:12345",
expectedIP: "198.51.100.5",
},
{
name: "falls back to X-Real-Ip when X-Forwarded-For has no valid ip",
header: map[string][]string{
"X-Forwarded-For": {"bad-ip"},
"X-Real-Ip": {"198.51.100.7"},
},
remoteAddr: "192.168.1.100:12345",
expectedIP: "198.51.100.7",
},
{
name: "uses RemoteAddr ip when no forwarding headers",
header: map[string][]string{},
remoteAddr: "192.168.1.100:12345",
expectedIP: "192.168.1.100",
},
{
name: "keeps unix socket marker when RemoteAddr is not an ip",
header: map[string][]string{},
remoteAddr: "@",
expectedIP: "@",
},
{
name: "uses IPv6 X-Forwarded-For entry",
header: map[string][]string{
"X-Forwarded-For": {"2001:db8::8, 198.51.100.7"},
},
remoteAddr: "192.168.1.100:12345",
expectedIP: "198.51.100.7",
},
{
name: "ignores spoofed IP when real client is public",
header: map[string][]string{
"X-Forwarded-For": {"8.8.8.8, 203.0.113.10, 10.0.0.1"},
},
remoteAddr: "192.168.1.100:12345",
expectedIP: "203.0.113.10",
},
{
name: "handles bracketed IPv6 remote address",
header: map[string][]string{},
remoteAddr: "[2001:db8::1]:12345",
expectedIP: "2001:db8::1",
},
{
name: "avoids returning DNS host names",
header: map[string][]string{},
remoteAddr: "example.com:9000",
expectedIP: "",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
req := &http.Request{
Method: "GET",
URL: &url.URL{Path: "/"},
Header: tt.header,
RemoteAddr: tt.remoteAddr,
}
values := ExtractConditionValuesFromRequest(req)
if len(values["aws:SourceIp"]) != 1 || values["aws:SourceIp"][0] != tt.expectedIP {
t.Errorf("Expected SourceIp %q, got %v", tt.expectedIP, values["aws:SourceIp"])
}
})
}
}
func TestPolicyEvaluationWithConditions(t *testing.T) {
engine := NewPolicyEngine()